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INTRODUCTION TO PORTFOLIO
This portfolio represents a selection of work carried out in partial fulfilment for the 
Practitioner Doctorate in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology at the University 
of Surrey. It incorporates an academic dossier, a therapeutic practice dossier and a 
research dossier. Each dossier reflects my personal progression through the three years of 
training and therefore indicates my developing views.
The portfolio includes confidential work and so throughout the anonymity of all people 
and places are protected. Therefore personal details, such as names of people, places and 
any other identifiable characteristics have been omitted or altered.
ACADEMIC DOSSIER
INTRODUCTION TO DOSSIER
The Academic dossier incorporates four papers from work submitted throughout the three 
years. The first two papers are a selection of the papers which make up the Advanced 
Theory and Therapy Course. The third paper is the Third Year Option Course and the 
fourth paper in the academic dossier is selected from the Context of Counselling 
Psychology Course.
The Psychoanalytic Idea of Countertransference as an Aspect of the Therapeutic 
Relationship
Although the therapeutic relationship comprises of a multitude of aspects, Snyder and 
Snyder (1961) suggest that it is fundamentally “a sort of mathematical relation between 
transference and countertransference attitudes” (p.56). Balint and Balint (1939) go one 
step further by explaining that the therapeutic relationship not only involves an interplay 
between the client’s transferences and the analyst’s countertransferences, but that it is 
complicated by “the reactions released in each by the other’s transferences on to him” 
(p.228). This essay will examine one aspect of this mathematical relation or interplay, 
namely countertransference, for no greater reason than the fact that throughout the 
psychoanalytic literature it has been so frequently belittled or dismissed with relatively rare 
glimpses of adequate discussion. Benedek (1953) noted that “as history of psychoanalysis 
shows, the discussion of countertransference usually ended in a retreat to defensive 
positions” (p.202). Following a brief discussion on the evolution of countertransference 
(for comprehensive literature reviews see Langs, 1976; McLaughlin, 1981; Slakter, 1987; 
Tansey & Burke, 1989; Tyson, 1986), two aspects of countertransference that impinge on 
the therapeutic relationship will be explored. Firstly, when an analyst fails to understand 
the countertransference and how this situation is worked through and secondly the issue of 
disclosure of countertransference feelings.
Freud made the first explicit references to countertransference in a congress he attended in 
1910 and again later in his paper ‘Observations on transference-love’ (1915), however, 
neither provided a particularly well honed definition for his followers. Freud equated 
countertransference, or ‘gugenubertragung’ with the analyst’s transference. He saw it as a 
hindrance which needed to be eliminated through further analysis. Following this rather 
negative view of countertransference, theorists began to suggest that such feelings of the 
therapist were in fact inevitable and could indeed play a large role in treatment be it good 
or bad (Balint & Balint, 1939; DeForest, 1942; Ferenczi, 1920, 1925, 1931, 1933). It was
also suggested that, acting on an unconscious level, countertransference provides the 
constructive basis for ‘intuitive empathy’ (Deutsch, 1926). Deutsch went as far to say that 
the “utilisation and goal-directed mastery of this countertransference are some of the most 
important duties of the analyst” (p. 137).
The major challenge however, to the classical view of countertransference, came in the 
late 1940s early 1950s such that it could not, as previously been the case, be ignored. This 
was led by a number of analysts representing the ‘Sullivanian Interpersonal School’ and 
the ‘British Object Relations School’. What underpinned their approach was the view that 
no analyst could expect to be objective when hearing the client’s account. They suggested 
that the analyst and client’s reactions make up a single ‘field’ and cannot be thought of in 
isolation. With an abundance of papers following such a theory, in an emerging social 
environment in which authority no longer escaped unchallenged, the debate on 
countertransference truly opened in psychoanalysis. Paula Heimann’s (1950) paper, ‘On 
Counter-Transference’, epitomised this challenge and radically expanded the definition of 
countertransference to included all of the analyst’s feelings and fantasies about the client, 
or as Kernberg (1965) later called it the ‘totalistic’ view of countertransference as 
opposed to the classical view.
In Winnicott’s seminal paper ‘Hate in the Countertransference’ (1949), he differentiated 
between two types of countertransference, firstly objective countertransference which he 
described as “the analyst’s love and hate in reaction to the actual personality of the patient, 
based on objective observation” (p.70). The second, he termed abnormal 
countertransference, which referred to those feelings, dreams, fantasies, projections, fears 
and desires of the analyst in the analysis. Such a distinction, which where later termed 
reactive and proactive countertransference respectively by Lewin (1963), is undoubtedly a 
valuable one in understanding countertransference and one which arguably acts as the 
pinion to release the current trends in countertransference. Certainly, the predominant 
view of countertransference seems to be one of an interactional or totalistic process in
which transference and countertransference are mutually interrelated, a view which Langs 
has systematically outlined in his many books and the journal he founded called the 
'International Journal o f Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy'. Indeed, even the classical 
analysts, who seek the ideal of being a blank screen, are more aware now of the part the 
analyst’s personality plays in the therapeutic relationship and how their emotional 
reactions can impinge on this relationship.
One way in which countertransference comes directly to impinge on the therapeutic 
relationship is when the therapist fails to understand his or her countertransference 
feelings. In order to explain this a description of what Money-Kyrle (1956) calls ‘normal’ 
countertransference, which predominates when the analysis is going well, is required. By 
this he means that through his own analysis the analyst has gained valuable insight to 
enable his countertransference feelings to be confined to a sense of empathy with the 
client. This relies on the analyst’s continuous understanding of his countertransference 
feelings. Such continuous understanding however, is impossible and when it fails the lack 
of understanding is likely to arouse conscious and unconscious anxiety for both the analyst 
and his client. Such failure in the analyst’s understanding is likely to occur when the client 
touches on aspects of himself which he has not yet learnt to understand. Unlike a real 
parent, or an educationalist, a psychoanalyst is restricted to offering interpretations which 
depend on him being able to understand the client. In these circumstances analysts are 
unable to offer interpretations and instead are likely to either offer some kind of love or 
become hostile toward the client. At this point the analysis can take on a cyclical nature as 
the client may facilitate the process by trying to provoke these reactions in the analyst who 
is likely to respond due to his lack of understanding. This interplay must not go unnoticed 
by the analyst as early patterns of the client may be involved and an interpretation of the 
repetition of this pattern may enable the client to reassess not only the analyst’s attitude 
towards him but also that of his real parents. Failure to notice this potentially important 
interplay following the analyst’s lack of understanding of his countertransference feelings.
may disturb the analysis and could result in the client seeing the analyst as a good parent 
and his real parents as bad.
It is during the analyst’s lack of understanding that he must silently do a piece of self- 
analysis to try to gain an understanding of his countertransference feelings, in order to 
interpret them and thus restore the ‘normal’ analytic situation. The speed at which one 
can do this is an important part of the capacity to use one’s countertransference in analysis 
(Bion, 1955). Failure to do this may impinge on the effectiveness of the analysis. As 
Ogden (1991) suggests, “ the patient is, of course, correct in his assumption that it will 
very likely be the limitations of the analyst’s capacity to analyse the countertransference 
that will, to a very large degree, determine the effectiveness of the analytic process that 
will unfold” (p.362). In the extreme, it has been suggested that the analyst and client 
seduce each other into interminable analysis in which everything is analysed but nothing 
changes. It is therefore important for the analyst to regain his understanding of his 
feelings in order to return to ‘normal’ countertransference.
Having accepted that ‘normal’ countertransference is the ideal but acknowledged that at 
times this is impossible to maintain (Money-Kryle, 1956), the issue of revealing 
countertransference feelings is the next step and arguably another area in which analysts’ 
feelings may change the therapeutic relationship for better or worse. It seems that there is 
no overriding consensus regarding this debate but instead views of theorists span a wide 
spectrum. As mentioned above, at one end of the spectrum is the classical view, which 
dismisses countertransference feelings to the analyst’s analysis, to be worked through 
there and not brought into the therapy. The question of disclosure then opens up into 
what Tansey and Burke (1989) categorised as the conservative, moderate and radical 
positions, all of which agree over the negativity of the classical view but differ over the 
issue of disclosure. It could be argued that the conservatives hold fort closest to the 
classical view in terms of the absence of countertransference disclosure but differ 
fundamentally in terms of using it to inform analysis.
At the bottom of this debate is the notion of the analyst remaining ‘incognito’, which is 
what fundamentally differentiates the three groups. Edward Tauber (1954) explained 
what he felt would happen if the analyst remained incognito:
The very nature of the analytic setting is such that the analyst plays a relatively 
passive role and maintains an incognito. Many patients seem to respond to 
this setting by presenting an incognito of their own (pp.331-332).
Theorists who make up the radicals, such as Gitelson (1952), Little (1951, 1957), Maroda
(1991), Searles (1979) and Tauber (1954), believe that if the client is encouraged to ‘hide’ 
from the analyst because the analyst is ‘hiding’ from her, then further uncovering of truth 
in the relationship is not helped. They therefore favour disclosure and active use of the 
countertransference. Many theorists have put forward reasons for communicating 
countertransference which were aptly combined by Gorkin (1987) in his review of the 
literature. He cites five reasons to disclose: 1) to conform the patient’s sense of reality; 2) 
to establish the therapist’s honesty or genuineness; 3) to establish the therapist’s 
humanness; 4) to clarify both the fact and the nature of the patient’s impact on the 
therapist, and on people in general; 5) to end a treatment impasse or break through a 
deeply entrenched impasse (pp.85-86).
Those who make up the conservative position, like Heimann (1950), Langs (1978) and 
Reich (1960), would disagree with the use of countertransference disclosure to attain 
these results. They believe that while countertransference is useful for the analyst to 
gather information, its disclosure to the client is not right, as Heimann (1950) states, “in 
my view such honesty is more in the nature of a confession and a burden to the patient” 
(p.83). They would argue that such reasons for communicating the countertransference 
can instead be attained by other means such as exploring the client’s fantasies about the 
analyst’s countertransference.
It would seem that the conservative view is given a further boost when the radical Tauber 
(1954), takes the disclosure of countertransference to the extreme in his paper ‘Exploring 
the therapeutic use of countertransference data’. He illustrates the analysis of three clients 
to whom he has openly described his dreams and fleeting thoughts about them and asked 
them to comment. Furthermore, he admitted that the decision to reveal these dreams 
came without considering the dream carefully himself beforehand. Despite his conclusion 
that each of these dreams were beneficial to his clients, providing further insight for them 
and preventing the analysis becoming stagnant (Tauber, 1954), it could certainly be argued 
that the therapeutic relationship would benefit little fi*om such open disclosure and 
directness by the analyst. This conclusion is primarily drawn because of the very personal 
nature of dreams which suggests that, a full and open description of one’s dreams is likely 
to include parts of the analyst which may not be based in the countertransference such as 
events from the analyst’s dream-day prior to his dream. Certainly, without prior 
consideration of the analyst’s dream this type of disclosure could be seen as burdensome 
for the client.
This seems to be an extreme level of disclosure and one which the majority of radicals do 
not reinforce. Instead, they advocate a more careful and selective approach to disclosure. 
Interestingly however, few of them pay specific attention to the actual process of this 
selection apart fi-om saying that they do not do it all the time with all clients. Having said 
this, Maroda (1991) suggests that “the timing, nature and extent of the 
countertransference disclosure can only be determined by the therapist in consultation with 
the patient” (p.87). She explains that this, along with checking what will be helpful and 
what will be burdensome to the client, can be done either by direct communication or 
through projective identification. One concern of the former maybe that the therapy turns 
into a chat about how useful the disclosure of analyst’s countertransference feelings are.
The moderates take the position in between the radicals and conservatives by advocating 
occasional disclosure but only with seriously disturbed clients (Giovacchini, 1972; 
Greenson, 1974; Winnicott, 1949). The radicals however, generally show some 
agreement with this position by frequently providing case illustrations which focus upon 
clients who would be diagnosed as having psychotic, borderline or narcissistic disorders. 
This is perhaps highlighted by the fact that the most frequently cited use of disclosure is 
when the analyst feels immense hatred towards the client, which is commonly found in 
psychotic and borderline clients (Epstein, 1977; Spotnitz, 1976; Winnicott, 1949).
It should be clarified that what is not under question here is whether the analyst should 
give some recognition that certain countertransferential enactments have occurred, such as 
a slip of the tongue or evidence of a lapse in concentration. Instead, what is being 
questioned is whether an explanation as to why is necessary. This point is clarified by 
Reich (1960) who writes:
“To be sure, at times it may be unavoidable to admit certain 
countertransference manifestations to a patient; e.g., that the analyst forgot 
something or made a slip, etc. Such an admission may be required in order to 
permit the patient’s free verbalization with regard to the analyst. But it is 
clearly quite a different matter to burden him with the analyst’s own affairs 
and to interfere with the sequence of the analysis by introducing extraneous 
material that is irrelevant for the patient himself (p.390).
When defending their position however, the radicals may suggest that little or no trust is 
placed in analysts by the conservatives to accurately select what, how and when to 
disclose. Such an accusation is levied at Langs (1975) by Maroda (1991) but it seems that 
this is clutching at straws when trying to discredit the conservative view as it is not the 
selection of what to disclose that underlies the conservative approach but more the view 
that any such disclosure has no place in the therapy.
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As with all debates there seems to be those who choose to ignore the issue of disclosure 
when writing about countertransference (e.g. Kernberg, 1965; Tower, 1956) but also 
those who sit on the fence by suggesting that the answer is further research (e.g. Racker, 
1968). Even those who are cautious about communicating countertransference feelings 
tend to err on the side of the conservatives, as Tansey and Burke (1989) state:
In the overwhelming majority of instances the therapist is better advised not to 
disclose direct countertransference material, but rather to make silent use of 
the responses to the patient in an effort to guide interpretations pertaining 
primarily to the patient’s subjective experience (p. 102).
It seems that the degree of open disclosure advocated by the radicals, albeit for some 
selectively, could at best be unnecessarily self-indulgent. At worst it could provide too 
great a gratification and therefore may confound or cloud the client’s transference to the 
analyst as well as undermine the therapeutic relationship in the process. When discussing 
the potential dangers such a communication may have on the therapy, even the radical 
Michael Gorkin (1987) shows awareness of their effect when he states:
The selective disclosure of countertransferences occasionally proved not to be 
selective enough. These errors can be costly, more costly perhaps than errors 
made in the interpretation of the patient’s transference or other material. 
Finding one’s way back after an ill-timed or ill-conceived communication of 
countertransferences can be quite difficult (p.84).
This provides further evidence to suggest that the dangers of such a move to disclose the 
countertransference feelings can be extreme if any mistake is made in the selection of what 
is disclosed. What is left, it seems, is the position advocated by the conservatives which
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not only eliminates these dangers occurring but also guards the client against a confession 
which may provide more harm than good in the therapeutic relationship.
Attention in this essay has been paid to two areas which are important when trying to 
understand the issue of countertransference. Although periods of failure to understand 
ones countertransference are inevitable, they present a challenge to the analyst who is 
required to formulate some hypotheses as to what his feelings mean. It is suggested that 
the speed in which the analyst can do this, along with a continued awareness of the 
interplay between the client and himself during these periods, are important areas when 
using the countertransference. During the periods of understanding or ‘normal’ 
countertransference, the issue of disclosure is an unresolved subject. The majority of 
theorists adopt the conservative view that disclosure is both unhelpful and burdensome to 
the client, which opposes the view of selective disclosure held by the radicals. It is 
important to acknowledge that the view adopted here, that of the conservatives, is one 
which has been formulated by extensive reading of the literature along with the knowledge 
of psychoanalytic theory and a limited amount of clinical practice. It should be noted 
therefore, that the ability to draw upon years of clinical experience could be valuable for 
the reassessment of this view.
What is clear is that a continued surge in the theorising of countertransference is vital if we 
are to learn more about this area. A willingness to study this area of psychoanalytic theory 
will undoubtedly bring an increased understanding about the central role it plays in the 
mathematical interplay which makes up the therapeutic relationship.
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In cognitive therapy, therapeutic change is not dependent upon the therapeutic 
system of delivery but on the active components which directly challenge the client’s 
faulty appraisals. Discuss.
The middle part of last century saw more and more theorists becoming disillusioned with 
both the behaviourist and psychoanalytic paradigms which were so dominant at the time. 
Consequently, the early 1960’s saw new models of therapy evolve which represented a 
hybrid of behavioural strategies and cognitive processes with the aim of facilitating 
behavioural and cognitive change. These therapies were collectively known as Cognitive- 
Behavioural Therapies. The most influential of these are Ellis’s ‘Rational-Emotive 
Therapy’ (Ellis, 1962), Meichenbaum’s ‘Self-Instructional Training’ (Meichenbaum & 
Goodman, 1971) and Aaron Beck’s ‘Cognitive Therapy’ (Beck, 1963). The following 
discussion will focus on cognitive therapy, as first described by Aaron Beck, but will also 
reference views from other theorists and clinicians who have contributed to the vast 
literature base which has developed since its conception.
Cognitive therapy arose from Beck’s cognitive model, which was developed through his 
work with depressed clients (Beck, 1963, 1964), and focuses on teaching the client to 
learn to identify and modify their dysfunctional thought processes. The statement framing 
this discussion suggests that the active components or techniques used to address these 
dysfunctional thought processes or faulty appraisals, are enough to bring about therapeutic 
change in the client. The following discussion will briefly illustrate these techniques and 
then go on to look at the therapeutic system of delivery and how the use of this, alongside 
the active components, could influence therapeutic change in cognitive therapy.
It is first important to clarify what is meant by some of the terms used to frame this 
discussion. The therapeutic system of delivery could be taken in a very broad sense or 
indeed be as narrow as the choice of words and the way that they are delivered by the 
therapist to challenge the faulty appraisals. This discussion will include the latter but will
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be extended to the broader sense and be taken to mean how the client experiences the 
whole therapeutic delivery from their initial contact and throughout therapy.
For the purpose of this discussion the client’s faulty appraisals will include two levels of 
cognitions. Firstly, they involve spontaneous thoughts or images which occur in a variety 
of situations and are deemed plausible to the client but are in fact unrealistic. These 
negative automatic thoughts are triggered by specific situations and precede affect. 
Secondly, what underlies these thoughts are core beliefs or cognitive schemata which are 
not situation specific and often develop during our early experiences. Unhealthy core 
beliefs are often rigid, absolute and overgeneralised. The client’s core beliefs directly 
influence their negative automatic thoughts and so both should be modified to bring about 
therapeutic change. The term faulty appraisals will therefore be taken to mean both the 
client’s negative automatic thoughts and their core beliefs.
The idea of therapeutic change in cognitive therapy can be difficult to establish as it is 
extremely difficult to set out markers beyond which change can be said to have occurred. 
However, two levels of therapeutic change in cognitive therapy have been identified; 
superficial change and deep change (Amkoff, 1980; Mahoney, 1980). Superficial change 
is achieved if there is a reorganisation of the client’s attitudes toward reality without 
revising their personal identity. This allows for an adaptation to the environment and a 
reduction of emotional distress. Deep change takes this further by including a 
restructuring of the client’s personal identity, a new attitude to reality and subsequently 
alternative views to their problems. The attainment of ‘deep change’ has to come from 
the client themselves, while the therapist aims only to stimulate their curiosity (Guidano, 
1988). It would seem therefore, that the ideal aim of cognitive therapy would be ‘deep 
change’. Although this may be unrealistic for all clients, it would surely be the objective 
of the therapist, when starting work with a client, to do as much as they can to facilitate 
this level of change. If this is the case then it prompts the question of whether the use of
19
active components to challenge the faulty appraisals are enough on their own to facilitate 
this level of change?
The active components used in cognitive therapy are designed specifically for challenging 
faulty appraisals. There have been a number of active components which Beck and other 
clinicians (for example Beck, J., 1995; Beck & Emery, 1985; Beck et al, 1979; Padesky, 
1995) have identified for the therapist to use to challenge the faulty appraisals. These 
involve verbally challenging the client about the thoughts and beliefs that they hold. This 
can be done by checking out the evidence they have for holding such appraisals, examining 
the advantages and disadvantages of holding them, seeking alternative views for them and 
to ascertain if any logical thinking errors are being made by the client (Fennel, 1989). 
Another technique, which prompts the client to entertain alternative ways of thinking, is 
rational-emotional role-plays in which the therapist and client take it turn to play the role 
of a significant other who may have been involved in an incident which was critical to the 
development of the core belief. Also, by exploring the client’s cognitive continuum, it is 
possible to break down the logical thinking error of dichotomous thinking. This is done 
by placing either people or behaviours on a continuum to establish different types of 
people or degrees of behaviours. Behavioural experiments set for the client may also help 
to test out the faulty appraisals that they hold. If these techniques adequately challenge 
the client’s faulty appraisals then it would be hoped that modification of them would result 
and subsequently lead to therapeutic change. However, to infer that this would generally 
be the case for clients may be ignoring the role of other important parts of cognitive 
therapy.
If the therapist sets out to maximise the chance of facilitating therapeutic change it would 
seem a little over simplistic and naïve to rely solely on the use of these techniques. Indeed, 
as Weishaar and Beck (1987) state, “therapists with a less than full understanding of 
cognitive therapy may view it as a technique-orientated approach and fail to appreciate the 
centrality of the relationship between patient and therapist” (p. 83). As with most
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approaches to psychological treatment (Strupp, 1973), the relationship that the therapist 
builds with the client is an essential ingredient. In fact, the sole use of the active 
components may lead to only superficial improvement if the client does not feel safe in the 
therapeutic relationship (Padesky, 1995). It is therefore important to build a strong 
therapeutic relationship with the client based around the Rogerian concepts of 
genuineness, warmth and empathy (Rogers, 1986). Beck et al. (1979) stated that “these 
characteristics in themselves are necessary but not sufficient to produce optimum 
therapeutic effect. However to the degree that the therapist is able to demonstrate these 
qualities, he is helping to develop a milieu in which the specific cognitive change 
techniques can be applied most efficiently” (pp. 45-46). If the relationship is not built 
around these concepts there is a danger that subsequent attempts to challenge the client’s 
distorted thinking may be perceived as insensitive or even persecutory (Moorey, 1996). 
This is particularly the case in cognitive therapy for people with schizophrenia as the 
challenging of such firmly held beliefs as paranoid delusions and auditory hallucinations, 
can easily be damaging to a weak therapeutic relationship (Nelson, 1995).
Part of establishing the therapeutic relationship is conveying the therapy to the client in 
terms of collaboration rather than teaching (Jarenko, 1987). Indeed, the collaboration 
between therapist and client, termed ‘collaborative empiricism’, has been raised as one of 
the hallmarks of cognitive therapy (Young & Beck, 1982). It suggests that the client’s 
understanding and subsequent change is not achieved by being persuaded by the therapist, 
but instead that the evidence is generated by the client in unbiased experiments (Hollon & 
Beck, 1979). One caveat to these suggestions has been raised by Birchwood and Tarder
(1992) in their work with people with schizophrenia. They suggest that, when challenging 
a delusional belief, the conventional aim of getting the client to generate their own 
alternative interpretation is, for some clients, a weak intervention. Instead, the therapist 
should provide an alternative interpretation. By this they are not suggesting that 
collaborative empiricism is not important in cognitive therapy but that this is one exception 
to it.
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One specific technique used in the system of delivery and which draws upon collaborative 
empiricism to aid the process of the client generating their own evidence is socratic 
questioning. This method involves systematic questioning and the use of inductive 
reasoning (Overholser, 1993a, 1993b) to facilitate the client’s self-discovery. Socratic 
questioning is used throughout therapy not only to help the client re-evaluate some of their 
faulty appraisals, but also to explore the meanings behind their statements in depth and 
breadth.
For the client to achieve the aim of therapeutic change, it is also important that they have 
an understanding of the cognitive model and are motivated to ‘buy into’ it. Without this 
knowledge the client may be at a loss as to the reason behind challenging their faulty 
appraisals and may subsequently be less likely to adopt the position of challenging their 
negative thoughts for themselves. Therefore, an important initial step in cognitive therapy 
is to explain how negative thoughts can evoke emotional and behavioural symptoms and 
lead to a vicious circle developing. Alongside the client’s understanding of the cognitive 
model, the therapeutic system of delivery should include motivation for the client to 
change. This can be done by explaining that change is possible and how, with practice and 
a willingness to try, the client can ‘catch’ and test their faulty appraisals with the aim of 
breaking the vicious circles. A combination of both of these provides the client with a 
clear rationale for the therapy.
Having established that the strength and nature of the relationship is important, as well as 
providing a clear rationale for cognitive therapy, the use of active components to challenge 
the negative thoughts may now be a useful direction. However, to suggest that 
therapeutic change will now occur if the therapist uses the aforementioned techniques to 
begin to challenge the client’s faulty appraisals, at the outset, makes one rather hasty 
assumption. It assumes that both the client and the therapist are already aware of the 
client’s faulty appraisals and with such information the therapist can then call upon his
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techniques to modify these appraisals. This is not the case, as although automatic 
thoughts are among the most “accessible cognitive data” available to the client (Weishaar 
& Beck, 1987), they are often unaware of them and their interpretations and judgements 
about them. In order to reach a point at which the active components can be used other 
areas need to be attended to first. These can be seen as further parts of the therapeutic 
system of delivery. Not least of these is a starting point of ignorance about the client’s 
negative thoughts. It is useful at the beginning of the therapy to explore with the client 
not only their faulty appraisals but also to contextualise them. This can be done in a case 
conceptualisation.
A case conceptualisation, as described by Judith Beck (1995), is an important part of the 
therapeutic system of delivery as it enables the therapist and client to conceptualise exactly 
what the client’s problems are and how they arose. It not only involves gathering 
information about the client’s cognitions, but also extends to formulating the client’s 
presenting problems and addresses any implications for therapy such as the client’s 
psychological mindedness, objectivity and belief in the cognitive model. The clearer the 
case conceptualisation of a client the easier and more accurate it becomes to develop 
strategies and techniques to address the specific goals (Moorey, 1996). Therefore, this 
should be carried out carefully and thoroughly at the beginning of the therapy and be open 
to change as therapy progresses. If the therapist has not conceptualised the client’s 
problem in a thorough and helpful way then it may, despite evidence of good treatment 
compliance, lead to the client not improving (Padesky, 1995).
As mentioned, part of the case conceptualisation is to identify the client’s automatic 
thoughts and subsequently their core beliefs. A number of ways have been described to 
effectively elicit these thoughts including questionnaires such as the Automatic Thoughts 
Questionnaire (ATQ: Hollon & Kendall, 1980), the Cognitive Response Test (CRT: 
Watkins & Rush, 1983), or the Daily Records of Dysfunctional thoughts (DRDT: see 
Beck et al, 1979). Additionally, the therapist may use appropriate questioning as well as
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attending to changes in the client’s affect during the session. One method of questioning 
is the downward arrow technique (Burns, 1980) which aims to elicit “associated beliefs 
and conclusions that are held at progressively lower levels of cognitive awareness, but 
nonetheless powerfully affect the individuals mood and behaviour” (Neimeyer, 1993, 
p.69). By using such methods, it is possible for the therapist to formulate the client’s 
faulty appraisals in terms specific to the client. Having identified these it would be 
appropriate to challenge them using the active components discussed. The aim of this 
would be to reduce or stop the client’s negative thoughts and modify their underlying 
beliefs. However, to facilitate an enduring change in the client’s cognitions it may be 
useful to strengthen the client’s modified beliefs. This can be done by asking the client to 
search for evidence which may support their new belief and which would similarly 
challenge their previously held beliefs. Such evidence is likely to help the client retain their 
modified beliefs and not return to previously held unhelpful beliefs.
Alongside the fundamental parts of challenging faulty appraisals, further work can be done 
by the client to practice initiating the challenging of their thoughts. As, in general, 
cognitive therapy is time-limited (Beck et al., 1979) and sessions are spaced no closer than 
weekly, it is often helpful if the client continues in between sessions to work on what is 
talked about during the sessions. This work should be collaboratively decided upon by 
both client and therapist and involve clear, manageable tasks to be done for the following 
session. Tasks vary depending on the content of the sessions at the time but generally 
involve either challenging faulty appraisals or strengthening modified appraisals. The 
former may include completing a ‘Thought Record’ (Padesky, 1995) or a diary of 
automatic thoughts. Both require the client to provide rational or alternative responses to 
their automatic thoughts on a daily basis. Christine Padesky’s ‘Thought Record’ extends 
to asking the client to provide evidence which supports and evidence which does not 
support their automatic thoughts (p.229). These homework tasks help the client to 
consolidate what has been explored in the session and to learn to seek evidence for and 
against their faulty appraisals by themselves. The rating scales requested on the records
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also provide base line data for, and evidence of, any change in the client’s appraisals. A 
reduction in the levels of emotions rated on these scales over time may also provide 
motivation for the client by showing that progress is being made.
Following up the tasks done between the sessions is also an important part of the therapy 
as it not only provides an opportunity for any problems the client has experienced to be 
explored, but also provides material which can be explored in depth during the session. 
This follow-up promotes a collaborative process between the therapist and client with the 
aim of aiding their progress in future homework tasks. The setting of homework tasks 
and their follow-up requires time in the session and so in order to ensure time is set aside 
for this and other issues in each session, an agenda is usefiil. As cognitive therapy is 
problem-orientated (Beck et al., 1979) structuring the sessions also ensures concentration 
on the goals set out in the case conceptualisation. Therefore an agenda is often 
collaboratively set at the beginning of each session. An example of an agenda of a session, 
after the assessment sessions, may include feedback on the previous session, a review of 
events since last session and a homework review. It may go on to involve an exploration 
of a particular issue and be rounded up by discussing homework assignments and receiving 
feedback on the session. This provides another fundamental part of the therapeutic system 
of delivery and concludes the main areas of the therapeutic system, which may, as a whole, 
best facilitate therapeutic change in cognitive therapy.
This discussion has presented the main areas of cognitive therapy which may be grouped 
together to provide a therapeutic system of delivery and suggests that it is a vital 
accompaniment to the active components used to challenge the client’s faulty appraisals. 
Due to the broadness of the therapeutic system of delivery there may be other areas which 
play a role in psychotherapy, however it is felt that these do not directly influence 
therapeutic change in cognitive therapy. The importance of the techniques used to 
challenge the client’s cognitions are not under question here as they are a fundamental to 
the practice of cognitive therapy (Beck et al., 1979). What is discussed is how important
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it is for the goal of therapeutic change that they are used within a whole system of delivery 
which underpins and complements them in order to aid the change. It is suggested that 
the therapeutic system of delivery involves, at its base, a strong and collaborative 
therapeutic relationship. From this base important concepts should also be part of the 
system of delivery including a clear rationale for the cognitive model and the therapy, case 
conceptualisation, the structuring of sessions and homework assignments. The use of 
socratic questioning to accurately uncover the client’s faulty appraisals is also a necessary 
part of the whole therapy and without which the essential active components may be 
rendered ineffective. Indeed, without this therapeutic system of delivery it is likely that the 
therapist will witness some resistance by the client to change. These resistances can come 
in many areas mentioned in this discussion but interestingly the reasons given for 
resistance are not directed at problems with the active components. Instead, some point 
to the case conceptualisation as a common cause of resistance (Beck, J, 1995; Padesky,
1995), whilst others claim a lack of rapport and understanding or failure to provide a clear 
rationale for the work (Beck et ah, 1979; Golden, 1983). This augments the argument put 
forward in the discussion by showing that possible reasons for resistance to change do not 
revolve around the active components but more an adequate system of delivery. This 
highlights the importance of the system of delivery and that without it therapeutic change 
is unlikely to occur.
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How Cognitive-Analytical Therapy can assist efforts to work integratively.
Since the first annual conference of the international Society for the Exploration of 
Psychotherapy Integration (SEPI) in 1985 and the formation in 1987 of the British 
Institute for Integrative Psychotherapy, counselling psychologists have addressed the issue 
of integration in psychological therapy. What pushes counselling psychologists to come 
up with a definition of integration is perhaps more about the differentiation process 
between integrative and eclectic psychotherapy. One suggestion was made by John Davis 
who uses a culinary metaphor (cited in Norcross and Napolitano, 1986) to explain that 
“the eclectic selects among several dishes to constitute a meal, the integrationist creates 
new dishes by combining different ingredients” (p.253). Cognitive Analytic Therapy 
(CAT) assists working integratively by itself having created a new dish combining 
ingredients from many theoretical approaches including object relations theory, Kelly’s 
personal construct theory, cognitive and behavioural psychotherapy and developmental 
and cognitive psychology (Ryle, 1990). To allow for a full discussion of this model as an 
assistant to integration and, as integrative psychology is theoretically led, a brief summary 
of its main theoretical roots will be given. The main areas of CAT which assist the 
process of working integratively will then be discussed namely the structure, practice and 
process of CAT. Furthermore, due to language being one of the main barriers of 
integration (Goldfried, 1982) the language that CAT uses will be addressed to ascertain 
how usefiil it is in assisting efforts to working integratively. As the model will be 
reviewed only briefly for the purpose of this discussion, the reader is directed to two 
books edited by Anthony Ryle (Ryle, 1990; Ryle, 1995).
The Procedural Sequence model (PSM), now changed to the Procedural Sequence Object 
Relations Model (PSORM) (Leiman, 1994; Ryle, 1985; 1992; 1994) to reflect a greater 
emphasis on object relations theory (Ryle, 1996), is the underlying theory of CAT. It 
gives an account of the “sequence of mental and behavioural processes involved in the
30
carrying out of aim-directed activity” (Ryle, 1990, p.9). The basic procedural sequences 
are described in seven stages:
1. Define aim (maybe in response to external event)
2. Check aim for congruence with other aims and values, i.e., for personal meaning.
3. Evaluate situation, and predict one’s capacity to affect it, and the likely consequences 
of achieving the aim.
4. Consider the range of means of roles (sub-procedures) available and select the best.
5. Act.
6. Evaluate (a) the effectiveness of the action and (b) the consequences of the action.
7. Confirm or revise (a) the procedure and (b) the aim.
It is from this model that the integration of primarily psychoanalytic and cognitive theories 
occurs. In this sense, to refer back to the culinary metaphor used above, the PSM is the 
new theoretical dish which combines the ingredients of other theories. It incorporates 
essentials of cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) such as identifying and challenging 
distorted meanings (stage 2) and challenging negative self-evaluations and faulty appraisals 
of the consequences (stage 3). Cognitive therapists also help select and devise appropriate 
plans (stage 4) and promote accurate evaluation of their consequences (stage 6).
The PSM also attempts to incorporate some ideas of psychoanalysis centred around ‘ego 
defences’ which Ryle and Cowmeadow (1992) see as examples o f ‘cognitive editing’ such 
as: denial - reality which is too anxiety provoking to reach consciousness (stage 1); 
Repression - memory and desire which are not acknowledged (stage 2); Dissociation - 
incompatibility of plans and values not acknowledge (stage 2 and stage 6); Reaction 
formation - stuck at one pole of a dilemma (stage 4) and Symptom formation - a 
replacement of a discarded procedure by another to bring an alternative reward (stage 4).
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It is the processes of evaluation and choice set out in the PSM which are idiosyncratic to 
each individual and come from our developmentally derived self-organisation (Ryle & 
Cowmeadow, 1992). Object relations theory and the developmental psychology of 
Vygotsky (Wertsch, 1985) purport that learning takes place through internalisation 
whereby interactions experienced within our first relationships become transformed into 
intrapsychic functions. It is internalisation which is the key to human personality 
development (Ryle & Cowmeadow, 1992). Any problems that arise during it can lead to 
personality issues which are addressed in psychotherapy.
When addressing the structure of CAT it is instantly noticeable that it is a directive, 
structured and time-limited therapy which takes little effort to reconcile among the 
cognitive behavioural therapies. It usually follows three stages spread across 16 sessions, 
which involve assessment (sessions 1-4), recognition (sessions 4-10) and ending phase (8- 
16). There is also a follow-up session for feedback, review and reinforcement. In contrast, 
psychoanalysis is not classically seen as a time-limited structured therapy and therefore it 
is difficult to see how psychoanalysis can be integrated within the structure of CAT. This 
point was raised by Leighton in a discussion with Ryle (Ryle, 1995). In line with 
Leighton’s argument, one of the main areas addressed in psychoanalysis concerns the 
unconscious material and its accessibility. In classical psychoanalysis emphasis is placed 
on repression as a means of preventing wishes from reaching consciousness. This is one 
reason, among others, that psychoanalysis is an in-depth therapy and requires time to 
reach beyond resistances. How then, can the view of unconscious mental activity be 
reconciled within such a short intervention offered in CAT? Ryle (1995) believes that the 
conscious and unconscious are not polarised systems. Instead, he states that the dynamic 
unconscious is “a kind of (partially silenced) alternative voice, not unlike aspects of 
internal dialogue which are available to one, but only deduced from the slips and omissions 
and the motivated acts we don’t accept conscious responsibility for” (p. 141). It is 
suggested that some of the procedures, that CAT identifies, are expressions of this 
silenced part (Ryle, 1995). Ryle (personal communication, 2001) explained that people
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change behaviours very quickly when their procedures are pointed out to them through 
description and reformulation. He suggested the metaphor that, in general through 
interpretation, psychoanalysts “throw darts at the unconscious” whilst in CAT through 
reformulation the therapist “drops supplies into the garrison,” thereby enabling the client 
to understand and dispense with repressed unconscious material. It is this 
conceptualisation of the unconscious which arguably enables CAT to be of most assistance 
to working integratively.
The actual practice of CAT involves procedures specific to CAT but which further aid the 
process of working integratively. One of them is the psychotherapy file, which is a 
questionnaire given to the client during the initial stage of therapy. This is used to gather 
specific information about the client’s Target Problem Procedures (TPPs), categorised as 
snags, traps and dilemmas. It therefore acts as a supplement to the assessment. In this 
sense it is similar to questionnaires used in schema-focused therapy such as the 
Multimodal Life History Inventory (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1991), which ascertains which 
schemas the client holds. How the client treats the psychotherapy file is also of interest in 
CAT as it acts as a transitional object; a Winnicottian (Winnicott, 1958) concept used to 
help make the transition from dependence to self-reliance. Whether it is returned 
complete or incomplete, kept neat or ripped, all aid understanding and reformulation of 
the client’s neurotic procedures.
Along with the psychotherapy file, other homework tasks are set such as diary keeping 
and self monitoring, a task suggested by Beck (1976) for people with depression, to 
promote an active, instead of passive, engagement by the client towards her difficulties. 
The collaboration between the client and the therapist is highlighted by the written 
material used in the therapy about the client’s difficulties. The purpose of this is to create 
and record a clear understanding and transformations of the client’s difficulties. In a 
structured, time-limited therapy this makes explicit what cognitive therapists may call 
‘goal setting’ but also gives the feeling of working together to achieve the goals. Beside
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the reformulation offered at the beginning of the second stage of therapy, another letter is 
given and discussed with the client towards termination. This ‘goodbye letter’, provides a 
written account of what has been achieved in therapy and what still needs attending to. 
This letter again makes explicit the work done in therapy in a similar way other models 
will spend time recapping and providing the client with material to return to in the friture.
The therapeutic relationship is deemed to be the most important factor in effective 
psychotherapeutic work (Clarkson, 1995) and CAT seems to subscribe to this by placing 
great importance on it. The development of a strong therapeutic relationship is seen as 
imperative in the initial stage of CAT and is used throughout therapy to inform the 
Reciprocal Role Procedures (RRPs). These are the roles that the client has internalised 
from early relationships and involves two roles, one played by the self and one played by 
the other (initially the parent). The transferential relationship informs the client and the 
therapist of these reciprocal roles. Cognitive therapy uses transference and 
countertransference to aid case conceptualisation (Layden et al, 1993; Wills & Sanders, 
1997) whilst in psychoanalytic psychotherapy interpretation of the transference is 
important (Bateman & Holmes, 1995) and maintains that the identification of transference 
cannot be rushed. CAT uses transference to aid understanding and reformulation but 
thereafter the transference is used to show the client how their TPPs demonstrate the 
recurrence of neurotic procedures in the therapeutic relationship. Furthermore, in CAT 
the process of breaking the transference down into specific roles (RRPs) would seem to 
greatly aid the accurate identification of them in a relatively short space of time.
The context of interpretation in CAT is quite different to psychoanalytic theory in that the 
process of reformulation always precedes it. This involves description followed by 
demonstration. Written reformulations, TPPs and diagrams such as the sequential 
diagrammatic reformulation (SDR) are used in CAT to precede interpretation. This 
approach within the therapy seeks to actively involve the client in their therapy and does 
not assume the possession of a greater knowledge which an analyst could be seen to be
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doing by providing interpretations (Ryle, 1990). As such, the collaboration between the 
therapist and client seems closely akin to ‘collaborative empiricism’, hailed as one of the 
hallmarks of cognitive therapy (Young & Beck, 1982).
When developing a model, which seeks to integrate aspects of established models, the use 
of different languages represent a problem and have to be addressed. In CAT the dilemma 
of integrating cognitive and analytic therapy was how to convert psychoanalytic 
formulations into accurate descriptions or measures which were operational (Ryle, 1991). 
Through experience of personal construct theory (Kelly, 1955), Ryle found that terms 
derived from repertory grids provided more useful and precise descriptions of client’s 
problems than formulations used in psychoanalytic theory. In this way it is possible to use 
the direct involvement of clients in defining their problems and thus be clear about the 
aims of therapy, in order for it to be assessed as to how far the aims are achieved. Guided 
by the cognitive language of repertory grids, the usefulness of descriptions of the client’s 
problems within the process of therapy itself were also drawn upon (Ryle & Cowmeadow, 
1992).
What developed out of this was an entirely new language which not only differentiates 
CAT from any other model, and therefore allows it to stand alone, but also provides a 
language that is an integration of other theoretical models. In a sense, the development of 
a new language guards against the suggestion of eclecticism as, although much of the 
terms used are similar with other therapeutic models (e.g. Traps and dilemmas in CAT, 
negative thinking and vicious cycles in cognitive therapy), there is a clear theoretical 
underpinning to them. What this new language does seem to do is use ‘lay-person’ terms 
to promote accessibility to clients by making them easily understandable. The use of terms 
such as target problems, traps, snags and dilemmas illustrate this.
To this end, it may be suggested that the translation of techniques from one approach to 
the language of another is a relatively easy task (Marzillier & Butler, 1995). As such
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Marzillier and Butler admit that this may mask the theoretical underpinnings of CAT and 
place it the realms of “wishy-washy eclecticism where anything goes” (p. 137). They argue 
however, that as an integrative model it derives from its own distinct theoretical 
framework. What is perhaps more difficult and something which CAT seems to manage 
to achieve is to provide a coherent, accessible and testable framework which integrates 
cognitive and psychoanalytic theory and practice. In the current climate of questioning 
therapeutic effectiveness the explicitness with which both client and therapist record and 
then return to the goals or target problems may prove an important advantage over other 
models which may assist working integratively.
It would seem that CAT, although relatively still in its infancy, combines important 
ingredients from other theories into a dish which itself is based upon a sound theoretical 
framework from which an integrative approach can be taken. Although Ryle 
acknowledges the current Zeitgeist towards convergence between cognitive and 
psychoanalytic psychotherapies, he suggests that “in CAT and the PSM can be found the 
matchmaker capable, I believe, of encouraging this desirable union” (Ryle, 1990, p.208). 
Where such a structured approach to integration might fall short however, is the relative 
lack of freedom an integrative practitioner may have in drawing from other theoretical 
frameworks when creating a dish for the individual needs of the client.
36
References
Bateman, A. & Holmes, J. (1995). Introduction to Psychoanalysis. London: Routledge.
Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders. New York: 
International Universities Press.
Clarkson, P. (1995). The Therapeutic Relationship. London: Whurr Publishers Ltd.
Goldfried, M. R. (1982). On the history of therapeutic integration. Behaviour Therapy, 
13, 572-593.
Kelly, G. A. (1955). The Psychology o f Personal Constructs. New York: Norton.
Layden, M. A , Newman, C. P., Freeman, A. & Morse, S. B. (1993). Cognitive Therapy 
o f Borderline Personality Disorder. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Lazarus, A. A. & Lazarus, C. N. (1991). Multimodal Life History Inventory ed.). 
Campaign, IL: Research Press.
Leiman, M. (1994). The development of cognitive analytic therapy. International 
Journal o f Short-Term Psychotherapy, 9, 67-81.
Marzillier, J. & Butler, G. (1996). CAT in relation to cognitive therapy. In A. Ryle (ed.). 
Cognitive Analytic Therapy: Developments in Theory and Practice (pp. 121-138). 
Chichester: John Wiley.
Norcross, J. C. & Napolitano, G. (1986). Defining our journal and ourselves. 
International Journal o f Eclectic Psychotherapy, 5, 249-255.
37
Ryle, A. (1985). Cognitive theory, object relations and the self. British Journal o f 
Medical Psychology, 58, 1-7.
Ryle, A. (1990). Cognitive-Analytic Therapy: Active Participation in Change. 
Chichester: John Wiley.
Ryle, A. (1992). Critique of Kleinian case presentation. British Journal o f Medical 
Psychology, 65, 309-317.
Ryle, A. (1994). Introduction to cognitive analytic therapy. International Journal o f 
Short- Term Psychotherapy, 9, 93-109.
Ryle, A. (1995). Cognitive Analytic Therapy: Developments in Theory and Practice. 
Chichester: John Wiley.
Ryle, A. & Cowmeadow, P. (1992). Cognitive-analytic therapy (CAT). In W. Dryden 
(ed.). Integrative and Eclectic Therapy, (pp. 84-108). Oxford University Press.
Wertsch, J. V. (1985). Vygotsky and the Social Formation o f Mind. London: Harvard 
University Press.
Wills, F. & Sanders, D. (1997). Cognitive Therapy: Transforming the Image. London: 
Sage Publications.
Winnicott, D. (1958). Collected Paper s. Condon: Taviskock Publications.
Yager, J. (1977). Psychiatric eclecticism: a cognitive view. American Journal o f  
Psychiatry, 134, 736-741.
38
Young, J. E. & Beck, A. T. (1982). Cognitive therapy: clinical applications. In A. J. 
Rush (ed.), Short-Term Psychotherapies for Depression. New York: Wiley.
39
Early Intervention in Psychosis: The Third Paradigm in the Management of People 
with Schizophrenia.
Traditionally schizophrenia has been managed within two paradigms. The first, 
approaches schizophrenia as a disorder that involves episodes of psychotic relapse for 
which the treatment comes in the form of acute crisis care working alongside medication. 
The second paradigm, sometimes resulting from the failure of the first, involves more of a 
rehabilitation method of cautious containment relying on an asylum approach. A third 
new ‘paradigm of care’ (Tarrier & Birchwood, 1994) is an ‘early intervention’ approach 
which involves a combination of intensive medical and psychological interventions 
targeted at young people in an attempt to prevent or limit social, psychological and mental 
deterioration. This approach, which is currently being evaluated in Birmingham by 
Professor Birchwood, pays specific attention to the early years of an individual’s 
psychosis.
Intensive early intervention in the first three years of psychotic breakdown has been shown 
to have long term benefits in the course of schizophrenia (see Jackson & Birchwood,
1996). There are three main reasons for this; firstly, the first two or three years are 
strongly predictive of long-term outcome. Secondly, as argued by many cognitive 
theorists, in the early years just after the onset of psychosis, damaging and maladaptive 
cognitions such as ‘entrapment’ are likely to form (see Gilbert, 1992). Thirdly, social 
theorists argue that working with someone to re-establish or newly establish a wide range 
of valued roles and goals such as employment, would also be best done early on 
(Champion & Power, 1995; Oately, 1992). In view of these reasons, this new paradigm 
aims to attend to the important early years of psychosis by emphasising prevention 
through early detection of impending relapse.
In the 1980s a number of both retrospective and prospective studies searched for 
predictors of relapse. Herz and Melville (1980) and Birchwood et a l (1989) found in
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their retrospective studies, that specific symptoms were experienced prior to relapse. 
These include dysphoric symptoms such as eating less, concentration problems, troubled 
sleep, depressed mood and withdrawal. Early psychotic symptoms were also found such 
as hearing voices, talking in a nonsensical way, increased religious thinking and thinking 
someone is controlling them. The period of time prior to relapse in which these symptoms 
occur is called the prodrome and is believed to predict relapse. Herz and Melville (1980) 
found that 52% of patients and 68% of their families observed prodromal symptoms more 
than week before full relapse. Birchwood et a l (1989) found that 59% of clients observed 
the onset of the prodrome one-month prior to relapse and 75% two weeks or more.
Despite these retrospective studies, the true predictive significance of the prodromal 
symptoms can only be confirmed in prospective studies. Such studies like Subotnik and 
Neuchterlein’s (1988) study of fifty individuals with psychosis, found that non-psychotic 
symptoms are sensitive to relapse but not specific to it, however, if they are followed by 
early psychotic symptoms then relapse is more probable. Hirsch and Jolley (1989) in their 
sample of 54 people with psychosis, found that 73% of relapses were preceded by a 
prodromal period of dysphoric and neurotic symptoms within a month of relapse. Further 
evidence was provided by Birchwood et aVs (1989) prospective study, which found that 
50% of their participants who relapsed showed prodromal symptoms. This however, was 
half of only eight relapsing clients. Another question that surrounds this work is the issue 
of dysphoric symptoms occurring which were not part of a participant’s relapse. The 
occurrence of these false positives could not be calculated as observations of the 
dysphoric symptoms were confounded with targeted medication.
From this body of research it is evident that, for most, there are changes in cognition, 
emotion and perception which metamorphose into psychotic symptoms (Birchwood, 
1995). The recognition of this ‘critical period’ enables the chance to reduce the severity 
of relapse or the likelihood of relapse all together. If this prodromal period can be 
correctly identified for each individual then the warning it brings allows the health
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professionals involved the chance to act in order to achieve this goal. To do this, 
information has to be obtained for each client about their individual symptoms and their 
onset prior to their psychotic episode. Such information is obtained through carefully 
interviewing both the client and their relatives about changes in thinking and behaviour 
leading up to a recent episode. Herz et a l (1982) first developed the Early Signs 
Questionnaire (ESQ) to do just this. It was then adapted by Birchwood et a l (1992) for 
the Early Intervention Service in Birmingham (see Appendix I). From this carefully 
obtained information, a client’s personalised prodrome can be elicited. This is called their 
‘relapse signature’ (see Appendix II). To increase accuracy, any future relapse should be 
used to inform and update the relapse signature.
With this in place, initial plans of pharmacological early intervention by administering 5-10 
mg daily of Haloperidol at the onset of a prodrome, were found to abort relapse in many 
instances (Carpenter et al, 1990; Jolley et al, 1989,1990). Although such studies found 
that both targeted and maintenance medication reduced the chance of relapse, cognitive 
and ongoing psycho-educational intervention were deemed necessary to further reduce 
relapse (Birchwood, 1995). Armed with a carefully designed relapse signature, a team led 
by psychologists and community psychiatric nurses (CPN’s), aim to educate both clients 
and their carers to help them understand and take some responsibility for recognising the 
occurrence of these symptoms and to actively seek help at the earliest possible stage. 
Clients’ keyworkers also act as observers for early detection of the prodrome and enable a 
clear route of access to the service. This raises the likelihood of early detection. It is this 
need for close co-operation between the client, carer and professionals that require an 
ethos of trust and ‘informed partnership’ (Smith & Birchwood, 1990). It is important that 
this is built from the first contact by spending time engaging with the client and their carer.
Once a prodrome has been detected, intensive support for the individual and their family 
needs to be quickly provided. As the psychological reaction to the onset of these 
predictive symptoms may cause strain on both, which in itself could accelerate the
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downward spiral, weekly or daily support is recommended to alleviate anxiety and 
emphasise a shared sense of responsibility. Alongside this support, early interventions 
would typically comprise of an individualised targeted dose of anti-psychotic medication 
(neuroleptics), counselling for stress and cognitive therapeutic strategies aimed at 
emerging psychotic symptoms (Birchwood, 1995; Chadwick et a l, 1996). Counselling by 
either the CPN or the psychologist would not only hope to alleviate stressors resulting 
from the onset of these symptoms, but also those which may have triggered the prodrome. 
This environment also facilitates the rehearsal of coping mechanisms. Along with this, a 
modified form of cognitive therapy is provided which attends to the client’s attribution of 
their prodromal symptoms. These may include catastrophisation, externalising attribution, 
or social attribution. Once these are identified, emphasis is placed on the client gaining 
control to facilitate re-attribution. This is done by verbally challenging, hypothetical 
contradiction and searching for alternatives (Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994; Chadwick & 
Lowe, 1990).
Such early and intensive interventions address the emerging symptoms in an attempt to 
reduce the severity of the predicted relapse or ideally to prevent it from happening 
altogether. With this new approach to the psychological management of schizophrenia 
and after further processing ideas from Australia, Professor Birchwood set up the ‘Early 
Psychosis Service’ (now the Early Intervention Service) in Birmingham as a pilot service 
to evaluate the success of this new paradigm of care. This service, which is aimed 
specifically at early intervention to reduce or prevent relapse, operates in inner city 
Birmingham; an area of above average deprivation (mean Jarman index of +51). It has a 
multicultural population of 300 000 with a high morbidity of psychosis of, on average, 50 
new cases per 100 000 population per year. The strict guidelines for accepting clients into 
this service include first episode clients between the age of 16 and 25 years. Clients with 
severe drug induced psychosis are not accepted as discriminating a prodrome against such 
a background is likely to be extremely difficult.
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Alongside aforementioned specific interventions, psychosocial and psychoeducational 
support is provided within this service as they are believed to be important after the first 
episode and are major factors in influencing long-term outcome and favourable course of 
psychosis (McGorry, 1992). Prodromal changes have an impact on interpersonal 
relationships (Jones et ah, 1993) and lead to shrinkage in their social networks 
(Hirschberg, 1985). The resulting social isolation is a prognostic factor in psychosis 
(Jablensky et al, 1992). For this reason high, medium and low level social groups for the 
clients are provided to bridge these social chasms. Other interventions include family 
work to help the relatives cope with the individual as well as attempting to reduce 
expressed emotion within families, found to be predictive of relapse (Bebbington & 
Kuipers, 1994; Butzlafif & Hooley, 1998). Occupational therapists provide skills of daily 
living and prepare clients for employment before providing sheltered work placements as a 
stepping stone to full or part time employment.
Other aims of the service are to reduce social stigma which surrounds mental health 
problems (this was the reason that the service changed to the early intervention service) 
and to address the difficulty of engagement, as it is one of the major difficulties in the 
treatment process of first episode clients (McGorry, 1992). To do this, an assertive 
outreach approach is adopted which places the emphasis on keyworkers investing quality 
time engaging with the clients following their referral and acceptance in to the service. As 
the catchment area for the particular service in Birmingham is so multicultural, translators 
are often used to ease language barriers and educate keyworkers about cultural and 
religious beliefs.
The application of this early intervention package to other types of mental health problems 
is now currently being explored. In particular the cyclical nature of bi-polar disorder lends 
itself to identifying early symptoms. Early intervention for this is being developed within 
the same service in Birmingham. The effectiveness of this approach for this client group 
has yet to be established.
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This new paradigm of care has been developed specifically with the aim of preventing or 
reducing the severity of relapse by using early warning signals to instigate early 
intervention. In practice, it seems that the initial stages of educating both client and carers 
are proving to be challenging. Inviting such responsibility, at this early stage, in vulnerable 
individuals following the occurrence of their first episode of psychosis is a huge request. 
Consideration has to be given to the psychological effects of this huge upheaval on the 
lives of both the individual and their carer (Greer & Wing, 1974; Fadden et a l, 1987). 
One of the effects may be the lack of desire for both clients and their families to assume 
responsibility of early signs monitoring in an attempt to prevent a future relapse. Another 
problem is the fact that an increase in accuracy of the relapse signature comes with further 
relapses. As the aim is to reduce or prevent future relapse, the effectiveness of primary 
and perhaps secondary relapse signatures need to be increased. This would exclude the 
reliance on future relapse to increase efficacy. It is obvious that further refinement of this 
early intervention is needed along with the auditing of those services in which the trials are 
taking place. What it does provide is a new and empowering approach to the management 
of people with schizophrenia which is so desperately needed following the ambivalence 
being experienced with the other established paradigms of care.
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Appendix I
EARLY SIGNS INTERVIEW: RELATIVES’ VERSION
Stage 1: Establishing date of onset/admission to hospital and behaviour at height of 
episode.
‘On what date was X admitted to hospital?’
Prompt: Date, day time; contemporary events to aid recall.
‘When did you decide he needed help?’
Prompt: date.
‘What was X’s behaviour like a that time?’
prompt: What kind of things was he saying?
What kind of things was he doing?
Stage 2 : Establish date when change in X was first noticed
‘So X was admitted to hospital weeks after you decided (s)he needed help...
Think back carefully to the days or weeks before then.’
‘When did you first notice a change in X’s usual behaviour or anything out of the 
ordinary?’
Prompt: Nature, time of change.
‘Were there any changes before then, even ones which might not seem important?’
Stage 3: Establish sequence of changes up to relapse
‘I’d like to establish the changes that took place after that up to (date) when you decided 
X needed help.’
‘What happened next (after last change)?’
Prompt: Was this a marked change? When did this happen? Can you give me 
some examples? Repeat question until point of relapse is reached.
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Stage 4: Prompting for items not already elicited
‘During this build up to his relapse/ admission to hospital Was he unusually anxious or
on edge?’
Prompt; when did you notice this? (prompt items from relevant early signs 
checklist.)
‘Did he seem low in his spirits?’
Prompt: as above
‘Did he seem disinhibited (excitable, restless, aggressive, drinking etc.)?’
Prompt: as above 
‘Did he seem suspicious of say/do strange things?’
Prompt: as above
Stage 5: Summary
‘Let me see if I’m clear on what happened before X’s admission’.
‘X was admitted on (date), (number) weeks after you decided he needed help; he 
was (describe presentation)’.
‘You first noticed something was wrong on (date when he (describe behaviour ) ... then 
he began to ....’
(complete description of prodrome)
‘Have I missed anything out?’
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INTRODUCTION TO DOSSIER
The therapeutic practice dossier includes a brief summary of the placements that have been 
undertaken throughout the three years of training. Each summary describes the context of 
the placement, the predominant theoretical approach to therapy and the client group. Also 
included is a description of other therapeutic work and professional activities undertaken. 
Following this an extended essay provides a personal account of how theory and research 
is integrated into therapeutic practice.
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First year placement: Community mental health team
The first year placement took place at a local community mental health team (CMHT) and 
was nine months in duration. The multidisciplinary team comprised of a psychiatrist, a 
psychologist, social workers from support workers to approved social workers (ASWs), 
community psychiatric nurses (CPNs), occupational therapists and clerical staff
The client group served in the team centred primarily on those referred by local general 
practitioners, but also included referrals from psychiatrists. All referrals were allocated in 
a weekly meeting to one or more members of the team, based on the referrer’s request. 
The team accepted clients between the age of 17-65 years with a clear presence of mental 
health problems. Supervision was received on a weekly basis from the clinical 
psychologist based in the team. Although this was primarily based within person centred 
approach I was also encouraged to work within a cognitive behavioural model.
During the placement I presented the research that I had completed to date as well as 
taking part in a trial of a risk assessment tool which was being prepared for the CMHT.
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Second year placement: A National Health Service psychotherapy unit
This placement took place in an outpatient adult psychotherapy unit and was ten months in 
duration. The psychotherapy unit consisted of three adult psychotherapists and a couple 
psychotherapist. Clients presented with a wide range of chronic mental health problems 
and were usually referred to the psychotherapy unit by their general practitioner. Other 
sources of referrals came from psychiatrists, community psychiatric nurses and 
psychologists. Each assessment was carried out by one of the psychotherapists and if 
deemed appropriate the client was offered a place on the waiting list. During assessment, 
all clients were considered for their suitability and commitment to long term 
psychotherapy. The waiting period for therapy varied between three and eight months.
Besides individual work I undertook some couple psychotherapy. Most individual clients 
were seen for the duration of the placement whilst others including the couple were 
offered brief psychotherapy, usually twelve to sixteen sessions. Supervision for the 
individual work was provided by one of the adult psychotherapist who was also a clinical 
psychologist. It took the form of one hour of individual supervision and one and half- 
hours of group supervision (three in group) per week. One hour per week of supervision 
for couple psychotherapy was provided by a Tavistock Institute of Marital Studies trained 
psychotherapist.
During this placement some time was spent attending ward rounds of the local hospital for 
people with severe mental illness. I also presented a client to the team of psychotherapists 
for a group discussion.
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Third year placement: Co-ordinated psychological treatments service
This placement took place in a co-ordinated psychological treatments service (OPTS) and 
was ten months in duration. The service provides psychological therapy within different 
therapeutic models for the local trust and receives referrals from its attached hospital, 
general practitioners and local community mental health teams. All referrals were 
considered at a weekly allocation meeting and if deemed appropriate they would be 
allocated to one of the therapeutic disciplines for assessment. The service comprises of 
three therapeutic approaches namely cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), cognitive- 
analytical therapy (CAT) and psychoanalytic psychotherapy both on an individual and 
group basis. In total it employs twelve qualified psychologists and psychotherapists and 
provides placements for four trainee psychologists.
The clients referred to the service were adults (17-65 years) and had a wide range of 
mental health problems. The number of sessions with each client varied depending on the 
level of input needed to address their specific problem but in general fifteen sessions were 
recommended. Supervision came from one of the principal clinical psychologists within a 
cognitive behavioural framework and was provided on a weekly basis for one hour. 
Group work was also undertaken and supervision for this came from my co-therapist who 
was a clinical psychologist.
Throughout the placement I attended seminar presentations and conference days. Many 
of these were presented by well-known researchers within the field of schizophrenia. I 
also presented my empirical research to psychologists within the service.
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Integrating Theory and Research into Therapeutic Practice: My Personal 
Approach. 
Introduction
This paper presents an account of the way in which I have arrived at my personal 
therapeutic stance through my training as a counselling psychologist. It involves an 
outline of how I have come to view the integration of theory, research and practice leading 
to the formulating of my own integrative style which enables close attention to the 
idiosyncratic needs of each client. Firstly, I will consider the role of my personal therapy 
and supervision which for me have been extremely important in my increasing maturity as 
an integrative practitioner. I will then elucidate the journey through which I have travelled 
during my training with regard to my integration of theoretical models of therapy and 
research. Throughout, I will illustrate my account with examples from my client work in 
an attempt to show how they inform my practice as a counselling psychologist today. I 
shall add here that I see my journey as by no means complete. In fact, I view the practice 
of counselling psychology as a life long journey of continuing professional development.
Personal therapy
It was a purposefiil decision for my development as a therapist to continue with personal 
therapy throughout my training. It is held that it is important for a therapist to be able to 
separate out in the therapeutic relationship what are his own experiences and what are the 
client’s (Jacobs, 1988). I feel strongly that this is a vital process in any therapeutic 
relationship. Through weekly personal therapy I have been able to understand and address 
issues or ‘blind spots’ (Jacobs, 1988) that I have and therefore may take into any 
therapeutic relationship. This process has enabled me to identify, with the use of 
supervision, countertransference feelings which are related to my own early experiences 
and therefore are not necessarily related to the client’s. This awareness of my own 
emotional vulnerabilities has also enabled me to remain genuine and congruent within the 
therapeutic encounter, two components which I think are essential in therapy.
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Furthermore, I believe that through my personal therapy I have developed what Sterba 
(1934) described as an ‘island of intellectual contemplation’. That is to say that in therapy 
as a client I have been able to observe with my therapist what was being experienced in the 
transference and indeed how powerfril this could be. As a therapist I believe that this is an 
important step which has given me the space to reflect both on myself and the client. It is 
the development of this mental space within which supervision and then the internal 
supervisor can operate (Casement, 1985).
Supervision
I would agree with Farrell (1996) that the supervisory process is a “cardinal element of 
basic graduate training” (p.584). Throughout my training I have been fortunate enough to 
have been supervised by experienced practitioners who have facilitated my development as 
a therapist by both offering containment, as illustrated in Bion’s model (Bion, 1962), and 
promoting my internal supervisor (Casement, 1985). As a practitioner at the beginning of 
the journey towards maturity and competence, the containment offered, particularly when 
faced with very real and difficult problems of clients, has been extremely important in 
enabling me to then contain the client. I recall this being particularly prominent at a time 
on my first placement when a client was expressing thoughts about suicide. Through my 
supervisor’s understanding and empathy with my fears about the client’s suicidal ideation 
during this time, I was able to offer the appropriate containment for my client. Twas also 
able to express my concern and to attend to ethical issues with regard to alerting 
appropriate professions without damaging the therapeutic relationship by doing so.
It was in supervision during my second placement that I came to recognise the parallel 
processes (e.g. Clarkson, 1995, pp.99-103) that were occurring in relation to one of my 
clients, Gena. My supervisor noticed that when I talked about Gena I spoke quickly and 
constantly, rarely allowing her to intervene and ignoring any comments when she did. 
This was pointed out to me and it instantly became clear that this demeanour was identical
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to how my client came across in therapy. Understanding this process and thus more 
closely attending to the countertransference, enabled me to offer more accurate and 
helpful transference interpretations. This was just one time when helpful and insightful 
supervision enabled me to reflect more accurately on the therapeutic process. 
Furthermore, it has been through the supervisory process that I have gradually developed 
an ‘internal supervisor’ which has been able to operate within the mental space created. 
Subsequently, I have now moved into a position of regular dialogue between both internal 
and external supervisor (Casement, 1985).
Integrating psychotherapeutic theories
My development as an integrative practitioner has inevitably been influenced by my 
training. In chronological order, I have come to train in various aspects of the humanistic 
paradigm, psychodynamic therapies and cognitive behavioural therapy. Despite coming to 
recognise how a personal integration of these is both possible and useful, I have needed to 
go through a process of immersing myself fully within each on both a theoretical and 
practical level. It is this experience of gaining a full grounding in each model which I 
believe has been important and necessary for my development of integration. The process 
of integrating the essential, useful and important aspects of each model, I believe, can only 
be a personal endeavour but nonetheless I have been influenced by various sources. These 
will be addressed here in an attempt to explain my personal process of integration. 
Limited space has meant that the theoretical underpinnings of each therapeutic model 
cannot be expanded upon here.
Humanistic Paradigm
The humanistic paradigm was first introduced by the founder of client-centred therapy 
Carl Rogers (1951, 1957, 1959, 1961, 1977) and the founder of gestalt therapy Fritz 
Pearls (1969, 1975). Its therapeutic aim is to facilitate the client’s exploration of the 
meaning of their problems and enable them to seek fiilfilment. One implication of this is 
that the emphasis is very much on the concept of process (McLeod, 1996) and in this way
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parallels my own personal exploration for meaning as a counselling psychologist in my 
training. It is through close attention to the process in all aspects of my training that I 
have come to reach an understanding of being an integrative counselling psychologist. 
Just as in humanistic therapy, my development as a counselling psychologist does not rest 
with fulfilment and attainment of meaning but rather is a continuous journey to be 
experienced.
The core elements in providing a facilitative environment for change (empathy, 
congruence and unconditional positive regard) are at the basis of the therapeutic 
relationship within client-centred therapy. It is my initial grounding in this approach, early 
on in my training, that has lead me to hold these as central to any ‘real’ therapeutic 
relationship (e.g. Adelstein et al., 1983; Ford, 1978), regardless of therapeutic approach. I 
recall the therapeutic relationship with one of my early clients which highlighted this for 
me.
Lucy, a 22-year-old girl, had been referred by her GP as she was experiencing symptoms 
o f anxiety and depression including panic attacks, loss o f appetite and often remaining in 
her room sleeping throughout the day. To me she appeared a lot younger than her age, 
possibly more like a 15-year-old. She reported being in the “middle'' between her 
parents during their divorce and often had to inform each parent o f what the other was 
doing. After her parents divorce, when she was ten, she was forced to take responsibility 
o f her younger brother and ensure that he was fe d  and in bed on time whilst her mother 
socialised.
Through unconditional positive regard for Lucy and an empathie understanding of her 
own feelings, she began to feel comfortable expressing how she felt about her parents and 
their divorce. It seemed that the Rogerian elements underpinning the therapeutic 
relationship meant that she found herself in a safe atmosphere to express her own needs 
instead of the conditional environment which she grew up in. Over a period of fifteen
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sessions due to the reduction in her panic attacks Lucy began to leave the house more; 
socialising and picking up hobbies that she had previously enjoyed.
I feel that the client centred approach to therapy, in holding the relationship at the core of 
any therapeutic encounter, is the basis from which I practice as a counselling psychologist. 
Indeed, Woolfe (1996) argues that the defining factor that makes counselling psychology 
different from other psychology disciplines is “the importance of the helping relationship 
as a significant variable in working with people” (p.5). It was therefore developmentally 
important to have this grounding within the humanistic paradigm. However, it also left me 
looking to other models of therapy to enable a more in-depth approach to the therapeutic 
relationship. I felt that the concentration on the ‘here and now’ in the client-centred 
approach seemed to pay insufficient attention to past feelings which may then be elicited in 
the therapy. I also deemed the relative lack of importance placed on gaining a full client 
history to be in contrast to my course based learning where great importance was placed 
on this in order to gain a full understanding of the client, thus aiding formulation. These 
concerns often left me pondering over useful additions that would aid my therapeutic 
approach. It was through this process that I felt I was more open to understand the 
theoretical underpinnings of what initially seemed to be a sometimes punitive approach of 
psychodynamic therapy.
Psychodynamic Therapies
The importance I place on the therapeutic relationship was further cemented as my 
knowledge and practical experience of psychodynamic therapy grew. Initially, it was the 
early interpretation of neuroses and trauma (Hinshelwood, 1995) and the Kleinian 
approach, which seemed to concentrate on the internal world ignoring external realities 
(Cooper, 1996), that left me feeling these could be experienced as unnecessary and 
punitive within the therapeutic relationship. I soon began to understand that this 
perception was not indicative of all psychodynamic theory and became open to exploring 
the importance given to early trauma, the role of the unconscious in determining
62
behaviour, anxiety and defences as well as issues of transference. In reconciling these 
concepts with a way of being with the client, I turned to the work of Heinz Kohut (1971, 
1984) who called for an ‘experience-near’ approach involving open and accurate empathy 
with clients. Indeed, as Kahn stated “just as Rogers had talked of the central importance 
of empathy, Kohut....demonstrated empathy as one of the most important qualities the 
therapist had to offer the client” (Kahn, 1991, p. 14). The Rogerian elements that I feel 
important to bring into any therapeutic relationship are not dissimilar to Winnicott’s 
(1965) description of “good enough” parenting (Wright, 1993) and as such, through the 
longer-term psychodynamic work, could provide a safe atmosphere for the client to re­
experience some early relationship experiences. I recall that during my second year I saw 
a client (Petra) on a weekly basis for forty-one sessions.
Petra, a 28-year old German lady lived with her husband o f four years. She was referred 
by her GP as she was experiencing relationship problems in her marriage. She reported 
no longer feeling attracted to her husband and that they had not had a sexual 
relationship for the last eighteen months. She also reported symptoms o f anxiety and 
depression including loss o f appetite, sleep disturbance and tightness in the stomach. 
She was in her second year o f her PhD and worked long hours to reach her paper 
deadlines. Petra explained that she rarely visited her parents, who lived in Germany, as 
she feels uneasy when she is with her father. She fe lt that this was due to his lack o f  
affection and extremely high expectations o f her.
In the initial stages of therapy Petra seemed suspicious of me, often remaining silent for 
long periods and peering intently over her left shoulder at me (she had swivelled around in 
her chair). Over time, we began to build a strong therapeutic relationship within which 
she was keen to show me how hard she was working and tell me about her successful 
publications. It became apparent that I was becoming her transferential father figure. 
Within our relationship Petra was able to test out the beliefs she held about her father’s 
expectations of her assiduity and success. I formulated that for Petra her lack of desire for
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sexual intimacy was a defence against not being fiilly accepted, acknowledged or loved. 
This seemed to be formed in response to her experiences of the relationship she had with 
her father, which she then repeated in subsequent relationships. She captured this with her 
own metaphor of never quite being able to reach the apple on a tree. With empathy and 
understanding at the core of the relationship Petra began to trust me more and be more 
intimate in our relationship. Interpretations of her defence mechanisms and the 
transference gradually, over the forty-one sessions, enabled her to address issues in her 
relationship with her husband and her father.
Transference
Snyder and Snyder (1961) suggest that the therapeutic relationship is fundamentally “a 
sort of mathematical relation between transference and countertransference attitudes” 
(p. 56). Indeed, I feel that it was the acknowledgement and experience of transference and 
countertransference feelings, during this stage in my training, which enriched my 
understanding of the therapeutic relationship. As a guide to understanding the inner world 
(Bateman & Holmes, 1995), I have come to see transference and countertransference as 
vital not just within psychodynamic psychotherapy but within an integrative framework. 
Indeed, my interest in this area led me to investigate the research and theoretical 
underpinnings of countertransference in an essay entitled ‘The psychoanalytic idea o f  
countertransference as an aspect o f the therapeutic relationship ’ (see academic dossier, 
p.4). I also believe the importance that I place in the therapist’s own issues within 
countertransferential feelings is shown by my continuing with on-going personal therapy. 
I experienced particularly strong transference and countertransference feelings during my 
‘psychodynamic year’ when seeing Claire who commented that my looks and mannerisms 
were exactly the same as her husband who was impotent and unfaithful. She then openly 
drew the same conclusion about me. This instigated some fairly strong defences for me in 
the countertransference and whilst this undoubtedly tapped into some of my issues, I 
began to understand how emasculated her husband might have felt. Having described a
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sexually stimulating relationship with her father the transference and countertransference 
aided my formulation of Claire’s problems.
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy
In moving into what I perceived to be a highly directive cognitive behavioural approach in 
my third year, I struggled to see how humanistic and psycho dynamic models could be 
reconciled within the cognitive model both on a theoretical and practical level. 
Furthermore, it became apparent to me thaf within the cognitive paradigm on the one hand 
we were being taught cognitive therapy and the developing arguments of this field (for 
example see Salkovskis, 1996; Wills & Sanders, 1997), whilst on the other my placement 
seemed to have a strong emphasis on cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT). The former 
seemed to me to attend more to cognitions, schemas and their restructuring and little to 
behavioural approaches to client’s symptoms whilst, although the latter integrated 
cognitive and behavioural approaches to therapy, emphasis seemed to be on behavioural 
work. The process which I found myself going through at this time, whilst being 
demanding and searching for myself as a trainee, was an extremely valuable one for my 
development as an integrative practitioner. My quest was not just to reconcile these issues 
within the cognitive paradigm but also one of integration.
In a search to resolve these issues for my own professional development I turned to the 
literature and research on differing theoretical standpoints of cognitive theory. These 
involved the original work by Aaron Beck (e.g. Beck, 1963; Beck et a l,  1979; Beck & 
Emery, 1985), more recent developments in the cognitive paradigm (e.g. Beck, J, 1995; 
Safron & Segal, 1990; Salkovskis, 1996; Wills & Sanders, 1997) and more specific work 
on schema focused therapy (e.g. Padesky, 1994; Young, 1999) as well as the integrated 
model of cognitive-analytic therapy (CAT: Ryle, 1994, 1995; Ryle & Cowmeadow, 1992). 
From this I began to understand how aspects could be tailored for each client depending 
on their specific idiosyncratic needs. I was therefore able to draw upon the techniques or 
active components aimed at challenging ‘faulty’ thinking whilst acknowledging that a rigid
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application of such components without attention to the relationship would be of little 
benefit to the client. In this sense I agree with Weishaar and Beck (1987) who state that 
“therapists with a less than full understanding of cognitive therapy may view it as a 
technique-orientated approach and fail to appreciate the centrality of the relationship 
between patient and therapist” (p. 83). My understanding of this is elaborated in an essay I 
wrote discussing the suggestion that “In cognitive therapy, therapeutic change is not 
dependant upon the therapeutic system o f delivery but on the active components which 
directly challenge the client's faulty appraisals" (see academic dossier, p. 17). An 
understanding of CAT also enabled me to reconcile my desire for attention to unconscious 
processes within the relatively time-limited and structured approach of cognitive therapy. 
This is described further in my essay entitled “How cognitive-analytical therapy can assist 
efforts to work integratively? " (see academic dossier, p.29).
Due to the continued importance I place on the therapeutic relationship I welcomed the 
emphasis on ‘collaborative empiricism,’ one of the hallmarks of cognitive therapy (Young 
& Beck, 1982) but also on the increasing attention to transference and countertransference 
in cognitive therapy. I have found that through attending to transference and 
countertransference feelings I am greatly enriching my understanding of the case 
conceptualisation (Wills & Sanders, 1997) and reformulation (Ryle, 1995). It can also aid 
the elucidation of how core beliefs and schemas are maintained, avoided and compensated 
for (Young, 1999).
A micro analysis of my therapeutic integration
Sue, a 32 year-old lady who works as a freelance magazine editor, was referred by her 
GP for CBT to explore her “phases” o f depression and her feelings o f anxiety and 
phobia about going in the lift to her flat. She gave an extensive background history, but 
in brief, she was put into a children's home soon after birth and then fostered out to a 
family who returned her after three years. During this time her biological mother would 
visit her occasionally but when she was returned to the children's home these visits
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ceased; she has not seen her since. She was placed with other foster parents when she 
was five and was adopted by them, against her will, when she was twelve. Her foster 
parents frequently argued and Sue was made to see that their problems were her fault. 
She was verbally and physically abused by her father until the age o f sixteen when she 
left home. During this time she would try to diffuse such an atmosphere by complying 
with her parent's demands. In her early twenties she attempted suicide on three 
occasions by taking an overdose and in the last six years she has been periodically self- 
harming by cutting her forearms. Prior to therapy she had not self-harmed fo r  six 
months, however between our first and second session she superficially cut her left 
forearm.
At the time of writing I had seen Sue for ten sessions on a weekly basis and planned to 
continue until the end of the placement. Research evidence suggests that CBT is effective 
for the treatment of anxiety and depression (Department of Health, 2001). However, 
having conducted a thorough assessment I believed that an integrative approach would 
attend to Sue’s individual needs more appropriately. She explained that one of her 
thoughts was that the dog in the flat below would trap her in the lift and attack her. 
Through further exploration of this negative automatic thought she acknowledged the fear 
of feeling trapped and helpless. By understanding this in context of her past experiences it 
would appear that she had internalised features of a ‘subjugation’ schema. This involves 
the perception that one’s own feelings are not valid or important and can lead to excessive 
compliance along with hypersensitivity to feeling trapped (Young, 1999). Understanding 
how she maintains her schema processes further supported my hypothesis. One way in 
which she maintains her subjugation schema is through repeatedly involving herself in 
‘needy’ friendships whereby the expression of her own feelings would frequently incur 
retribution. This is also evident in the transference feelings. Each session she arrives 
punctually, is always very grateful of my time and often apologises when I make an 
intervention highlighting her behavioural pattern. Furthermore, whilst exploring her 
feelings around her self-harm, after the first session I conducted a thorough assessment of
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cognitions and behaviours leading up to the self-harm and, following guidance from my 
supervisor, we set out a verbal contract that she would not do this again during our 
therapy. She agreed to this and went on to say that she would understand if I found her 
too difficult to work with and wanted to terminate our therapy. In attending to the 
transference it is becoming apparent that she fears I might reject her. An awareness of the 
countertransference, such as feelings of annoyance at her when she continually apologises, 
feels unworthy of my time or ‘fishes’ for approval, is aiding my understanding of others’ 
reactions to her and how this may feed into maintaining her schemas.
The integration of psychodynamic theories further aided my understanding of Sue. 
Although her experiences could be formulated within various psychoanalytic theories it 
was integrating theories of Winnicott, Kohut and Klein which most aided me with this 
client. Sue’s early experiences of rejection by both her biological parents and foster 
parents and then subsequent abuse, has resulted in her experiencing the “annihilation of the 
infant’s self’ (Winnicott, 1956, p.304). Not only were her own needs not met but 
caregivers seemed demanding of her during quiescent states. It would seem that as a 
result fragmentation of the self occurred leading to a split between ‘true self and ‘false 
self. Sue’s ‘false self took on a caretaker role to provide the environment which non of 
her caregivers could provide and to protect the ‘true self by complying with the 
environmental demands (Winnicott, I960). Her subservient behaviour in therapy and her 
search for affirmation is likely to derive from the lack of ‘good enough’ parenting or early 
unmet mirroring needs (Kohut, 1984). Indeed, her defence against expressing her own 
feelings is perpetuated by seeking out people who cannot offer her appropriate mirroring 
(repetition compulsion; Freud, 1926), by seeking primitive forms of mirroring or being 
unable to accept mature gratifications when they are offered. Klein’s notion of ‘projective 
identification’ (1946) has also aided my understanding of the anger that I have felt towards 
both Sue and her foster parents, in particular her father. It would seem that she is 
projecting into me ‘bad’ split-off parts of the self.
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Through the course of therapy we have explored Sue’s subjugation schema by looking at 
ways she could find a balance between her own needs and others’. Indeed, I feel that it is 
through interpreting her need for confirming responses, as suggested by Kohut, in an 
empathie and open way that she has begun to express her own needs. She has also been 
able to express some of her feelings of annoyance and anger towards her fi-iends and 
partner. Although at present she can only project her anger towards her parents into me, 
the occurrence of a tight lump in her throat the day before each session suggests that 
expressing any negative feelings towards anyone is a difficult step but nonetheless one that 
seems important. The aim over time would be for her to be able to reintroject these split- 
off parts. She is now no longer anxious about getting in the lifi; at home and has not self­
harmed since the occasion after the first session.
Integrating Research
Counselling psychology calls for “the scientific demand for rigorous enquiry with a firm 
value base grounded in the primacy of the counselling/psychotherapeutic relationship” 
(British Psychological Society, Division of Counselling Psychology, 1998, p.3). This 
appears to be ideally encapsulated by qualitative research, indeed counselling psychology 
is based on phenomenological and humanistic philosophies (Mcleod, 1994; Van Deurzen- 
smith, 1990; Woolfe, 1996) and therefore lends itself to non-positivist investigation 
(Behram, 2001). However, as highlighted by a recent article in ‘The Psychologist’, the 
scientist-practitioner model developed out of clinical psychology (Kennedy & Llewelyn, 
2001) and aligns itself with positivist empiricism, which is grounded in the realist 
epistemological position. This seemingly polarised stalemate, 1 believe, can be reconciled 
by the very essence of what it is for me to be an integrative practitioner. Here 1 draw 
upon Barkham (1996), who states that the research approach within counselling 
psychology should be one of “methodological pluralism, incorporating both qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies. The critical point for the researcher is to select the approach 
which is most appropriate to the question being asked” (p.23). This encapsulates the 
theoretical diversity of counselling psychologists (Woolfe, 1996).
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During my training I have completed both qualitative and quantitative research which has 
provided me with both the ability to make an informed choice and the knowledge to then 
carry out what is deemed to be the more appropriate method. An example of the decision 
making process came during my first year when I decided that a qualitative approach to 
my research would enable a better understanding of my research question (see research 
dossier, p.79). In order to understand the experiences of carers of people with 
schizophrenia it seemed wholly restrictive to adopt a realist epistemological position. 
Instead, I felt that by using interpretative phenomenological analysis and adopting a 
critical realist position I would gain a far more in-depth understanding of how the carers 
constructed their experiences. A similar decision process was adopted for my second 
empirical research piece (see research dossier, p. 125). To understand the experiences of 
people with schizophrenia with regard to their relatives, collecting qualitative data, albeit it 
personally interesting would have lacked validity when the aim was to show in an 
exploratory study that their voice should be elucidated. I therefore adopted a quantitative 
approach to the research.
Constant evaluation of my therapeutic work has played an important part in the process of 
developing as a counselling psychologist. Such evaluation has been carried out through a 
combination of statistically proven inventories, which compare clients to accepted norms, 
(for example Beck Depression inventory (BDI) (Beck et a l, 1961), the Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (BAJ) (Beck, 1987) and the Brief State Inventory (BSI) (Derogatis, 1993)) as 
well as collecting qualitative data fi-om clients during evaluation sessions. The latter has 
involved regular reviews and checking with each client to evaluate their own views on 
change. Through regular evaluation I have been able to be reflective of my own practice 
and to attend to client’s changing needs. Another important aspect of integrating research 
into my therapeutic practice is as a consumer of research. The abundance of research, 
both in terms of symptoms or clusters of symptoms but also of theory and therapeutic 
practice, has been a rich source of information. I should note here how my own
70
understanding of research has also stood me in good stead to critique and seek further 
clarification of any literature that I read. As a result I have, on many occasions, turned to 
the research literature to inform my understanding and practice.
An example of my use of the literature and evaluation of client work can be highlighted by 
my therapeutic work with a client during my third year placement. I was seeing a 32-year- 
old Croatian lady (Anna) who, for the last eight years, had experienced a fixed paranoid 
delusion that her previous employees were constantly watching her either through the use 
of cameras or acquaintances acting as informants. Although I had previously worked with 
people with psychotic symptoms prior to training, I had not practised therapeutically with 
this client group. I therefore turned to the growing literature which describe CBT as a 
successful intervention for symptoms of psychosis (Drury et a l, 1996; Kingdon et a l, 
1994; Kuipers et a l, 1997). I proceeded under close consultation with the literature 
which describes how to carry out this modified approach to CBT (Chadwick et al, 1996; 
Fowler et al, 1995). Over a period of fifteen sessions it seemed that little progress had 
been made in weakening Anna’s strongly held beliefs. I checked this hypothesis out in 
two ways, firstly she completed the BSI for a second time and secondly we arranged a 
review session of our work. Although her depression and anxiety scores on the BSI had 
reduced from ‘before therapy’ scores, her levels of ‘psychoticism’ remained unchanged. 
During our review session she also confirmed that she still believed she was being watched 
one hundred percent of the time. This evaluation of therapy with Anna coincided with my 
attendance at a seminar held by one of the above authors which led me to critique the 
generalisabilty of this model for psychotic symptoms. Although Professor Kuipers 
presented research which confirmed previous claims that CBT was an effective 
intervention for psychosis, it was apparent to me that not all studies replicated her findings 
and indeed certain criteria such as length of time the psychotic symptom had been 
experienced, reduced the efficacy of CBT. In seeking recent research on the efficacy of 
CBT with psychosis, I found that in the long-term ‘supportive counselling’ was just as 
helpful as CBT for delusions (Tarrier et a l, 2000; Tarrier et a l, 2001). Subsequently,
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although attention was paid to the therapeutic relationship throughout, which is not only 
in-line with my own integrative practice but also held with utmost importance in the 
literature I was drawing from, less attention was paid to the active challenging of the 
Anna’s delusional beliefs. This not only strengthened the therapeutic alliance but also 
enabled us to explore the death of her parents, in particular her mother who died a couple 
of years before the development of her belief. An understanding of the loss she 
experienced, the psychosomatic symptoms she developed after her mother’s death and the 
cultural issues for Anna, led to a more informed understanding of the development of her 
belief.
Concluding Comments
To have reached a point of being an ‘integrative practitioner’ to me is misnomer. I rather 
view my current standing as having gained valuable understanding of psychotherapeutic 
theory, practice and research and how at present I integrate these. Indeed, I see this as 
still an early stage in my professional development and as such what is described here is 
more of a snap-shot of where the experience of my training has led me. It has been 
difficult to incorporate every aspect that has played a role in the process that has been my 
training however, it has been my aim to encapsulate the essence of what has been 
important. To this end, I believe that my training has equipped me with invaluable skills in 
clinical experience, research expertise and theoretical knowledge. It is through this 
grounding that I see future experience continually aiding my process of integration as a 
counselling psychologist.
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RESEARCH DOSSIER
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INTRODUCTION TO DOSSIER
The research dossier includes two empirical pieces of research and one literature review 
that have been completed during my training. Having undertaken research in the area of 
expressed emotion and people with schizophrenia prior to my training, I began my 
doctoral work with a clear idea of where I wanted to proceed in this field. I therefore 
made the decision in my first year of training to undertake an empirical research piece. It 
is for this reason that the research dossier begins with two empirical research pieces and 
concludes with a literature review. A list is presented of the papers which are in press and 
under review as well as a conference poster that I presented.
81
Can parental responses to adult children with schizophrenia be 
conceptualised in terms of loss and grief? A case study analysis.
Working title: Theorising parental bereavement following the diagnosis of schizophrenia in 
their child: A Case Study Analysis.
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Can parental responses to adult children with schizophrenia be conceptualised in
terms of loss and grief? A case study analysis.
Abstract
It has been suggested that parental responses to adult children with schizophrenia may 
involve feelings of loss and grief, centred around loss of the pre-morbid version of their 
child. In this exploratory study, an in-depth case study analysis of four parental accounts 
of their responses was undertaken in order to obtain insights into whether these responses 
can be conceptualised in terms of loss and grief, with the aim of informing therapeutic 
practice with parents in this position. Information was also obtained on how parents 
coped with the reactions that their child’s condition elicited in them. Data were analysed 
using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. In relation to the central research 
question, it was found that the perception of loss was not uniform amongst participants. 
Three acknowledged a sense of loss at least to some extent but one parent resisted such an 
interpretation because she perceived a continuity over time in her son’s behaviour and she 
also challenged her son’s diagnosis. One parent acknowledged a loss of his daughter’s 
pre-morbid self but qualified this by pointing to her continued physical presence. The 
usefulness of existing models of grief are examined in light of the findings. The 
implications for the practice of counselling psychology are discussed.
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Can parental responses to adult children with schizophrenia be conceptualised in
terms of loss and grief? A case study analysis
Introduction
It is acknowledged that families face a formidable burden in caring for a relative with 
serious mental illness (Cook et a l, 1994; Hatfield, 1978; Hoenig & Hamilton, 1966; 
Horwitz & Reinhard, 1995; Pariante & Carpiniello, 1996; Thompson & Doll, 1982). 
Caring for a son or daughter with a mental illness involves unique financial, social and 
emotional burdens (Crotty & Krulys, 1986; Doll, 1976; Gubman & Tessler, 1987; 
Hatfield, 1987; Maurin & Boyd, 1990; Potasznik & Nelson, 1984). These are due mainly 
to the specific changes in behaviour that parents experience in their son or daughter which 
include withdrawal, psychotic symptoms, behavioural excesses and impaired social 
performance (Birchwood & Smith, 1987).
It has been suggested that part of the burden for parents of (adult) children with 
schizophrenia involves dealing with feelings of loss and grief (Atkinson, 1994; Chafetz & 
Barnes, 1989; Davis & Schultz, 1998; MacGregor, 1994; McElroy, 1987; Miller, 1996; 
Parker, 1993; Ryan, 1993; Solomon & Draine, 1996). This suggestion arises from the 
belief that, with the onset of schizophrenic symptoms, parents experience a perceived loss 
of the pre-morbid version of their child, a loss of their child’s potential (Davis & Schultz, 
1998; Ryan, 1993) and therefore the loss of hopes and aspirations for their child’s future 
(Miller, 1996; Parker, 1993). Conceptualising these experiences as a loss - termed by 
Miller (1996) a ‘psychic loss’ - may not be straightforward, however, due to the insidious 
and cyclical nature of the illness and periodic reappearances of the child’s ‘former self. 
Detailed parental accounts of their responses to a son or daughter with schizophrenia are 
therefore required to explore the validity of this conceptualisation.
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If parental responses can be conceptualised in terms of loss, there may be some overlap 
between parental experiences and the experience of grief following a bereavement, 
although the continued physical presence of the son or daughter means that one 
experiential domain does not map exactly onto the other (Solomon & Draine, 1996). An 
understanding of the grieving process, prompted by Freud’s (1917) seminal paper 
Mourning and Melancholia, led western psychotherapeutic approaches to claim that ‘grief 
work’ is essential for the resolution of grief (Davy, 1998). The work of many authors, 
spanning much of the twentieth century, sought to develop this ‘grand theory’, including 
Bowlby (1969, 1973, 1980), Lindemann (1944, 1979), Parkes (1965, 1980, 1985, 1993, 
1998) and Worden (1991, 1996). Therapeutic approaches are said to facilitate grief work 
by concentrating on making the loss ‘real’, to enable detachment from the deceased and 
engagement in new relationships (see Raphael & Nunn, 1988).
Throughout the 1990s, however, Margaret Stroebe and colleagues have undertaken 
literature reviews and empirical studies which call into question the grief work hypothesis 
(e.g., Schut a/., 1997; Stroebe, 1992, 1994, 1998; Stroebe e/a/., 1994). She suggests 
that there is insufficient empirical evidence to confirm the claims of theorists who 
subscribe to this idea. From this body of research, she developed a new model of coping 
with loss called the ‘Dual Process Model’ (Stroebe, 1998). In essence, this suggests that 
the avoidance of grief work - which she termed ‘restoration-orientation’ - can be usefial if 
oscillation occurs between this and the ‘real’ work or working through of grief - which she 
termed ‘loss-orientation’. This model, however, may prove problematic if used in cases 
where experiences of loss are complex. Miller (1996) acknowledged the usefulness of 
stage models in facilitating complex grief work when he took Worden’s (1991) four-task 
model of grief and adapted the last two tasks to develop a model specifically to address 
the sense of loss to mental illness. These tasks were transformed into ‘ accommodations to 
the loss via relationships outside that with the mentally ill relative’ and ‘accommodations 
to the loss via the relationship with the mentally ill relative’ (p. 633). Although
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researchers have empirically explored loss and grief among parents of people with 
schizophrenia (Atkinson, 1994; Davis & Schultz, 1998; Miller et a l, 1990; Solomon & 
Draine, 1996), not only has little attention been paid to the actual conceptualisation of loss 
but also no qualitative work has been undertaken specifically in the area of ‘psychic loss’.
The aim of the present study was to explore parental responses to having a child 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, with the research being informed by existing models of 
grief. In this study, the term ‘child’ and ‘children’ is used to refer to offspring, regardless 
of their age, whilst being aware of the danger of such terms infantilising those to whom 
they refer. The study involved elaborating parents’ understanding of and responses to 
their children’s schizophrenia and exploring whether these responses could reasonably be 
interpreted and understood in terms of loss and grief. The intention was to use the 
research findings to identify therapeutic interventions which could help parents resolve 
problematic feelings about their children with schizophrenia.
Method
Participants
Having gained ethical approval for the study (see appendix I), parents of people who had 
been diagnosed with schizophrenia were recruited through the National Schizophrenia 
Fellowship (NSF), an organisation which aims to help people with serious mental illness, 
their families and carers. Local group co-ordinators in one geographical area (Surrey) 
were provided with information about the study and were asked to invite members to take 
part. Four parents agreed to participate.
Interview Schedule
Data were collected through interviews, using a semi-structured interview schedule (see 
appendix II) to elicit information relating to parents’ responses to their son or daughter’s
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condition and whether they experienced their son or daughter’s condition in terms of loss. 
Questions were carefully designed to avoid leading participants into simply complying 
with this construction of their experiences. For example, the possibility that parents might 
construct their child’s condition in various ways was presented and then parents were 
invited to reflect upon how they thought of their child’s condition and of the life changes 
associated with it. Participants were asked to provide a history of their child’s condition, 
including their emotional and practical reactions to this, how they coped with any negative 
feelings and what support (if any) they received from others.
Procedure
Two participants were interviewed in their homes and two were interviewed at the 
researcher’s university base. Interviews were conducted by the author and lasted 55-80 
minutes. Before the interviews, all participants signed a consent form (see appendix III) 
and completed a demographic information questionnaire (see appendix IV). Due to the 
sensitive nature of the research topic and the potential for the interview to cause distress 
for participants, interviews were undertaken using a basic counselling-style format, 
following the recommendations of Coyle (1998). On completion of the interview, each 
participant was offered a follow-up counselling session to talk through any feelings of 
distress. No participant availed of this offer. Interviews were audiotaped and transcribed 
verbatim.
Analytic Strategy
An idiographic approach was adopted in the analysis of the interview data, analysing each 
case individually in order to produce detailed accounts of parental responses. Although 
there has been a tradition of using clinical case studies in psychology, a decline in their use 
in research occurred in the middle part of the twentieth century (Runyan, 1982). A revival 
of interest, however, can be observed more recently in the work of writers and researchers 
such as Jones (1993), Josselson and Lieblich (1993), McAdams (1988) and Smith (1990, 
1991) and colleagues (Smith et al., 1995).
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The data were analysed using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Smith, 
1996; Smith et ah, 1997, 1999). This method of analysis is concerned with developing an 
‘insider’s perspective’ (Conrad, 1987) on participants’ experiences and concentrates on 
the meanings that they attach to their experiences. It requires the detailed analysis of 
accounts of experiences offered by small samples, with the aim being to say something 
meaningful about the cognitions and emotions which are reflected in these accounts.
The analysis involved examining the transcript of each interview in detail. During repeated 
readings of each transcript, notes were made of significant or interesting points related to 
the research topic. These notes formed the basis for emergent themes which encapsulated 
the essence of significant points within the participant’s account. These relatively fine­
grained themes were then amalgamated where possible into more analytic ‘superordinate 
themes’. However, steps were taken to ensure that these themes remained grounded in 
the participant’s account by checking for evidence in the transcript which would support 
the themes. Although each transcript was analysed on an individual basis, inevitably the 
analysis of previous cases influenced the analysis of subsequent ones to some degree.
IPA recognises that the research product necessarily represents the outcome of a dynamic 
interaction between participants’ accounts and the researcher’s interpretative framework 
(Smith et ah, 1999). It is therefore necessary to reflect upon the researcher’s 
interpretative framework in relation to this topic and the ways in which it may have 
influenced the analysis. The researcher has worked with both people with schizophrenia 
and their carers in clinical practice. His interest in this research topic includes a previous 
research piece exploring expressed emotion in carers of people with schizophrenia as an 
adaptation to loss (Birchwood & Osborne, unpublished paper). It could be argued that 
the analysis of participants’ accounts within such interpretative frameworks -  far from 
resulting in a research product tainted by the researcher’s subjectivity -  produced an 
analysis that made constructive use of informed subjectivities. All interpretations offered
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were checked by the researcher’s supervisor in the hope that this would enable 
unwarranted, idiosyncratic interpretations to be identified and removed. In addition, all 
major interpretations are illustrated by quotations fi*om the interviews, thereby 
demonstrating the basis for these interpretations and enabling readers to assess their 
persuasiveness for themselves.
In the quotations presented in the analysis, information within square brackets has been 
added for clarification and ellipsis points (...) indicate where words or a passage have 
been omitted from the original quotations. All identifying information, such as names and 
locations, have been changed to pseudonyms to protect the confidentiality of the 
participants.
Note that on occasions, participants talked not only about their experiences but also about 
the experiences of other family members. Although the accuracy of this data is open to 
question because of its second-hand nature, it will sometimes be included in the analysis as 
it provides some indication of the extent to which the family system can be challenged by 
accommodating a person with schizophrenia. However, readers should treat this data with 
caution.
Analysis
Case Study One: Jean
Jean is 54 years old and is married to the father of her three children. They live with their 
son, Timothy (22) who was diagnosed with schizophrenia one year ago. He has displayed 
symptoms of schizophrenia for four years during which time Jean has been his main carer. 
Her younger daughter is at university and her other daughter is married.
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Uncertainty prior to diagnosis
Jean described a long period of time between first observing her son’s difficult behaviour 
and his diagnosis of schizophrenia. This was described as a period of three years of not 
knowing what the cause of his behaviour was. She explained that an earlier diagnosis 
would have provided her with a better understanding of his behaviour and also how to 
react to his criticisms. When incidents occurred with her son, she ‘put it down to the 
behaviour from this incident [a fight Timothy was involved in] more than thinking “This is 
a mental illness.” I can honestly say it wasn’t until the breakdown and he was put into 
hospital that we ever thought he was mentally ill. ’ It would seem that Jean had initially 
interpreted this unusual behaviour as a manifestation of temporary destabilisation instead 
of the first sign of mental illness (Terkelsen, 1987). Later in the interview, she explained 
that in retrospect she began to ‘pull the wool over my eyes’ to guard herself from 
admitting it was mental illness. She went on to explain that ‘you are confronted with a 
situation in which you just think the person involved has just totally gone against the 
family.. .the total trauma for parents. ’.
Interpreting the illness in terms of loss
In the early stages of the illness, Jean said that she perceived a change in her son. She 
described him as a ‘very different son and a son, oddly enough, who had been so laid back 
and such an easy going personality. ’ It would seem from this that Jean felt that her son’s 
former self had receded. She confirmed this later in the interview when, unprompted, she 
explained that having a son with schizophrenia was like a ‘bereavement because one felt 
one had lost the person one knew... almost like a living death.’ Note here the use of the 
general term ‘one’ instead of the more personal ‘I’: this could be interpreted as a 
rhetorical distancing of herself from a situation which would be too painful to talk about in 
personal terms. Such a loss has been conceptualised in the literature on carers of people 
with mental illness as a ‘psychic loss’ (Miller, 1996), in which the person lives on but the 
relationship changes profoundly. This was illustrated when Jean explained that ‘his
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symptoms started to get worse, his relations with us broke down completely.’ For Jean, 
her loss involved the loss of aspirations for her son, including his academic potential and 
his future happiness. She reported that ‘he did actually have a good brain so it was a little 
frustrating to see him, as we perceived it, as losing all his talents.’ It is possible that the 
family therapy which Jean and her family were attending at the time of the interview led to 
her conceptualising her experiences in terms of loss. She suggested that ‘this [the 
conceptualisation of her experiences in terms of bereavement] did come out very much’ in 
therapy.
Although in one of her comments (cited earlier) Jean implied that she felt her son’s former 
self had been ‘lost’, elsewhere she described this former self as ‘trapped’ because on 
occasions he would ‘laugh and carry on just like he used to’. Jean went on to explain that 
‘it’s like a blinding glimpse of life...you think [sigh] “That’s the person we used to know 
and love. McElroy (1987) claimed that this periodic reappearance of the ‘former self 
serves to prolong periods of bereavement. It would seem, however, that Jean 
conceptualises these glimpses as a sign of hope for the return of her son’s pre-morbid self: 
‘there is a good, possibly sixty per cent of the person does return... what is different is the 
lifestyle you lead. ’ This perhaps indicates that although she feels that she has lost the pre- 
morbid version of her son, she still has expectations that the majority of his former self will 
return and therefore perhaps in one sense the loss is ‘unreal’ or temporary to her.
Emotional reactions
During the initial stages of her son’s illness, prior to his diagnosis, Jean recalled feeling 
‘extremely distressed’ due to her son’s verbal abuse towards her. She has since found that 
this abuse was a reaction to voices that he was hearing. She also alluded to her frustration 
over Timothy’s stubbornness, suggesting that he would not see ‘anybody else’s point of 
view’ and also his alienation from the family: ‘he came down to eat, he was totally silent, 
shoved his plate to one side and you couldn’t communicate with him. ’ It has been
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suggested that such behaviour directed at carers may be very difficult to cope with 
(Gibbons £?/a/., 1984; MacCarthy, 1988).
Following her son’s diagnosis, Jean reported that her initial emotion was one of shock, 
describing it as ‘a bit earth shattering’. She also described a feeling of ‘flatness’. These 
emotions were said to have given way to feelings of guilt, which seemed to lead to self­
blame. Jean explained that these ‘enormous feelings of guilt’ were due to looking back 
and thinking ‘if I hadn’t had done that [argued], perhaps he wouldn’t have got so 
stressed. ’ She reported that Timothy’s father also felt guilty about how he had dealt with 
his son. It would appear that this guilt may have led them to blame each other: ‘it’s 
human nature - you accuse the other person - “If you hadn’t have been so strict this 
wouldn’t have happened” ...“If you hadn’t been so lenient that would have happened.” ’ 
Jean went on to express the view that the fiiction that this caused ‘can pull relationships 
apart.’ It has been suggested in the bereavement literature that similar emotions of guilt 
are experienced by parents who have developmentally disabled children and experience 
grief reactions (Olshansky, 1962). The expression of these emotions, Worden (1991) 
suggests, are a vital part of the second task in his reminiscence phase, that of expressing 
overt and latent affect. Such experiences of loss can have serious adverse consequences 
amongst couples (Cook & Oltjenbruns, 1989; Kohner & Henley, 1992; Long, 1992; 
Schatz, 1986).
Coping with the loss
Jean reported that each family member dealt with Timothy’s changing behaviour in 
different ways. Her husband was said to have ‘distanced himself psychologically’ and 
concentrated his thoughts on work, a response often associated with fathers coping with 
loss (Doka & Martin, 1998; Forrest, 1983; Littlewood et al., 1991). Jean explained that 
other family members also distanced themselves. She made this easier for them by limiting 
her communication with them about Timothy. This represents a standard strategy for 
protecting others from an unpleasant event (Rando, 1986). Further evidence of this came
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when Jean explained that she has ‘never actually told my mother...as she’s 80 next 
year...I feel fundamentally she wouldn’t cope. ’ She concluded by remarking that it is 
‘interesting how you sort of protect your own circle. ’ It has been suggested that this may 
engender an inability to grieve appropriately for both the protector and protected 
(Mander, 1994). Jean said that she gained support from her church, as a place ‘one could 
go and be quiet and she found her son’s community psychiatric nurse ‘extremely helpful’, 
as she was able to ‘get a bit of a relationship going’ with him. She also expressed her 
distress to her younger daughter who was said to have ‘just been absolutely incredible. I 
suppose with her training [psychology graduate] she was the best person. She was better 
than my husband...she must have been broken hearted herself. ’ This quotation illustrates 
how important Jean found it to discuss her son with a close family member.
Adjusting to the loss
In her adjustment to the loss of ‘the person one knew’, Jean talked about having ‘your 
own life as well...I mean our life has become totally altered due to the situation, which 
one does willingly because he’s our son and we love him dearly, but there’s got to be an 
element of us attaining our lives as well. ’ From this quotation it would seem that she has 
tried to continue to live her own life with her husband, yet despite this attempt, Jean finds 
it difficult as illustrated in the following remark; ‘He’ll often be there in the evening on his 
own...that is heartbreaking and it’s even worse if we go out...you feel really guilty for 
going out, thinking “Well why should we be going out for the evening enjoying 
ourselves?” ’ This may reflect Jean’s difficulty in adjusting to the new post-diagnosis 
version of her son.
Case Study Two: Amy
Amy is 66 years old, currently lives on her own and became a widow following her 
husband’s suicide ten years ago. She has a daughter and two sons. Her eldest son, Ian 
(34) was diagnosed with schizophrenia 16 years ago after graduating from Cambridge 
University. Up until three years ago, he lived at home. He currently lives locally in
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supported housing and Amy sees him once a fortnight. During the interview, Amy 
appeared reluctant to talk about her emotional responses to her son’s condition and tended 
to change the subject when the topic of emotional responses was raised.
Resisting the diagnosis
Although it would seem that Amy accepts that her son has an illness, she reported that she 
does not accept her son’s diagnosis of schizophrenia, explaining that ‘it’s hard to accept, 
erm, even now I can’t accept it fully. ' She went on to suggest that she thinks it ‘may be 
something like Asperger’s syndrome...I’ve read a lot of books about it...and the 
symptoms of that seem to fit his case exactly. He’s not a split personality at all. I know 
he’s had confused thoughts but all the other symptoms are to do with Asperger’s 
syndrome. ’ Here she seems to justify her questioning of the diagnosis of schizophrenia 
firstly by invoking the popular representation of schizophrenia as ‘split personality’ and 
distancing her son fi-om this and secondly by constructing his symptoms as only partly 
overlapping with those of schizophrenia. It would seem that another reason why she does 
not interpret her son’s behaviour in terms of schizophrenia and asks the question ‘Is it 
possible they [the psychiatrists] have made the wrong diagnosis? ' is because ‘he 
manipulates the doctors and psychiatrists. ’ This was illustrated later when she explained 
that ‘knowing how manipulative he is and clever, I think he’s quite capable of putting on 
the symptoms - not to start with because I think it was a nervous breakdown. ’ Note the 
application of the non-specific label ‘nervous breakdown’ to his condition. This resistance 
to the diagnosis of schizophrenia and the search for alternative interpretations of his 
behaviour and condition are also reflected in the following quotation where Amy explained 
that her son ‘used to get hallucinations - this was when he was very ill - over his food like 
a plate of food, .and he had very, very bright lights, but I think it was [due to being] over­
worked. '
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Continuity of the person
Amy suggested that her son was not a different person because of his condition, remarking 
that ‘he’s always been different and he’s always caused problems in the fact of tensions 
and every time we went on holiday as a family...it was ruined. ’ This may suggest that 
Amy did not perceive her son’s current self as significantly different from how he was 
throughout his childhood and therefore no loss of a pre-morbid self was believed to have 
occurred. Instead, in her account, there appeared to be some continuity in how she 
represented him. This was further illustrated when Amy explained that ‘I don’t think he’s 
changed... he’s always been like that... a bit difficult, erm, I feel he’s the same person.’
Coping with the condition
When asked how she coped with her son’s illness, Amy explained that 1 think I haven’t 
coped too badly... somehow you get the inner resources to cope with things. ’ This 
suggests that she believes she has gained an inner strength to cope without help from 
others. This was further illustrated when she reported that T don’t like to distress them 
[her other children]...because my daughter has got her own little children to bring up and 
Jonathan [other son] has got a nice girlfi-iend. I feel it’s my. I’ve got to deal with it - in a 
way it’s my problem. I’m the mother. ’ It appears that Amy has isolated herself from the 
rest of her family in terms of coping with her son, as she perceives it to be her problem. As 
well as indicating the standard positioning of mothers as being primarily responsible for 
the care of their children, this could also be seen as reflecting some degree of self-blame, a 
reaction perhaps evoked by the routine blaming of mothers for the occurrence of any 
problems with their children (Caplan, 1985).
Aspirations for the future
Amy explained that she felt unsupported by her son’s social worker as illustrated by the 
following quotation: ‘Well if I could talk to somebody who’d listen you know, like the 
social worker - she doesn’t really listen. ’ She went on to explain that she wanted them to 
‘support me in the move that I think, and my son thinks, that he is well enough to get
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some paid, interesting work, give it a go but they won’t. They either say it’s too early - 
they have been saying that now for years. I mean it’s 12 years since he left Cambridge... he 
can’t be a solicitor without this year course [one year law course]. ’ It would seem from 
these quotations that the support Amy feels she needs is help in getting her son to ftilfil his 
pre-morbid potential. This could be interpreted in one sense as Amy seeing her son’s 
possible stage of remission as a full recovery from his illness and seeing the social worker 
as repressing her future part-images of her son (Terkelsen, 1987). It may also show how 
Amy continues to invest her hopes in her son’s earlier life script instead of considering that 
these investments may be lost and that hopes may need to be reconceptualised. It is 
suggested that this a common feature of loss among parents within Western cultures 
(Braun & Berg, 1994) and can be seen as impeding the overall acknowledgement of loss, 
which is the first stage of Worden’s (1991) model.
Case Study Three: Graham
Graham is 76 years old and lives with his 40-year-old daughter, Rachel. She has been 
displaying symptoms of schizophrenia for 20 years and was diagnosed with schizophrenia 
five years ago. Graham has cared for Rachel since the onset of these symptoms as well as 
caring for his late wife who also had schizophrenia.
Qualified interpretation of the illness in terms of loss
At first, Graham explained that he did not perceive the illness-related changes in his 
daughter as a Toss’: No I don’t see it as losing a daughter really... no I don’t feel I’ve 
lost her. ’ Further evidence of this came later in the interview when he stated with 
insistence that Tf she was suddenly taken ill [or] she was taken away I might feel I ’ve lost 
a daughter of course but no, not at the moment, no, no, no.’ It would seem, however, that 
although here Graham states that he does not conceptualise his response to his daughter’s 
condition in terms of loss, the following quotation could be interpreted as acknowledging 
a ‘psychic loss’ (Miller, 1996): ‘She’s only physically the same...you know, yes, she’s a 
daughter alright, she’s in a bad mental state but so, I mean I’ve lost a daughter in the sense
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that she’s not really intelligent and doesn’t say, doesn’t converse really at all, so in that 
respect I lost a daughter but she’s there in presence. ’ In this extract, Graham points to 
the physical continuity in his daughter over time but contrasts this with the psychological 
and social discontinuity that has been occasioned by her condition. Remarks later in the 
interview once again suggested that he experienced some sense of loss when he reminisced 
about how his daughter used to be, saying that as ‘a young child she was delightful and 
very beautiful and [I was] very proud of her of course, so it is very sad that she has gone 
this way. ’ Although Graham felt he had lost the daughter he used to know, there seemed 
to be little expression of sadness but rather acceptance and a feeling of lacking control 
over the situation as illustrated in the following quotation: ‘But there is nothing I can do 
about it. One has to accept these things. Well, you know, depressing as they are... one 
must accept. If you don’t you could make yourself ill. ’ This could be interpreted as a 
successful resolution of grief or as a conscious or unconscious attempt to ignore 
potentially threatening thoughts or feelings - something that is defined as an extreme 
coping mechanism for loss, termed ‘escape’ (Bowlby, 1980; Glick et a l,  1974; 
Lindemann, 1944; Parkes, 1998).
Coping with the illness
It would appear that Graham’s main method of coping with his daughter’s illness revolved 
around distancing himself fi-om it both mentally and physically. This was illustrated when 
he explained that Tor most of the time I’ve been out at work. I mean, I worked till I was 
70 and then I took on a part time job. . . I mean, to a certain extent out of sight and out of 
mind. You see, I was able to dismiss it and concentrate on my work.. .I coped with it that 
way otherwise if I’d had to live with it all these years... if I’d had to full time, you know, 
at home - well, I don’t know. I’d be in a terrible state. ’ This type of coping has been 
referred to as ‘masculine grief as such distancing fi-om emotionally threatening situations 
has been found to be a standard male response (Martin & Doka, 1996). Graham went on 
to suggest that ‘It’s only this last year, as I say, that I’ve given up work that it’s 
pressurised me more shall we say and concerned me more. ’ This quotation suggests that
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Graham has more recently found coping with his daughter and her illness to be more 
difficult due to spending more time with her. This could been seen as a time when 
Graham can no longer avoid confronting his thoughts and feelings about his daughter.
Support
Graham rarely spoke of seeking support for himself apart from one point in the interview 
when he reported attending the NSF carers support group. He explained that T thought it 
might be helpful so, yes, I - well, I don’t think I get a lot from it...It was interesting to 
know that someone had a relative that was - well, had similar problems to my daughter. I 
don’t know that she [the other carer] said he [her son] had any destructive habits so from 
that point of view I felt she was a little better off ’ These comments could be interpreted 
as suggesting that the most credible support for Graham would have been offered by 
someone who was in a situation that was closely analogous to his own. Graham may see 
their experiences as enabling them to truly understand and empathise with his situation. 
On the other hand, his account could be interpreted as indicating a reluctance to be 
supported.
Case Study Four: Linda
Linda is 69 years old and is widowed following the death of her husband 15 years ago. 
She lives with her 29-year-old son, Liam, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia four 
years ago. He has displayed symptoms of schizophrenia for 15 years and has been cared 
for by Linda throughout his life.
Interpreting the illness in terms of change and loss
Linda reported feeling that she had lost her son through his illness, explaining it is like 
something in another world. You know, you think you’re in another world because you 
can’t believe what’s happening to you because one minute you love them and then you 
think it’s the devil himself got them. ’ This perhaps suggests that Linda interprets her 
son’s illness in terms of it having occasioned a sudden and difficult-to-believe
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transformation in her son’s self. Later in the interview, however, she points to a 
continuity at some level, although at the same time implies change, saying ‘as a kid, he’s 
always been hard work for us - well, it wasn’t same thing as what his schizophrenia is but 
he’s always had them [behavioural problems]. There’s no getting away from that - he’s 
had that from when he was a baby, you know. When it’s schizophrenia it’s a totally 
different thing altogether. ’ Here continuity is highlighted in her son’s behavioural 
problems but these are differentiated from schizophrenia.
Emotional reactions
There were few occasions during the interview when Linda expressed any emotions about 
the changes in her son and the Toss’ of her son to schizophrenia. On one occasion she 
explained that it is ‘very sad, very sad’ to think of how her son used to be compared to 
how he is now. Later in the interview, whilst reminiscing, Linda stated that she felt ‘very 
hurt about it, not knowing what it was and I feel that I - 1 don’t feel that I ’m to blame for 
it like that [social worker] said I was. How can I be blamed for giving one of my children 
schizophrenia? ’. This suggests that she is upset about her son’s illness yet it is difficult to 
determine whether these emotions were compounded by Linda’s interpretation of her 
interactions with the social worker, when she seemed to feel that she was being held 
responsible for her son’s condition. To the extent that Linda’s recollection of her 
interaction with the social worker is accurate, this may again be seen as highlighting the 
way in which mothers tend to be routinely blamed for causing dysfunction in their children 
(Caplan, 1985) (see Jean’s case for an earlier example).
Coping with negative feelings
Linda reported that she deals with her sadness by going ‘for a walk, go out in the garden 
and lose yourself. You know no one else will listen to you. ’ This seems to denote a 
reliance on oneself rather than on others perhaps because of experiences of not being 
heard. She also explained that T think you hide them [feelings] a lot. I think you keep 
them in, to yourself, which makes it worse...I mean you can admit to your family but you
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don’t want to go out to the world because people have got a different view about it 
[schizophrenia].’ Here, Linda seems to be referring to having suppressed her emotions or 
having shared them only with a limited audience because of an awareness of the stigma 
attached to schizophrenia. Miller (1996) suggests that alongside the abstract nature of 
‘psychic loss’, the stigma of the illness serves to inhibit open discussion of the loss and 
thus causes protracted grief. Linda concluded by remarking that ‘You try to hide it all, 
you know. You think it’ll go away but it’s never going to go away. ’ It would seem from 
this that Linda internalises her emotions in the hope that her painful feelings will disappear, 
yet she acknowledges that this is not going to happen.
Discussion
Limitations o f the study
The self-selected sample for this study included those parents who were involved in 
carers’ groups of the NSF. Therefore, the sample consists only of those parents who have 
sought this type of support for themselves and does not include parents who are not aware 
of these groups or to whom they are not readily available. The sample may also exclude 
parents who have either dealt with any issues surrounding the loss of their child to 
schizophrenia or equally, those who refuse the offer of support from carers’ groups, 
opting to support themselves or seek support from within the family. It also does not 
include a same-sex dyad between parent and child. Inclusion of such parents and dyads 
may have produced different findings.
It is acknowledged that the accounts offered by participants may not be isomorphic with 
the events and experiences of which they speak. The reasons for this may include memory 
distortions, recall biases and the impact of the context; for example, in one interview, the 
son who was being discussed was occasionally within earshot of the participant. Despite 
this, it should not be assumed that autobiographical memory and retrospective accounts
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are necessarily inaccurate and unstable. There is sufficient research evidence to suggest 
the contrary and some writers have offered suggestions for improving accuracy, some of 
which were employed in this study (Blane, 1996; Brewin et a l, 1993; Neisser, 1994; Ross 
& Conway, 1986; Rubin et a l, 1986; Wagenaar, 1986).
Due to the case study approach, the generalisability of this research remains limited. What 
this study does offer is an in-depth assessment of participants’ responses and feelings to 
enable an exploration as to whether these can be conceptualised in terms of loss and grief. 
Such close attention to personal accounts is perhaps more important at this early stage of 
our understanding of parental responses, particularly in light of the specific changes in an 
adult child with schizophrenia that are experienced by parents. This exploratory study is 
therefore important to aid our understanding before extending research to a larger sample.
Theoretical implications
Throughout the interviews, participants preferred to recount their child’s behaviours and 
actions despite being asked direct questions regarding their own feelings. This mind set, 
alluded to by Miller (1996), limited overt expression of their own emotions. It is possible 
that this has been brought about by a prolonged period of speaking for their son or 
daughter and attending to their child’s needs whilst suppressing their own. For three of 
the participants, an in-depth, individual exploration of their feelings may have been a 
unique experience, quite different from what had been provided at NSF groups. The other 
participant attended family therapy to deal with issues surrounding her son’s illness. This 
may have served to influence her conceptualisation of her son’s illness in terms of loss.
When exploring the extent to which parents conceptualised their responses to their child 
with schizophrenia in terms of loss and grief, it was clear that there were mixed messages. 
Whilst two participants acknowledged a loss at least to some extent and conceptualised 
the changes in their child in these terms, another felt that no loss had occurred, as she did 
not see her son as being any different to how he was before the onset of his illness. The
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other participant similarly did not conceptualise the changes in his daughter in terms of 
loss, due mainly to her continued physical presence, yet his further remarks could be 
interpreted as implying an experience of loss to some extent. The data therefore suggest 
that there was a difference amongst participants concerning the extent to which responses 
to their adult child with schizophrenia involved a sense of having lost the child they once 
knew. Those who did not conceptualise their experiences in terms of loss tended to 
express methods of coping with the illness itself, whereas those who did acknowledge a 
loss spoke of coping with this loss and with its associated emotions.
It is possible that there were factors which served to complicate participants 
conceptualising their experiences as a loss. A delayed diagnosis, as reported by Jean, may 
have done this as it led to her continuing to cling to aspirations for her son, the 
relinquishment of which is a major part of the grieving process (Miller, 1996). Another 
factor, which could in one sense be seen as complicating the portrayal of experiences in 
terms of loss, is the lack of acceptance of the illness. However, although acceptance of 
the illness is understood as a ‘turning point’ in accepting the child as he or she is 
(Yamashita & Forsyth, 1998), it could be argued in light of critiques of diagnostic 
categories in mental health (Harper, 1994; Parker et a l, 1995) that Amy’s sceptical view 
of diagnosis should not necessarily be deemed an ‘unhealthy’ response.
Another factor which may have served to cause differences in participants’ 
conceptualisations of their experiences is their perception of their child’s pre-morbid self. 
Linda alluded to the contrast between pre-morbid behavioural problems and symptoms of 
schizophrenia in her son. This perceived contrast may have served to aid her in 
representing her experiences in terms of loss. Amy, on the other hand, had always 
perceived her son as different to others, and so her perception of the impact of her son’s 
psychotic symptoms on his former self may have been markedly reduced. It could be 
hypothesised that this may have been a factor in her not conceptualising her experiences as 
a loss. It could be concluded from this that it is not the existence of ‘abnormal’ pre-
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morbid behaviour that complicates representing experiences as loss but rather the parent’s 
perception of the contrast.
As acknowledged by other researchers (Miller, 1996; Parker, 1993; Solomon & Draine, 
1996) it was found that the continued presence of the child served to make the resolution 
of grief problematic, as explained by Jean. Such continued presence makes it difficult for 
parents to assimilate the loss, which is said to be an essential part of grief work (Marris, 
1986). It would seem that this continued presence also played a role in Graham’s initial 
unwillingness to see his experiences in terms of loss, as for him his daughter’s presence 
meant that in one way he felt that he had not lost her.
In identifying whether these responses can be accommodated within existing theories of 
grief, attention should be firstly given to Miller’s (1996) adaptation of Worden’s (1991) 
stage approach to grief work. In light of this study, it would seem that Miller’s model 
provides useful tasks to work through ‘psychic loss’. It should be noted however that 
little comment can be made on the latter tasks of this model (the phases that Miller 
actually adapted) from the data obtained as it would seem that there is little evidence to 
suggest that the participants were at these stages. Instead, evidence is presented 
suggesting that the initial task o f ‘making the loss real’ is possibly an important part of the 
process. Due to the specific nature of this loss the difficulty of proceeding past this stage 
should not be underestimated, a point to which Mfiller perhaps paid insufficient attention. 
Successful completion of this stage may bring a different prognosis of the resolution of 
grief and possibly the need for a different, less directive approach from the counselling 
psychologist.
Regarding the utility of applying Stroebe’s (1998) model of grief to these issues within 
therapy, the data suggest that problems may occur. Without an acknowledgement of loss, 
it could be argued that the parent remains in ‘restoration-orientation’ without movement 
to the ‘loss-orientation’. If it were deemed necessary to promote ‘loss-orientation’ (and
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whether this is always necessary or desirable is open to question), a careful initial focus on 
conceptualising one’s experiences in terms of loss would be required. Following this, the 
oscillation between the two would need to be carefully monitored throughout therapy.
This study highlights variation in the ways in which parents conceptualise their experiences 
with their schizophrenic child. Other responses to having an adult child with 
schizophrenia were also expressed. These included the burden of their child’s behaviour, 
coping with the illness and the type of preferred support. Further research could extend 
this exploratory study by involving a larger sample to increase our understanding of 
whether responses can be conceptualised in terms of loss and grief. Furthermore, such 
qualitative data could be examined against quantitative measures collected to assess the 
conceptualisation of grief.
Implications fo r  the practice o f counselling psychology
If this study has managed to access common parental experiences and conceptualisations 
to any extent, then counselling psychologists may have a vital role to play in providing a 
facilitating environment for parents to explore their responses to their children with 
schizophrenia. The initial stages of therapeutic interventions for such parents could 
represent opportunities for providing information about mental illness in a supportive 
environment. Laford (1994) explained that ‘when we see mental illness as loss we are at 
the starting point of the conscious grieving process’ (p. 11). If this is considered cathartic, 
then it may be worth spending time exploring whether a conceptualisation in terms of loss 
is plausible and useful for parents. Tentative challenges by the counselling psychologist 
concerning how the child is perceived by the parent to be the same and how he or she is 
perceived as different may make the loss more conscious for the parent. A premature 
progression to deal with the process of grieving, before ensuring this vital stage is 
achieved, may cause problems later in therapy.
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However, as not all parents in this study felt that they had experienced a loss, the cathartic 
possibilities of facilitating the construction of parents’ feelings in terms of loss may be 
questionable. In some circumstances, counselling psychologists may not wish to facilitate 
a construction of loss on the grounds that to do so would overwrite unproblematic 
parental subjectivities and limit parents’ conceptualisations of their experiences. In these 
cases, counselling psychologists could simply provide a facilitative environment in which 
parents can express their own feelings and explore their concerns around their child’s 
condition in an environment quite different from that which can be offered by health 
professionals involved in the care of their child.
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Appendix H
Experiences among parents of adult children with schizophrenia:
Topic Areas for Interview
I. INTRODUCTION
Introduction of researcher, explanation of the research -  what it will involve and why do 
it. Explanation and signing of consent form. Explanation and completion of background 
information form.
[Switch on audiotape recorder]
n. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS
1. I wonder if we could start by going back to the time when [relative] first started 
showing symptoms associated with schizophrenia.
How long ago was that?
How old was [relative] at the time?
Could you tell me what happened?
Prompts (check list)
- Reactions to their symptoms, how they made sense oEinterpreted them 
Need to know the development and progression of condition
- How they felt at specific events in the story
- How did they cope with any difficulties (please give examples)
Tty and ascertain if  they experienced it as a loss or not
2. From what has been written on caring for a relative with schizophrenia, it appears that 
carers think of this experience in many different ways. For example some carers have 
said that, as their relative’s condition deteriorated, they felt they were losing the 
person they once knew and so that their feelings were similar to the feelings of
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someone who had sufifered a bereavement. Others, however, may feel that their 
experiences are not like bereavement because they haven’t entirely lost the person 
whom they once knew as they are still around and are still in some respects the same 
person they always were.
How do these fit with your experiences? Was there a time that you felt you lost the
[relative] whom you used to know or have you felt that he/she is still pretty much the
same person?
If loss then;
- In what ways do feel you have lost the person you used to know?
- When did you realise that you were losing or had lost the [relative] you used to know
- How did this make them feel?
- How did they cope with these feelings?
- Are they still experiencing these feelings?
I f  same person then:
- How do you feel he/she is the same?
(Now go to qu. 7)
3. How do you feel now when you think about how your {relative} used to be?
4. It seems that from what is said about losing a person that you once knew, coming to 
terms with it is a very difficult and painful experience. We all have different ways of 
coping with difficult events in our lives.
How do you feel you have coped with this experience?
Prompts: -
In what ways have you coped?
Have you received support from others?
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What have they said or done which you have found helpful?
What have they said or done which you have found unhelpful?
5. Looking back, is there anything you think you could have done which would have made 
it easier for you to cope?
-How do you feel that would have made a difference to how you feel now?
6. Thinking back over the last (X amount of years) how easy or difficult have you found it 
to discuss the differences that you saw in your {relative} with other people?
{if they have found it easy)
Prompts:
- Who have you talked to?
- What have you talked about? {how they used to be /how  they are now)
- Did you or do you find it helpful?
- What parts of this did you find helpful?
(if they have found it difficult)
Prompts:
- In what ways have you found it difficult?
- Has this changed over time?
7. Are there any ways that you feel health services could have helped you deal with your 
experiences?
I f  yes
How would these have helped you to cope? 
in . THE FUTURE
8. Looking ahead now, how do you see things developing in the future for [relative]? 
And for you?
What makes you say that?
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How does that prospect make you feel?
(If they see a difficult future:)
What sort of help would you need to enable you to cope better with this?
How would that make a difference?
- That’s all the questions I want to ask. Is there anything which I haven’t covered that 
you would like to talk about?
- How did you feel about taking part?
Was there anything about the discussion you found helpful? Unhelpful?
Could you give me an example of what you mean?
[Check that the interview has not left them feeling upset/distressed.]
IV. CLOSURE
[Switch off audiotape recorder]
1. Thank the participant for taking part.
2. Remind participant that their identity will remain anonymous and what 
they have said will be treated with the utmost confidence.
3. Remind participant that a follow up session is available on request.
Probes which may be used to elicit further information :
Could you say more about that?
Why do you think that is?
Could you give me an example of what you mean?
How does [did] that make you feel?
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Appendix HI
Consent Form for Interview Recording
I the undersigned voluntarily agree for the interview regarding the study into carers of the 
mentally ill to be recorded.
I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided. I have been given an 
explanation regarding the reason for tape recording the interview. I have been given the 
opportunity to ask any questions about the interview.
I understand that all documentation including recorded tapes held about myself is in the 
strictest confidence and complies with the Data Protection Act (1984).
I understand that I am free to stop the recording of the interview at any time and on 
request, be given the tape without needing to justify my decision and without prejudice.
I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to the recording to 
this interview.
Name of Volunteer......................................................................
(Block Capitals)
Relationship to mentally ill person..................................................
Signed............................................................................................
Date.
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Appendix IV
Demographic Information
To begin, I would like to get some basic information about you and the person whom you 
care for. The reason that I would like this information is so that I can show those who 
read the research report that I managed to obtain the views of a cross-section of people. 
The information that you give will never be used to identify you in any way because this 
research is entirely confidential. However, if you do not want to answer some of these 
questions, please do not feel that you have to.
la. Are you: Male   Female
lb. The person you care for is: Male   Female
2a. How old are you? [ ] years
2b. Age of the person you care for: [ ] years
3. Which of the following ethnic groups would you say you and the person you care for 
belong to? {tick the appropriate answer)
YOU THE PERSON YOU CARE FOR
Black- African ______  ______
Black-Caribbean ______  ______
Black-Other ______
Chinese________________________ ______  ______
Bangladeshi ______  ______
Indian ______  ______
Pakistani ______  ______
White ______  ______
Other (Please specify:_________________________________   )
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4. What relation is he/she to you?
5. Do you; live together (go to qu.7) live separately  ( go to
qu.6)
6.How often do you see this person? (please tick).
Every day______________  A few times a week
Once a week____________  Once a fortnight__
Once a month____________  less than once a month (please specify)
7. How many years has he/she been diagnosed as Schizophrenic? [______ ] years
8. How long do you feel that your relative displayed symptoms before diagnosis? 
[___________________ ] Years or months.
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All pages should be numbered. Proofs for checking will normally be sent to the first 
author, to whom any correspondence and offprints will also be addressed. Footnotes to 
the text should be avoided wherever this is reasonably possible.
Short communications and case reports normally limited to four journal pages 
(approximately 2400 words including tables and references) will be published in the next 
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progress.
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An exploratory comparison of expressed emotion ratings from people
with schizophrenia and their relatives
Working title: A comparison o f ‘perceived’ and ‘actual’ expressed emotion in people with 
schizophrenia and their carers.
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An exploratory comparison of expressed emotion ratings from people with
schizophrenia and their relatives
Summary
The degree of expressed emotion (EE) in the familial environment to which a person with 
schizophrenia returns after discharge has been found to predict relapse. Most studies have 
relied upon relatives’ ratings of EE and have ignored the perspective of people with 
schizophrenia. In the present study, it was hypothesised that there would be a significant 
difference between the EE ratings provided by people with schizophrenia and the EE 
ratings provided by their closest relatives. Thirty-five dyads consisting of people with 
schizophrenia and their closest relatives were recruited through National Schizophrenia 
Fellowship groups and through a schizophrenia internet site. Each participant completed 
an original version and a modified version of the Level of Expressed Emotion (LEE) scale 
and the Home Life Questionnaire to measure EE from both perspectives. Significantly 
higher levels of EE were reported by the relatives than by the people with schizophrenia 
on the Home Life Questionnaire; no significant differences were found on the LEE scale. 
This suggests that people with schizophrenia may perceive EE behaviour differently to 
their relatives. The implications that this may have for the assessment and predictive 
efficacy of EE and for therapeutic interventions to reduce EE are explored.
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An exploratory comparison of expressed emotion ratings from people with
schizophrenia and their relatives
Introduction
Influential studies by Brown et a l  (1958) and Brown (1959) found that the type of 
emotional environment that a person faces following discharge after a schizophrenic 
episode is predictive of subsequent relapse. It was suggested that patients returning to 
high levels of relatives’ criticism and/or emotional overinvolvement had a higher 
propensity to relapse than those returning to low levels of these behaviours. This 
emotional environment was described as being characterised by high expressed emotion 
(EE) (Brown, 1959). The process by which high EE in the family environment may lead to 
relapse has been elaborated by various writers. For example, Kavanagh (1992) suggested 
that the symptoms and problem behaviours exhibited by people with schizophrenia elicit 
various emotions among their relatives, such as frustration, distress and concern, which 
prompt relatives to try to cope with the symptoms and problem behaviours through critical 
or overinvolved interactions, i.e., high EE behaviour. Such behaviour is said to exacerbate 
the stress within the interaction between the patient and their relatives, which in turn raises 
the patient’s arousal beyond an optimal level (Brown et a l, 1972). It is these changes 
which are believed to lead to relapse.
Since the studies by Brown and colleagues appeared in the 1950s, many subsequent 
studies have investigated EE and its relationship with relapse in schizophrenia. High levels 
of EE are now generally accepted as a reliable predictor of relapse as shown by both 
aggregate analyses (Bebbington & Kuipers, 1994; Parker & Hadzi-Pavlovic, 1990) and 
meta analyses (Butzlaff & Hooley, 1998). However, it should be noted that some studies 
have failed to replicate these findings (Kottgen et al., 1984; MacMillan et a l, 1986; 
Parker et a l, 1989) or have found that EE is only predictive of relapse in males (Hogarty,
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1985). More generally, it has been shown that EE is not a reliable predictor of first 
admission with schizophrenia to psychiatric hospital (Birchwood & Smith, 1987; Stirling 
et a l, 1991). In light of these considerations, it is important to continue to scrutinise the 
concept of EE and its predictive efficacy and to identify potentially fruitful new lines of 
inquiry in this process.
One possible explanation for the discrepancies that have occurred in the EE literature is 
that the majority of studies have deployed measures of EE that are reliant on ratings 
provided by relatives. The most commonly used of these measures is the Camberwell 
Family Interview (CFI), which takes the form of a semi-structured interview with the 
patient’s most ‘significant other’ (usually a relative) (Brown & Rutter, 1966; Rutter & 
Brown, 1966; Vaughn & Leff, 1976). It is, however, the interpretations that the people 
with schizophrenia place on the emotional interactions in their households that are 
believed to mediate the effects of these interactions on them (Gerlsma & Hale, 1997). The 
importance of individuals’ interpretations of events and situations in shaping psychological 
states and behaviours in relation to these events and situations has long been 
acknowledged. For example, one of the key corollaries of Kelly’s (1955) personal 
construct theory was that people differ in their construction of events. These different 
constructions - regarded as working hypotheses - were seen as being tested out in 
behaviour (Bannister & Fransella, 1986). In the literature on stress, Lazarus and Folkman 
(1984) emphasised the importance of cognitive appraisal in determining what is perceived 
as stressful. Following this, Wallander and Varni (1998), in a study of child and family 
adjustment to pediatric chronic physical disorders, suggested that it is the meaning of the 
event rather than its mere occurrence that results in its perception as stressful or benign for 
an individual. In relation to EE, it could therefore be suggested that investigating the 
interpretations or perceptions of people with schizophrenia regarding their relatives’ levels 
of EE - rather than relying solely on relatives’ ratings of EE - is an important but often 
overlooked aspect of EE assessment which could increase the predictive efficacy of EE 
ratings.
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In seeking information about EE, a few dyadic studies have shifted away from this reliance 
upon relatives’ ratings. These studies have focused upon various dyads, including ‘healthy’ 
individuals (Gerlsma et ah, 1992), people with depression and their relatives (Hooley & 
Teasdale, 1989) and people with schizophrenia and their relatives (Donat, 1996). In these 
cases, the ratings provided by ‘focal’ members of the dyads have been found to have 
substantial predictive power. For example, in Donat’s (1996) study, which assessed 
perceived EE in 69 rehospitalised people with schizophrenia, the level of patient-assessed 
intrusiveness/control on the part of their relatives was found to be the second most 
powerful predictor of relapse after drug and alcohol abuse/dependence. Gerlsma et al. 
(1992) suggested that a discrepancy between experimenter-observed (or ‘other’-observed) 
EE and patient-perceived EE has clear implications for interventions, which should then 
involve a patient-focused approach to address their interpretations of EE and foster coping 
skills to deal with their interpreted version of their familial emotional environment. This 
may be more appropriate than the standard family-focused approach that is currently 
adopted to address high EE (Goldstein et a l, 1978; Hogarty et a l, 1986; Leff et a l, 
1982, 1989; Vostanis et a l, 1992). Additionally - as suggested by Gerlsma and Hale’s 
(1997) study with depressed patients - if discrepancies are found between EE ratings from 
people with schizophrenia and their relatives, this may highlight a need for 
psychotherapeutic practitioners who work with clients with schizophrenia to address these 
clients’ perceived interactions between themselves and their relatives. For those providing 
support for relatives, such findings might highlight a need to explore the discrepancy 
between relatives’ perceptions of their behaviour and the perceptions held by the 
individuals with schizophrenia. Given the potential importance of exploring interpretations 
of EE held by people with schizophrenia, one can only speculate about the reasons why 
the interpretations of people with schizophrenia have seldom been sought in research on 
EE. In therapeutic literature, this population has been routinely represented as being 
challenging to work with (Fowler et a l, 1995; Frank & Gunderson, 1990; Nelson, 1998) 
and this representation may have been extended to include research contexts.
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The aim of the present study was to explore the possible differences between EE as rated 
by people with schizophrenia and EE as rated by the relative with whom they had their 
closest relationship. It was hypothesised that there would be a significant difference 
between the EE ratings provided by people with schizophrenia and the EE ratings 
provided by their closest relatives. If significant differences were found, it was intended to 
explore the nature of these differences further.
Method
Sampling and participants
Group co-ordinators of patients’ and relatives’ groups within the National Schizophrenia 
Fellowship (NSF) were contacted throughout the United Kingdom via the NSF 
newsletter. The group co-ordinators were informed about the research and were asked to 
discuss the study with their group members and invite them to participate. This sampling 
procedure produced a limited response (eliciting 18 dyads of people with schizophrenia 
and their closest relatives). This is not unusual as other studies which have investigated 
patient-relative dyads have attracted small samples (for example, Gerlsma & Hale, 1997, 
N=26; Kazarian et al., 1990, N= 22), perhaps because some relatives may feel that EE is a 
pejorative label which attributes blame to them for any instances of relapse (Hatfield et a l, 
1987; Parker et a l, 1988). It was therefore decided to use the internet to recruit further 
dyads. Due to the relief from geographical restrictions that the internet affords, it is being 
increasingly used to recruit research participants who would otherwise be difficult to reach 
(for example, see Turner and Coyle’s, 2000, use of the internet to recruit participants who 
had been conceived by donor insemination), although it is appreciated that there may be 
concerns about the authenticity of those recruited in his way. The schizophrenia web page 
(http://www.schizoplirenia.comI was used to post information about the research and to seek 
participants.
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Thirty-five dyads (N—70) of people with schizophrenia and their relatives were ultimately 
recruited and participated in the study. In terms of ethnicity, 34 dyads were white and the 
other was Asian (from the Indian subcontinent). In terms of nationality, one dyad was 
Canadian, one from the USA, one Australian and the remainder were British. All 
participants with schizophrenia (25 male and 10 female) were outpatients at the time of 
the study; their mean age was 33.7 years (range = 35; SD = 10.0). They were asked to 
indicate which symptoms of schizophrenia they experienced; all conformed to the broad 
ICD-10 criteria for schizophrenia (World Health Organisation, 1992). The sample 
included people who reported only one episode of psychosis (N=6) and those with chronic 
problems (N=29). Of the relatives (29 female and 6 male), all were primary caregivers to 
the participants with schizophrenia: 23 (65.7%) were mothers, 6 (17.1%) spouses, 5 
(14.3%) fathers and 1 (2.9%) sibling. Their mean age was 57.0 years (range = 56; SD =
11.3). The relatives were also asked to indicate which symptoms had been experienced by 
the person for whom they cared; each list of symptoms provided by the relatives 
conformed to the ICD-10 diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia.
Measures
Although the CFI is regarded as the ‘gold standard’ in the measurement of EE, the 
duration of the training required to administer this instrument (70 hours), together with 
the length and complexity of its scoring system, render it an impractical tool for many 
research contexts. Due to these considerations and also because it has been felt that the 
EE concept should not rest on a single operationalisation (Kavanagh, 1992), other tools 
for assessing EE have been developed. Among these is the Home Life Questionnaire 
(Docherty et al., 1990) (see appendix I), which (like the CFI) is completed by a relative. 
This 99-item self-report measure is scored using a four-point Likert scale (‘never, or 
almost never’ = 0; ‘occasionally’ = 1; ‘often’ = 2; ‘always, or almost always’ = 3). Seventy 
items relate to criticism (CC) and 29 to emotional over-involvement (EOI). Ratings of EE 
on the Home Life Questionnaire have been found to correlate strongly with ratings of EE
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on the CFI (Docherty et al., 1990). In validating the CC and EOI subscales against CFI 
scores, cut off criteria were established (87 or higher for high CC and 44 or higher for 
high EOI); ‘high’ classifications on one or both components indicates high EE.
A measure of EE as perceived by people with schizophrenia was provided by the Level of 
Expressed Emotion (LEE) scale (Cole & Kazarian, 1988). The original version of this 
scale took the form of a 60-item questionnaire involving four subscales, each designed to 
assess one of the four response styles which Vaughn and Leff (1981) identified as 
characteristic of high EE relatives. When assessing concurrent validity, it was found that 
total scores on the LEE scale correlated strongly with CFI scores (Kazarian et al., 1990), 
but, in the case of the LEE subscales, the correlational pattern with CFI categories was 
inconsistent. Subsequent attempts to validate the structure of the LEE, however, led 
Gerlsma et al. (1992) to discard the original subscales in favour of three internally 
consistent but moderately intercorrelated factors (lack of emotional support, 
intrusiveness/control, irritability). This revised scale has been found to have good 
psychometric properties (Startup, 1999) and has been used in recent studies (Gerlsma & 
Hale, 1997; Startup, 1999) (see appendix II). It is a 33-item questionnaire, which uses a 
four-point Likert scale (‘not true’ = 1; ‘mostly untrue’ = 2; ‘mostly true’ = 3; ‘true’ = 4). 
Although the LEE scale provides an opportunity to assess differences between the EE 
ratings of people with schizophrenia and their relatives, it has not previously been used in 
this way.
Versions of both the Home Life Questionnaire and the LEE scale (as revised by Gerlsma 
et a l, 1992) were given to participants in each dyad. Each person received one 
questionnaire that had been designed and validated for their viewpoint (i.e., the viewpoint 
of the person with schizophrenia or the viewpoint of their closest relative) and a modified 
version of the questionnaire that had originally been designed to obtain the viewpoint of 
the other person in the dyad. So people with schizophrenia were given the original version 
of the LEE scale and a modified version of the Home Life Questionnaire (see appendix
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Ill); relatives were given the original version of the Home Life Questionnaire and a 
modified version of the LEE scale (see appendix IV). The wording of each item in the 
modified versions of the questionnaires was kept as close as possible to the wording of the 
original version, except for small adjustments which were required to ensure that the item 
applied to the person who was to complete the questionnaire. For example, in the version 
of the Home Life Questionnaire completed by participants with schizophrenia, the item 
‘looking after him is a burden to me’ (which relates to relatives’ perspectives) was 
changed to ‘he/she feels that looking after me is a burden to him/her’.
Procedure
When ethical approval for the research had been obtained (see appendix V), those 
individuals who volunteered to take part were contacted by the researcher and were asked 
if they would complete the questionnaires and provide information about how to contact 
the other person in their dyad. The two questionnaires, together with a brief questionnaire 
designed to gather background information (see appendix VI), were sent to each 
participant. In an accompanying letter, participants were asked to complete the 
questionnaires without consulting the other person in their dyad about their answers.
Analysis
All analyses were conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (version 
8.0). The study used a ‘between participants’ design and therefore an independent samples 
/-test was used to assess the difference between total EE on both measures as reported by 
the two groups. The assumption of equality of variance between groups was tested using 
Levene’s F test and adjusted t values were used when it was found that this assumption 
was not met. A Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was used to assess the 
difference between the sub scales of each measure. The assumptions required to undertake 
this test were examined and tested. Pearson product-moment correlations were 
undertaken on the data provided by each participant group in the dyads to check the 
convergent validity of each measure.
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Results
Analysis of the overall scores for EE using independent /-tests revealed that for the Home 
Life Questionnaire, there was a significant difference between relatives’ ratings of EE 
(mean = 108.3; SD = 31.2) and the ratings of participants with schizophrenia (mean = 
86.7; SD = 21.5) (/ = 3.4, /7<0.01). However, similar differences were not found for the 
LEE scale. Relatives did not report significantly higher levels of EE (mean = 59.9; SD = 
9.9) than the participants with schizophrenia (mean = 57.8; SD = 10.1) (/=  0.8,/?>0.05).
A MANOVA was conducted to examine where the differences between the subscales of 
each questionnaire lay. This method of analysis was chosen instead of a series of /-tests as 
it involves one single analysis and therefore protects against an inflated type I error. There 
were no univariate outliers and the assumptions of normality and linearity were satisfied. 
The outcome of the Box’s M  test for homogeneity of dispersion matrices was not 
significant at p< 0.001 (F (15,18618) = 1.98, p  = 0.013) and the samples were of equal 
size, thereby confirming homogeneity of variance-covariance.
Wilks’ Lambda implicated that the multivariate main effect of group membership was 
significant (F (5,64) = 3.31, p  = 0.01). This indicated that the population means on the 
subscales were not all the same for each group. To investigate the impact of the main 
effect, the follow-up analyses within the MANOVA were used. Results of these analyses 
are summarised in Table 1.
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Table 1.
Means and standard deviations, and tests of between subjects effects for each 
subscale of the Home Life Questionnaire and the Level of Expressed Emotion scale
Relatives People with Schizophrenia P
Mean SD Mean SD F value
Home Life Questionnaire
Criticism 64.3 26.9 52.1 20.6 4.52 0.037
Emotional overinvolvement 44.0 14.8 34.6 11.4 8.84 0.004
LEE scale
Lack of emotional support 32.4 4.5 31.1 6.7 0.89 0.350
Intrusiveness/control 15.5 6.1 13.2 3.6 3.75 0.057
Irritability 13.1 3.4 12.2 3.7 1.17 0.284
d.f. = 1, 68
Table 1 shows that within each subscale, participants with schizophrenia consistently 
reported lower perceived levels of the behaviour than the relatives did. Only the subscales 
of the Home Life Questionnaire, however, elicited significantly different scores between 
these groups. As the total EE score is derived from the accumulation of the subscales, 
these results provide further support for the study’s hypothesis. It should be noted 
however, that, on the LEE scale, the difference between people with schizophrenia and 
their relatives approached significance at p<0.05 on the intrusiveness/control subscale {p = 
0.057). Therefore, it could be suggested that, taken on its own, this subscale tends 
towards a similar difference between the two groups as that found on the Home Life 
Questionnaire.
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Due to the modification of both measures in this study, it was important to assess whether 
the validity of the questionnaires had been altered and hence might have played some role 
in eliciting these results. When a Pearson r correlation was carried out between each 
group’s scores on the sub scales of the measures, all correlations were significant at the 
/?<0.05 level at least (see Table 2). However, although the correlations between the 
subscales in each questionnaire were found to be significant, apart fi*om the criticism 
subscale they remain low. Higher correlations would have increased the convergent 
validity of the measures used which will have enabled a more confident interpretation of 
these results. As things stand, it is possible that the results found in this study are either 
due the alterations made to the questionnaires or, as is perhaps more likely, that the 
differences found within each group can be interpreted in terms of each group using 
different parts of the scales.
Table 2.
Pearson r correlations within each subscale of the Home Life Questionnaire and the 
Level of Expressed Emotion scale
Pearson r p  value
Home Life Questionnaire
Criticism 0.73 0.000
Emotional overinvolvement 0.42 0.011
LEE scale
Lack of emotional support 0.40 0.019
Intrusiveness/control 0.53 0.001
Irritability 0.42 0.013
N = 35 for all correlations.
139
Discussion
The self-selected sample in this study consisted of dyads in which at least one member was 
either involved in NSF groups or visited a schizophrenia internet site. It is possible that 
participants’ exposure to such fora might, through education or discussion with others, 
have influenced their perception of EE. A study with dyads in which neither person had 
had such involvements might have produced different results. This could be done by 
recruiting participants directly from health care settings and screening out those dyads 
who fell into either group. Furthermore, the participants with schizophrenia in this study 
were mainly male and the relatives were mainly female. As EE may be gender related 
(Docherty et al., 1998; Hogarty, 1985), the high proportion of male-with- 
schizophrenia/female-relative dyads in this study may have influenced the findings. 
Furthermore, all but two of the participants were white and all were living in developed 
countries in the Western world, thus making it difficult to generalise the findings to other 
ethnic groups and other parts of the world. Similar work needs to be conducted in other 
countries, especially in developing countries; such studies might help explain why the risk 
of relapse is not as high in these countries as in the Western world (Waxier, 1979; World 
Health Organisation, 1979). Athough the use of the internet facilitated the recruitment of 
participants, it does raise questions about the authenticity of these participants. The checks 
on reported symptomatology increase confidence in the bona fides of the participants who 
were recruited via the internet. However, it is difficult to eliminate entirely the possibility 
that people may dissemble, although it is also difficult to imagine what the motivation 
might be for such dissembling. Nevertheless, due to these considerations, the present study 
can only be regarded as exploratory and as providing some but not conclusive evidence in 
favour of the hypothesised difference between EE as rated by people with schizophrenia 
and by their relatives.
140
It has been acknowledged that the use of adapted questionnaires to compare relatives’ EE 
and EE as perceived by people with schizophrenia was one way to begin the exploration 
of these hypotheses. It should be noted however, that although the convergent validity of 
the subscales was measured, a more stringent examination of the reliability and validity of 
the questionnaires would enable a more confident interpretation of the data. Without this 
the conclusions drawn from making comparisons between the two dyads should be taken 
with some caution.
Different results were found on the two measures that were used to assess EE. Data from 
the Home Life Questionnaire - which assessed the acknowledged components of EE, 
namely criticism and emotional overinvolvement - highlighted significant differences 
between how the relatives rated their EE and how the people with schizophrenia perceived 
relatives’ EE. The LEE scale did not support these differences, although it should be 
acknowledged that some degree of difference was found between the two groups on the 
intrusiveness/control subscale. It could be argued that this subscale seems to relate closely 
to the type of questions asked in the critical component of EE, which may therefore 
support the suggestion that people with schizophrenia perceived their relatives’ level of 
criticism to be significantly lower than the level suggested by the relatives’ own ratings. 
One reason for the overall differences in the results found between the measures may be 
due to the assumptions that underpinned the measures. The LEE scale was initially 
developed from the response styles which Vaughn and Leff (1981) believed were 
characteristic of high EE relatives as opposed to the actual components of EE. Indeed, it 
has been suggested that a subscale should be included within the LEE scale to measure 
perceived criticism (Startup, 1999), thereby bringing it more in line with ideas about the 
components of EE. It could be suggested that this study shows some link between the 
differences found on the criticism scale and those found on the intrusiveness/control scale. 
Therefore this subscale may not be too dissimilar to the criticism subscale and with some 
alteration could assess the same phenomenon. The other subscales do not seem to map as
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closely onto the components of EE and therefore may have contributed to the differences 
in the results.
On the Home Life Questionnaire, the significantly higher EE ratings by relatives compared 
to the ratings of participants with schizophrenia could be understood as identifying the 
differences between how people with schizophrenia interpret what their relatives rate as 
EE. As shown, their perception of their relatives’ level of EE behaviour was significantly 
lower than their relatives’ ratings of this behaviour. There may be two reasons for this 
difference. Firstly, due to the difficulty people with schizophrenia have in recognising both 
facial expressions (Feinberg et a l, 1986; Morrison et al., 1988) and emotional prosody 
(Murphy & Cutting, 1990), they may fail to recognise fully their relatives’ EE behaviour, 
thus rating it differently to how their relatives rate it. However, a more likely reason for 
this perceptual difference arises from how the person with schizophrenia interprets and 
copes with their relative’s behaviour (Gerlsma & Hale, 1997; Kavanagh, 1992). Indeed, 
this reflects the difference between the relative’s subjective view of their behaviour, which 
has been used to infer relapse, and how the person with schizophrenia perceives their 
relative’s behaviour. If this is the case, it could be argued that the individual’s 
interpretation of their relative’s behaviour and the coping skills they use to deal with this 
behaviour may reduce the level of EE experienced by the person with schizophrenia.
This has two important implications. Firstly, this study suggests that the standard use of 
relatives’ ratings of EE to predict relapse in people with schizophrenia may elicit false 
positives. Not only would this lead to the provision of unnecessary family intervention but 
it may also compound relatives’ feelings of self-blame (Hatfield et a l, 1987; Parker et a l, 
1988). If the findings of the present study were replicated in other similar studies, it may 
be more appropriate for clinical assessment and research to adopt a patient-assessed 
approach to EE in order to understand their perception of their relative’s behaviour; this in 
turn may provide a more accurate prediction of relapse. It is acknowledged, however, that 
such a radical shift would not be unproblematic. A clear and reliable assessment of
142
perceived EE may not always be possible for a client group for whom psychotic episodes 
are symptomatic of their illness; completing a lengthy questionnaire assessing perceived 
EE may prove difficult. Despite this, however, due to the fact that the ratings used in 
standard EE assessments are based on relatives’ subjective views, the possibility of bias on 
the part of relatives should not be underestimated. What this does indicate is that accurate 
assessment of EE is difficult and so it is necessary to examine carefully the methods by 
which this is undertaken. This study therefore not only prompts further investigation of 
differences between perceptions of EE held by people with schizophrenia and their 
relatives but also raises questions about the ways in which EE is assessed. It also points to 
a need for longitudinal studies to assess the efficacy of perceptions of EE among people 
with schizophrenia in predicting relapse.
Secondly, the study implies that the way in which people with schizophrenia appraise the 
‘emotional temperature’ of their family environment (Vaughn, 1989) is important. Any 
help that people with schizophrenia can be offered in developing their interpretations and 
the ways in which they cope may reduce the levels of stress experienced and thereby 
reduce the risk of relapse (Brown et a l, 1972). This would lead to a shift within the EE 
paradigm away from the over-emphasis on relatives and on various psychoeducational 
interventions (for a review, see Dixon & Lehman, 1995; Lam, 1991) and towards 
understanding the responses of people with schizophrenia to their relatives’ behaviour and 
providing appropriate interventions for them. One implication of such a shift would be to 
alleviate the self-blame instilled in relatives by the current emphases within EE literature 
(Hatfield et a l, 1987; Parker et al., 1988), something that Kavanagh’s (1992) interactive 
model has already attempted to do.
If the findings of the present study were replicated and supported by other researchers, 
this would have implications for psychotherapeutic practice in this area, as was noted 
earlier. Rather than focusing on the provision of interventions directed at relatives and 
families, psychotherapeutic practitioners might also usefully direct therapeutic attention
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towards the interpretations of EE behaviour held by the person with schizophrenia and 
their ability to cope with this behaviour. In specific terms, as well as conveying an 
empathie understanding of the client’s interpretation of a relative’s high EE behaviour, the 
psychotherapeutic practitioner might also use problem-focused coping strategies - such as 
using negotiation to resolve an interpersonal conflict - to enable some clients to reduce the 
level of stress experienced in the family environment and thereby reduce the risk of 
relapse. However, it is appreciated that psychotherapeutic work with clients with 
schizophrenia can present substantial challenges and so these approaches may not prove 
fhiitflil with all clients. Finally, it is important to point out that, if the findings of the 
present study prove robust, responsibility for effecting change in the family environment 
should not be shifi;ed exclusively onto the person with schizophrenia; instead, a focus on 
their interpretations should be seen as a complementary and potentially valuable adjunct to 
psychotherapeutic work with the family.
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Appendix I
M 
Home Life Questionnaire
This questionnaire is intended to find out how the patient behaves at home, and how his 
behaviour affects family members. Each item is a statement followed by a scale ranging 
from 0 to 3. Circle the number that represents how much each statement describes your 
carer and their feelings towards you. It is important that you respond as you really feel, 
and not as you think you should feel or as you think we want you to feel.
0 = never, or almost never
1 = occasionally
2 = often
3 = always, or almost always
1. His personal care and habits are good. 0 1 2  3
2 .1 like the way he dresses. 0 1 2  3
3. He looks so unkempt that it bothers me. 0 1 2  3
4. It worries me if he I goes out alone. 0 1 2  3
5. He worries over silly things. 0 1 2  3
6. He and I take care of each other. 0 1 2  3
7 .1 understand his feelings perfectly. 0 1 2  3
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8. He complains excessively about his physical health. 0 1 2  3
9. He is destructive of property. 0 1 2  3
10. His condition is extremely distressing to me. 0 1 2  3
11. He gets along well with other people. 0 1 2  3
12. His sleep habits disrupt the family. 0 1 2  3
13. He is so overactive it disturbs me. 0 1 2  3
14. He talks too much. 0 1 2  3
15. His language is offensive. 0 1 2  3
16. I get after him to stop doing certain things. 0 1 2  3
17. He is the most important person in my life. 0 1 2  3
18. He shows good judgement. 0 1 2  3
19. He does stupid things. 0 1 2  3
20. He means well. 0 1 2  3
21.1 have tried hard to help him get along in the world. 0 1 2  3
22. He has failed to take advantage of his opportunities. 0 1 2  3
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23. He creates a bad atmosphere at home. 0 1 2  3
24. He brings objectionable people into our home. 0 1 2  3
25. He behaviour causes tension between other family members. 0 1 2  3
26. Other people stay away from home because of him. 0 1 2  3
27. He embarrasses me in front of others by his behaviour. 0 1 2  3
28. He has nice friends. 0 1 2  3
29. He is excessively withdrawn. 0 1 2  3
30. He is a danger to others. 0 1 2  3
31. He and I are like best friends. 0 1 2  3
32. He does as much as can be expected of him under the 0 1 2  3
circumstances.
33. He works hard at school or job when he is able. 0 1 2  3
34. He does a reasonable share of the household chores. 0 1 2  3
35. When he is in hospital I miss him so much 0 1 2  3
I can hardly stand it.
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36. He tries to be helpful around home. 0 1 2  3
37. He is lazy. 0 1 2  3
38. He has been a disappointment to me. 0 1 2  3
3 9 .1 have to get after him to do things. 0 1 2  3
40. I try to protect him from other people. 0 1 2  3
4 1 .1 am afraid to go out and leave him alone. 0 1 2  3
42. When I don’t like his behaviour, I say so . 0 1 2  3
43. When he is upset, I hold him and comfort him. 0 1 2  3
4 4 .1 have to watch him carefully. 0 1 2  3
45. He needs firm discipline to get his life organised. 0 1 2  3
4 6 .1 feel that his problems are at least partly my fault. 0 1 2  3
47. Between episodes, he behaves normally. 0 1 2  3
48. He is selfish. 0 1 2  3
49. He looses his temper easily. 0 1 2  3
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50.1 don’t socialise much because I spend most of my time 0 1 2  3
with him.
51.1 regret letting him be admitted to the hospital. 0 1 2  3
52. He expects to get things without working for them. 0 1 2  3
53. He is irritable. 0 1 2  3
54. He is unusually stubborn. 0 1 2  3
55. He can turn almost anything into an argument. 0 1 2  3
56. He is spiteful. 0 1 2  3
57. He refuses to accept any kind of responsibility. 0 1 2  3
58 .1 know what he is feeling even when he doesn’t 0 1 2  3
say anything.
59. He appreciates the things people do for him. 0 1 2  3
60. He has patience. 0 1 2  3
61. He likes to make trouble. 0 1 2  3
62 .1 think I can help him better than anyone else can. 0 1 2  3
63. He is friendly. 0 1 2  3
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64. He is basically a likeable person. 0 1 2  3
6 5 .1 have to take charge of his life. 0 1 2  3
66. He does whatever I want him to. 0 1 2  3
67. He’s a very easy person to get along with. 0 1 2  3
68 .1 would rather he didn’t live with me. 0 1 2  3
69. Looking after him is a burden to me. 0 1 2  3
70. He leaves home overnight when we have arguments. 0 1 2  3
71. There is tension between us. 0 1 2  3
72. There are times when he is angry that he refuses to 0 1 2  3
speak to me.
73. When he is unhappy, I am unhappy. 0 1 2  3
74. He makes me angry. 0 1 2  3
75. Living with him is difficult for me. 0 1 2  3
76. His behaviour is irritating to me. 0 1 2  3
7 7 .1 do whatever he wants me to. 0 1 2  3
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7 8 .1 enjoy his company. 0 1 2  3
79. He and I get so close we are like one person. 0 1 2  3
80. He wears me down emotionally. 0 1 2  3
81. I feel like I can read his mind. 0 1 2  3
82. He and I have serious disagreements. 0 1 2  3
83 .1 enjoy talking with him. 0 1 2  3
84 .1 try to help him understand his own feelings. 0 1 2  3
85. He expects too much from me. 0 1 2  3
86. He manipulates me to get what he wants. 0 1 2  3
87. He is resentfiil of me. 0 1 2  3
88. He yells at me. 0 1 2  3
89. He behaves badly to get back at me. 0 1 2  3
90 .1 feel as though there is something I should do that 0 1 2  3
would help him.
91. My life centres around him. 0 1 2  3
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92 .1 have bought things for him that I couldn’t really afford. 0 1 2  3
93. The things he says upset me. 0 1 2  3
94. He says things on purpose to upset me. 0 1 2  3
95. He is affectionate enough toward me. 0 1 2  3
96 .1 am the most important person in his life. 0 1 2  3
97. He seems to enjoy making me angry. 0 1 2  3
98. He makes life hard for himself. 0 1 2  3
99 .1 feel like I’d give anything to see him get over his difficulties. 0 1 2  3
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Appendix II
THE LEE SCALE
This questionnaire is about the ways in which someone may behave towards you. We are 
interested in the ways in which the most influential person in your life has behaved 
towards you during the past 3 months. This person must be someone that you know 
personally.
Please consider who has been the most influential person in your life recently. Then write 
down what relationship that person has to you. For example, that person might be a 
spouse or partner, a parent, a child of yours, or a friend.
Relationship of influential person:
Now please indicate how true each of the following statements is of this influential person. 
Use the following scale: NOT MOSTLY MOSTLY TRUE
TRUE UNTRUE TRUE
1 2  3 4
The most influential person in my life (in the last three months)....
NOT MOSTLY MOSTLY TRUE 
TRUE UNTRUE TRUE
1. Calms me down when Fm upset. 1 2  3 4
2. Is tolerant of me, even when I’m not meeting 1 2  3 4
his/her expectations.
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3. Is sympathetic towards me when I’m ill or upset 1 2  3
4. Can see my point of view. 1 2  3
5. Is always interfering. 1 2 3
6. Can’t think straight when things go wrong. 1 2  3
7. Will not help me when I’m upset. 1 2  3
8. Makes me feel valuable as a person. 1 2  3
9. Doesn’t know how to handle my feelings 1 2  3
when I’m unwell.
10. Understands my limitations. 1 2  3
11. Often checks up on me to see what I’m doing. 1 2  3
12. Is able to be in control in stressful situations. 1 2  3
13. Tries to make me feel better when I’m ill. 1 2  3
14. Is always nosing into my business. 1 2  3
15. Hears me out. 1 2  3
16. Has to know everything about me. 1 2  3
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17. Makes me feel relaxed when he/she is around 1 2  3 4
18. Accuses me of exaggerating when I say I’m 1 2  3 4
unwell.
19. Will take it easy with me even if things 1 2  3 4
aren’t going right.
20. Insists on knowing where I’m going. 1 2  3 4
21. Is a considerate person when I’m ill. 1 2  3 4
22. Butts into my private matters. 1 2  3 4
23. Can cope well with stress. 1 2  3 4
24. Is willing to gain more information to understand 1 2  3 4
my condition, when I’m not feeling well.
25. Is understanding is I make a mistake. 1
26. Doesn’t pry into my life.
27. Makes matters worse when things aren’t 
going well.
28. Often accuses me of making things up 
when I’m not feeling well.
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29. Flies off the handle when I don’t do 1 
something well.
30. Gets upset when I don’t check in with him/her. 1
31. Gets irritated when things don’t go right. 1
32. Tries to reassure me when Fm not feeling well. 1
33. Expects the same level of effort from me, 1 
even iff don’t feel well.
NAME:
164
Appendix IQ
F
Home Life Questionnaire
(modified version)
This questionnaire is intended to find out how you feel the person who cares for you 
behaves towards you at home. Each item is a statement followed by a scale ranging from 
0 to 3. Circle the number that represents how much each statement describes your carer 
and their feelings towards you. It is important that you respond as you really feel, and not 
as you think you should feel or as you think we want you to feel.
0 = never, or almost never
1 = occasionally
2 = often
3 = always, or almost always
1. She thinks my personal care and habits are good. 0 1 2  3
2. She likes the way I dress. 0 1 2  3
3. She thinks I look so unkempt that it bothers her. 0 1 2  3
4. She worries if I go out alone. 0 1 2  3
5. She thinks I worry over silly things. 0 1 2  3
6. She feels that she and I take care of each other. 0 1 2  3
7. She understands my feelings perfectly. 0 1 2  3
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8. She thinks I complain excessively about my physical health. 0 1 2  3
9. She thinks I am destructive of property. 0 1 2  3
10. My condition is extremely distressing to her. 0 1 2  3
11. She thinks I get along well with other people. 0 1 2  3
12. My sleep habits disrupt the family. 0 1 2  3
13. She thinks I’m so overactive it disturbs her. 0 1 2  3
14. She thinks I talk too much. 0 1 2  3
15. She thinks my language is offensive. 0 1 2  3
16. She gets after me to stop doing certain things. 0 1 2  3
17. She sees me as the most important person in her life. 0 1 2  3
18. She thinks I show good judgement. 0 1 2  3
19. She thinks I do stupid things. 0 1 2  3
20. She knows I mean well. 0 1 2  3
21. She has tried hard to help me get along in the world. 0 1 2  3
22. She thinks I have failed to take advantage of my opportunities. 0 1 2  3
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23. She thinks I create a bad atmosphere at home. 0 1 2  3
24. She thinks I bring objectionable people into our home. 0 1 2  3
25. She feels my behaviour causes tension between other family members. 0 1 2  3
26. She thinks other people stay away from home because of me. 0 1 2 3
27. She feels I embarrass her in front of others by my behaviour. 0 1 2  3
28. She thinks I have nice friends. 0 1 2  3
29. She thinks I am excessively withdrawn. 0 1 2  3
30. She thinks I am a danger to others. 0 1 2  3
31. She thinks she and I are like best friends. 0 1 2  3
32. She thinks I do as much as can be expected of me under the 0 1 2  3
circumstances.
33. She thinks I work hard at school or job when I am able. 0 1 2  3
34. She thinks I do a reasonable share of the household chores. 0 1 2  3
35. When I am in the hospital she misses me so much she 0 1 2  3
can hardly stand it.
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36. She feels I try to be helpful around home. 0 1 2  3
37. She thinks I am lazy. 0 1 2  3
38. She thinks I have been a disappointment to her. 0 1 2  3
39. She feels she has to get after me to do things. 0 1 2  3
40. She seems to try and protect me from other people. 0 1 2  3
41. She’s afraid to go out and leave me alone. 0 1 2  3
42. She says when she does not like my behaviour. 0 1 2  3
43. When I am upset, she holds me and comforts me. 0 1 2  3
44. She feels she has to watch me carefully. 0 1 2  3
45. She thinks I need firm discipline to get my life organised. 0 1 2  3
46. She feels that my problems are at least partly her fault. 0 1 2  3
47. Between episodes, she thinks I behave normally. 0 1 2  3
48. She thinks I am selfish. 0 1 2  3
49. She thinks I loose my temper easily. 0 1 2  3
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50. She doesn’t socialise much because she spends most of her time 0 1 2  3 
with me.
51. She regrets letting me be admitted to the hospital. 0 1 2  3
52. She thinks I expect to get things without working for them. 0 1 2  3
53. She thinks I am irritable. 0 1 2  3
54. She thinks I am unusually stubborn. 0 1 2  3
55. She thinks I can turn almost anything into an argument. 0 1 2  3
56. She thinks I am spiteful. 0 1 2  3
57. She thinks I refuse to accept any kind of responsibility. 0 1 2  3
58. She seems to know what I am feeling even when I don’t 0 1 2  3
say anything.
59. She thinks I appreciate the things people do for me. 0 1 2  3
60. She thinks I have patience. 0 1 2  3
61. She thinks I like to make trouble. 0 1 2  3
62. She thinks she can help me better than anyone else can. 0 1 2  3
63. She thinks I am friendly. 0 1 2  3
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64. She thinks that I’m basically a nice person. 0 1 2  3
65. She thinks she has to take charge of my life. 0 1 2  3
66. She feels I do whatever she wants me to. 0 1 2  3
67. She thinks I am a very easy person to get along with. 0 1 2  3
68. She would rather I didn’t live with her. 0 1 2  3
69. She thinks that looking after me is a burden. 0 1 2  3
70 .1 leave home overnight when we have arguments. 0 1 2  3
71. She feels there is tension between us. 0 1 2  3
72. There are times when I’m angry that I 0 1 2  3
refuse to speak to her.
73. She is unhappy when I am unhappy. 0 1 2  3
74 .1 make her angry. 0 1 2  3
75. She finds living with me is difficult. 0 1 2  3
76. She finds my behaviour irritating. 0 1 2  3
77. She feels she does whatever I want her to. 0 1 2  3
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78. She enjoys my company. 0 1 2  3
79. She feels that she and I get so close we are like one person. 0 1 2  3
80. She feels I wear her down emotionally. 0 1 2  3
81. She thinks she can read my mind. 0 1 2  3
82. She feels she and I have serious disagreements. 0 1 2  3
83. She enjoys talking with me. 0 1 2  3
84. She thinks she tries to help me understand my own feelings. 0 1 2  3
85. She thinks I expect too much from her. 0 1 2  3
86. She thinks I manipulate her to get what I want. 0 1 2  3
87. She thinks I am resentful of her. 0 1 2  3
88. She feels I yell at her. 0 1 2  3
89. She thinks I behave badly to get back at her. 0 1 2  3
90. She feels as though there is something she should do that 0 1 2  3
would help me.
91. She thinks her life centres around me. 0 1 2  3
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92. She has bought things for me that she perhaps couldn’t afford. 0 1 2  3
93. The things I say upset her. 0 1 2  3
94. She thinks I say things on purpose to upset her. 0 1 2  3
95. She feels I am affectionate enough toward her. 0 1 2  3
96. She thinks I am the most important person in her life. 0 1 2  3
97. She thinks I enjoy making her angry. 0 1 2  3
98. She thinks I make life hard for myself. 0 1 2  3
99. She would give anything to see me get over my difficulties. 0 1 2  3
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Appendix IV
M
THE LEE SCALE
(modified version)
This questionnaire is about the ways in which you may behave towards someone you care 
for. We are interested in the ways in which you have behaved towards your (son/daughter 
etc) during the past 3 months.
Relationship of the person you care for:
Now please indicate how true each of the following statements is of your behaviour. 
Use the following scale:
NOT MOSTLY MOSTLY TRUE
TRUE UNTRUE TRUE
1 2  3 4
NOT MOSTLY MOSTLY TRUE 
TRUE UNTRUE TRUE
1 .1 calm him down when he is upset.
2 .1 am tolerant with him even when he does 
not meet my expectations.
3 .1 am sympathetic towards him when he’s 
ill or upset.
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4 .1 can see his point of view. 1
5 .1 am always interfering. 1
6 .1 can’t think straight when things go wrong. 1
7 .1 will not help him when he’s upset. 1
8 .1 make him feel valuable as a person. 1
9. I don’t know how to handle his feelings 1
when he’s unwell.
10.1 understand his limitations. 1
11.1 often check up on him to see what he’s doing. 1
12.1 am able to be in control in stressftil situations. 1
13.1 try to make him feel better when he’s ill. 1
18.1 am always nosing into his business. 1
19.1 hear him out. 1
20 .1 have to know everything about him. 1
21 .1 make him feel relaxed when I am around 1
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18.1 accuse him of exaggerating when he says he is 1 2 3
unwell.
19.1 will take it easy with him, even if things 1 2  3
aren’t going right.
2 0 .1 insist on knowing where he’s going. 1 2  3
2 1 .1 am a considerate person when he’s ill. 1 2  3
2 2 .1 butt into his private matters. 1 2  3
23 .1 can cope well with stress. 1 2  3
2 4 .1 am willing to gain more information to 1 2  3
understand his condition, when he’s not feeling well.
25 .1 understand if he makes a mistake. 1
2 6 .1 don’t pry into his life.
2 7 .1 make matters worse when things aren’t 
going well.
2 8 .1 often accuse him of making things up 
when he’s not feeling well.
175
2 9 .1 fly off the handle when he doesn’t do 1 
something well.
30 .1 get upset when he doesn’t check in with me. 1
31.1 get irritated when things don’t go right. 1
32 .1 try to reassure him when he’s not feeling well. 1
3 3 .1 expect the same level of effort from him, 1
even if he doesn’t feel well.
NAME:
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A Comparison o f ‘perceived’ and ‘actuaF expressed emotion in people with 
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above protocol and the subsequent information supplied and has approved it on the 
understanding that the Ethics Guidelines are observed.
The letter of approval relates only to the study specified in your research protocol 
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enclose a copy of the Ethics Guidelines for your information.
Yours Sincerely
Helen Schuyleman (Mrs)
Secretary, University Advisory Committee on Ethics
Cc: Professor L J King, Chairman, ACE
Dr Adrian Coyle, Department of Psychology
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Appendix VI
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
(for carer)
To begin, Fd like to get some basic information about you and the person whom you care 
for. The reason that Fd like this information is so that I can show those who read the 
research report that I managed to obtain the views of a cross-section of people. The 
information that you give will never be used to identify you in any way because this 
research is entirely confidential. However, if you don’t want to answer some of these 
questions, please don’t feel that you have to.
1. Are you: Male ____  Female
2. How old are you? [ ] years
3. Which of the following ethnic groups would you say you belong to? {Please tick the 
appropriate answer)
Black- African
Black-Caribbean
Black-Other
Chinese
Bangladeshi
Indian
Pakistani
White
Other (Please specify:
4. What relation is the person you care for to you?
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5. Do you: live together_________(go to qu.7) live separately________ ( go to qu.6)
6.How often do you see this person? (please tick).
Every day______________  A few times a week____________
Once a week____________  Once a fortnight_______________
Once a month____________  less than once a month (please
specify)______________
7. What diagnosis if any was given to the person you care fo r_____________ _^______
8. Has the person you car for experienced any of the following during his/her last episode 
(please tick).
Delusional beliefs Hallucinations Voices
Thoughts insertions or withdrawal________ Marked apathy/social withdrawal
9. How many years has he/she been diagnosed as the above? [_______ ] years
10. Please give the approximate dates of his/her previous 3 relapses
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION
(for individual)
To begin, Td like to get some basic information about you and your most influential carer. 
The reason that I’d like this information is so that I can show those who read the research 
report that I managed to obtain the views of a cross-section of people. The information 
that you give will never be used to identify you in any way because this research is entirely 
confidential. However, if you don’t want to answer some of these questions, please don’t 
feel that you have to.
1. Are you; Male ____  Female
2. How old are you? [_______ ] years
3. Which of the following ethnic groups would you say you belong to? {tick the 
appropriate answer)
Black- African
Black-Caribbean
Black-Other
Chinese
Bangladeshi
Indian
Pakistani
White
Other (Please specify;__________________   )
4. Who would you say is the most influential carer in your life other than a health 
professional? _______________________________
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5. What relation is he/she to you?
6. Do you: live together (go to qu.7) live separately__________ ( go to
qu.6)
7. How often do you see this person? (please tick).
Every day______________  A few times a week
Once a week____________  Once a fortnight__
Once a month____________  less than once a month (please specify)
8. What diagnosis if any were you given? ________________________
8. Has the person you car for experienced any of the following during his/her last episode 
(please tick).
Delusional beliefs Hallucinations Voices
Thoughts insertions or withdrawal________ Marked apathy/social withdrawal
9. How many years have you had this diagnosis? [ ] years
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A comparison of three relationship dyads involving people with 
schizophrenia: Implications for expressed emotion and counselling 
psychology.
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A comparison of three relationship dyads involving people with schizophrenia: 
Implications for expressed emotion and counselling psychology.
Abstract
Research into families of people with schizophrenia has predominantly concentrated on the 
parent-child dyad when assessing expressed emotion (EE). As a result, the conclusion 
that high EE is a robust predictor of relapse in people with schizophrenia is drawn 
primarily with this relationship dyad in mind. This review explores other relationship 
dyads between people with schizophrenia and their main caregiver i.e. sibling-sibling dyads 
and spouse/partner-spouse/partner dyads. The similarities and differences between each 
dyadic relationship are highlighted and conclusions are drawn as to how any differences 
may impact on the assessment of EE. Evidence from experiences of people with 
depression and their carers is addressed to further the understanding of differences 
between the dyads in relation to EE within schizophrenia. In light of these differences, 
implications for the therapeutic practice of counselling psychologists working with either a 
person with schizophrenia or their carers are considered. Suggestions for future research 
are made which call for specific attention to each relationship dyad, both in order to assess 
levels of EE more accurately and to provide more effective family intervention.
Key Words:
Expressed emotion, schizophrenia, parent-child relationship, sibling-sibling relationship, 
partner relationships
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Introduction
For much of the twentieth century, researchers have sought to unravel the suggestion that 
there is a link between symptoms of schizophrenia and interactions within families, an idea 
which was first suggested by Sullivan in 1927. However, it was not until the latter part of 
the last century that research into schizophrenia concentrated on how people with 
schizophrenia are cared for within the family, arising partly from the move from 
institutionalised care of people with severe psychological problems to care in the 
community. In the late 1950s George Brown and colleagues at the Medical Research 
Council Social Psychiatry Unit in London initiated a series of studies which investigated 
the family relationship and its influence on the course of severe mental health problems, 
mainly schizophrenia (Brown et al. 1958; Brown, 1959). They explored various aspects 
of the interactions in the relationship between the person with schizophrenia and their 
most significant other to identify if there were features which would affect the prognosis 
when returning to such a relationship after their discharge from psychiatric hospital. The 
features that were identified as important were characterised by the term ‘expressed 
emotion’ (EE).
Since the 1950s many studies have investigated this phenomenon and to date it is generally 
accepted that high levels of EE are a reliable predictor of relapse in schizophrenia, as 
shown by a number of aggregate (Parker and Hadzi-Pavlovic, 1990; Bebbington and 
Kuipers, 1994) and meta-analyses (Bultzaff and Hooley, 1998). In the studies analysed, 
the majority of the key relatives interviewed were parents of the person with 
schizophrenia. Although other relationship dyads are included in this research such as 
sibling relationships and spousal or partner relationships, results are generally interpreted 
with the parent-child dyad in mind (for example Parker and Hadzi-Pavlovic, 1990; 
Bebbington and Kuipers, 1994; Bultzaff and Hooley, 1998). It appears that within the EE 
literature this generalisation extends to identify families as high-EE if one parent is 
assessed as being high-EE. Athough EE has been identifying as occurring within a family.
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surprisingly little attention in the literature has been given to systemic theory when 
identifying families’ level of EE. However, as discussed later, Leff (1989) acknowledges 
the benefit of systemic thinking when exploring who instigates EE within the family.
One possible explanation for the concentration on the parent-child dyad may be linked to 
the peak age of onset of schizophrenia. For males this is between 18 and 25 years while 
females have a broader peak from about 26 to 45 years (Stromgren, 1987). It would 
therefore seem likely that the majority of people in their first episode of schizophrenia 
continue to have their parents (usually the mother) as the main caregiver. As a result, the 
majority of people discharged return to their familial home and are cared for by a parent 
rather than by any other relation such as a sibling or partner. It would seem erroneous, 
however, to generalise the emotions expressed towards people with schizophrenia by their 
parents to other relationship dyads. It is not the case in the research on other psychiatric 
disorders that attention is almost solely paid to the parent-child dyad. Indeed the majority 
of studies which investigate the EE phenomenon in bipolar and unipolar depression have a 
participant bias towards the spouse caring for the person with depression and not a parent 
(Vaughn and Leff, 1976a; Miklowitz et al. 1988; Hooley and Teesdale, 1989; Gerlsma and 
Hale, 1997).
As EE encapsulates aspects of the relationship such as expression of criticism, hostility 
and emotional overinvolvement by the carer towards the person with schizophrenia, it 
would seem likely that the type of dyadic relationship is fundamental when exploring EE. 
It is therefore the aim of this article to review the literature on caring for a person with 
schizophrenia, exploring the extent to which the parent-child relationship in schizophrenia 
is similar to and/or different from other dyadic relationships. Attention will be focused on 
three types of relationships, namely the parent-child relationship, the sibling-sibling 
relationship and the spouse/partner-spouse/partner relationship. The reason for this is that 
these relationship dyads are the most commonly represented dyads in the literature on 
non-professional carers of people with schizophrenia (for example see Judge, 1994).
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Following a discussion of the similarities and differences between these three relationship 
dyads in schizophrenia, the review will draw upon relevant literature regarding the 
relationship carers have with people diagnosed as having depression. This attends 
specifically to EE within relationship dyads other than the parent-child dyad. From this, 
suggestions will be made as to how the differences impact on the occurrence of the EE 
components. Suggestions for future research will be made to further our knowledge of 
EE, which will call for the acknowledgement of the different types of relationship [within 
their own right]. Implications for counselling psychology will be addressed when working 
therapeutically with both people with schizophrenia and their carers.
Before this can be done it is important to be clear about the condition for which high 
levels of expressed emotion are said to be a reliable predictor. Recent changes in thinking 
about the concept of schizophrenia have led to a questioning of the usefulness of this label. 
Kraeplin’s (1896) introduction and elaboration of dementia praecox and Bleuler’s (1911) 
subsequent introduction of the concept of schizophrenia have been widely documented 
(for example Lewis, 1966; Wing, 1978; Clare, 1980; Neal and Oltmanns, 1980) and have 
remained a fundamental part of psychiatry since then. However, in the second half of the 
last century a body of literature developed which questioned the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (for example Szasz, 1976; Boyle, 1990; Bentail, 1990, 1993). This led to 
the proposal of a somewhat radical view that the concept of schizophrenia has “impeded 
the development of adequate scientific accounts of psychotic behaviour” (Bentall, 1993, p. 
223) and thus should be abandoned. The basis of such objections lay in these writers’ 
assessment of the validity and reliability of the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia from 
which they found that there was little common ground between one person’s diagnosis of 
schizophrenia and another person’s. The conclusion drawn was that there is no good 
reason to group the symptoms of schizophrenia into one diagnosis. Instead there was a 
call to study psychotic symptoms and not syndromes (Bentall et al. 1988) which was 
hailed as the “catalyst for psychological exploration” (Chadwick et al. 1996, p. xvii).
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It would seem likely that ‘schizophrenia’ covers many symptoms and therefore is not a 
unitary disorder (Chadwick, 1997). However, as Chadwick (1997) states, in his 
autobiographical book on schizophrenia, “the removal of the schizophrenia label will not 
make suffering go away. Indeed, it is well known that patients sometimes are even 
grateful for the diagnosis as it organises their perception of their life’s histoiy and removes 
their feelings that they are a morally ‘bad’ person” (p. 22). Shepherd (1995) highlights 
issues that are not encompassed by the symptoms of schizophrenia, such as work and 
social skills, development of coping and self care skills and the attitudes of others towards 
people with schizophrenia. The term ‘schizophrenia’ will therefore be used throughout 
this review to both reflect the symptoms of schizophrenia and the wider issues that are 
experienced but also because it is a review of literature in which the term ‘schizophrenia’ 
is routinely used in an unproblematic way. Until an agreed reconceptualisation of the 
phenomena now denoted by ‘schizophrenia’ is developed, all we can do in such a review is 
to work with the literature on ‘schizophrenia’, mindfijl of the critical analyses of the 
concept.
Review of the EE literature
Expressed emotion (EE) refers to a construct which incorporates some key aspects of 
interpersonal relationships (Wearden et al. 2000). Following a period of refinement. 
Brown and Rutter specified categories of ‘negative’ or ‘intrusive’ attitudes expressed 
about the person with schizophrenia that made up EE. These included criticism, hostility, 
‘emotional overinvolvement’ (EOl), warmth and positive comments (Brown and Rutter, 
1966; Rutter and Brown, 1966). These researchers developed the standard assessment of 
EE known as the Camberwell Family Interview (CFl) to assess these categories. This 
consisted of a semi-structured interview with the most significant non-professional 
caregiver. Following this, the next decade saw a dearth of interest in this line of research 
(Brown, 1985). However, enthusiasm was re-ignited with the third study of EE in 1976 
(Vaughn and Leff, 1976b). This came in the same year that Vaughn and Leff offered a 
refined version of the CFl (Vaughn and Leff, 1976a), which is now seen as the ‘gold
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standard’ measure of EE. What followed was a large number of replication studies of 
Vaughn and Leff s work, examining the link between EE and relapse in schizophrenia. 
These have shown that, of the five scales, criticism, hostility and EOI are the most 
predictive of relapse and therefore many studies now do not discuss warmth and positive 
comments. Criticisms are defined as comments made about the person with schizophrenia 
which clearly reflect an annoyance toward certain characteristics of their behaviour. 
Hostility is rated categorically, according to whether generalised criticisms or rejections 
are made about the person with schizophrenia. EOI is a retrospective rating in light of the 
comments and attitudes expressed during the interview about the concern for and over­
protection of the person with schizophrenia. The occurrence of high levels of one or more 
of these would suggest high-EE in the carer of the person with schizophrenia.
Over the past 30 years of EE research a number of questions have been raised, which 
include its use of categorical data and the post hoc choice of criteria (for a review, see Leff 
and Vaughn, 1985; Kuipers and Bebbington, 1988; Lam, 1991; Kavanagh, 1992). An 
acceptance of these particular issues seems to have characterised the EE literature and has 
now become so institutionalised (Bebbington and Kuipers, 1994) that all studies continue 
to follow suit. Another ongoing debate has been over the direction of causality of EE; this 
is the ‘chicken and egg’ debate, questioning which comes first. Does the increase in 
symptoms of schizophrenia lead to their relatives’ high-EE? Or does living with a relative 
who is critical, hostile or emotionally overinvolved affect the person with schizophrenia in 
a way which contributes to relapse? Athough it is difficult to answer these questions 
accurately through naturalistic studies (Leff, 1989), intervention studies aimed at 
modifying high-EE have resulted in fewer relapses in symptoms for people with 
schizophrenia in families who received intervention, compared to people with 
schizophrenia whose families were in control groups (Hogarty et al. 1986; Tarder et al. 
1988). This lends support to the idea that the EE status of the relative contributes to the 
likelihood of relapse. Nonetheless, it would seem likely, as Hooley and Richters (1995) 
point out, that there is a complex circular relationship between the behaviour exhibited on
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both sides of the dyad. Kavanagh’s (1992) interactional model of the course of 
schizophrenia provides an alternative to the previously adopted unidirectional models of 
symptoms and EE. His model recognises that each member of the dyad interprets the 
behaviour of the other and then employs their own coping skills in reaction to their 
interpretation. This underlies the rationale for measuring EE as perceived by people with 
schizophrenia (e.g. Osborne, 2000) but also considers how people with schizophrenia may 
elicit relatives’ EE.
Wuerker (1994), in her work on interpersonal control, found that the person with 
schizophrenia was just as controlling as the parent in high-EE families. Her recent work 
on EE in parents of people with schizophrenia draws upon the literature on ‘relational 
control’ (Wuerker et al. 1999). This refers to the distribution of power in a relationship, 
i.e., the enactment of dominance and submission via verbal exchange. Wuerker et al. 
(1999) found that in high-EE parents, both the parent and their child with schizophrenia 
asserted more control and were less submissive than low-EE parents. This adds weight to 
the growing acknowledgement that EE is not a unidirectional construct. This is further 
compounded by Leff (1989), who, when reviewing family interventions to reduce EE and 
relapse, draws upon systems theory to highlight how families can adjust in order to reduce 
relapse rates. By viewing the family as a whole system within which changes in one part 
bring about compensation and alteration by other parts to maintain equilibrium (Dallos, 
1991), we can see how behaviour in any family member can lead to compensatory 
behaviour by others. Athough Leff (1989) concludes that systemic therapy is an effective 
intervention in reducing relapse rates, to date knowledge of systems theory has not been 
applied to the initial assessment of EE.
In reviewing the studies that have investigated the predictive efficacy of EE and relapse in 
people with schizophrenia it becomes apparent that, for the most part, high or low-EE is a 
function of ‘relatives’ or ‘carers’. Some studies have questioned whether the presence of 
many high-EE relatives in a household increases the predictive efficacy of EE and relapse
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or, conversely, whether low-EE relatives in high-EE households reduce or cancel out the 
association. It seems that what is more common is to single out one key relative with 
whom the person with schizophrenia has the closest involvement (for example Parker and 
Hadzi-Pavlovic, 1990; Bebbington and Kuipers, 1994; Bultzaff and Hooley, 1998). 
However, by ignoring other family members in the assessment of EE it becomes difficult 
to trace the impact of other parts of the system on the person with schizophrenia and 
indeed how they in turn impact on the family. Attention to the system within which the 
person with schizophrenia is cared for may be an important change of direction in EE 
research in the future, allowing for a fuller understanding of the experiences of each part 
of the system and how they impact on other family members.
Of the EE literature to date, the studies used in the aggregate and meta-analyses of EE 
were either specific or more general about the identified key relative. Of the 27 studies 
which Bultzaff and Hooley (1998) reviewed, some broadly classified the participants as 
‘relatives’ and did not specify the precise nature of their relationship with the person with 
schizophrenia (e.g. Moline et al. 1985; Nuechterlein et al. 1986), some assessed just 
parents (e.g. Parker et al. 1988; Niedermeier, 1992) and some incorporated parents, 
partners or spouses and siblings (e.g. Vaughn and Leff, 1976b; Kamo et al. 1987; 
Vaughan et al. 1992). Those that did assess EE in different relationship dyads tended to 
leave the acknowledgement of different dyads at a methodological level, with the more 
generic term of ‘relatives’ being deployed to discuss the findings. An exception to this is 
Brown et al.’s (1972) study in which further investigation was conducted into the levels of 
EE found in both spouses and parents. They concluded that considerably more unmarried 
people with schizophrenia living with high-EE relatives relapsed (42%) than married 
people (26%). Athough participants in this study did not include sibling relations as the 
key relative. Brown and his colleagues found in their earlier work that relapse was more 
likely if the person with schizophrenia returned to live with parents or wives than if they 
lived with siblings (Brown et al. 1958).
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Experiences within the relationship dyads and their impact on levels of EE
Parent - child relationship
In general parents act as caregiver to their child from birth. Indeed, according to classical 
psychoanalytic theory (Freud, 1986), a primitive form of caregiving such as the provision 
of food to the child leads to feelings of security and affection in the child. Erikson (1982) 
took this a stage further and suggested that such caregiving influences the strength of the 
child’s attachments. This initial caring role continues in various forms and ways 
throughout the child’s development into adolescence and adulthood. The development of 
any serious health problems in these latter stages undoubtedly affects the caregiving role 
of the parent, with specific changes for parents caring for a child with schizophrenia. 
Indeed, MacGregor (1994) suggests that parents of children with schizophrenia “undergo 
a complex reorganisation of lifestyle, self perception, role, economic security and belief 
systems” (p. 163).
The aetiology of schizophrenia has for over half a century been linked to parental 
characteristics and in particular maternal ones. Fromm-Reichmann (1948) first introduced 
the term ‘schizophrenogenic mother’ to describe mothers of people with schizophrenia 
whose maternal characteristics involved overprotection and deficient care. This led to the 
suggestion of blame on the part of the mother and therefore could be seen as a 
controversial concept (Parker, 1982); nonetheless it has continued to surface in the 
literature. However, in an extensive review of this literature, Parker (1982) showed that 
although the schizophrenogenic mother was evidenced in uncontrolled studies, clear and 
replicable findings were not found in case-controlled studies. He concluded that in 
“regard to the development of schizophrenia, such a parental style would appear neither 
necessary nor sufficient” (p.460). A similar suggestion was made by Brown and 
colleagues (1962) whose work on EE related to the course of schizophrenia and not its 
aetiology. Nonetheless, the earlier literature implicating mothers, along with the higher 
prevalence of people with schizophrenia living with parents, undoubtedly had an influence 
on the attention paid in the EE literature to the parent-child dyad.
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Changes in behaviour of people occur both because of the presence of symptoms, termed 
within this literature as ‘schizophrenia’, but also because of wider issues such as 
behavioural excesses and impaired social performance (Birchwood and Smith, 1987). 
These changes bring unique financial, social and emotional burdens for parents caring for 
their adolescent or adult child (Doll, 1976; Potasznik and Nelson, 1984; Grotty and 
Krulys, 1986; Gubman and Tessler, 1987; Hatfield, 1987; Maurin and Boyd, 1990). 
Hoenig and Hamilton (1967) distinguished between objective burden (tangible or 
observable effects, such as loss of income) and subjective burden (the negative 
psychological impact on the caregiver) in their influential work on caregiver burden within 
mental health problems.
In terms of objective burden, studies have shown that parents of people with schizophrenia 
have experienced financial, marital, legal, employment and housing burdens (Fadden et al. 
1987; Lefley, 1987a; Chafetz and Barnes, 1989) as well as restrictions in social and leisure 
activities (Gibbons et al. 1984; Seymour and Dawson, 1986). An objective burden 
specific to parents of children with schizophrenia is their child’s disrupted developmental 
progression, termed ‘off-timedness’ (Cook, 1988; Cohler et al. 1991; Pickett et al. 1994). 
As Marsh (1992) states, the emergence of schizophrenia “is tragically out-of-phase in 
terms of normative expectations, with a resultant sense of disruption in the life cycle” 
(p.77). As parents often build strong developmental expectations of their children’s life 
progress (Hagestad, 1986, 1988), feelings of frustration over their child’s limitations and 
resentment over their prolonged caregiving may arise (Cook, 1988; Cohler et al. 1991). 
Indeed, mothers and fathers feel frustrated and held back fi-om accomplishing their own 
life-span goals when an adult child remains at home beyond the expected age of departure 
(Smith, 1983; Wilen, 1985). Whilst the child’s developmental progression and the 
parents’ expectations remain incongruent, such feelings of frustration may at times be 
expressed within the relationship. Even if efforts are made within the relationship to 
define new objectives and realistic expectations, the process of achieving congruence may
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also be fraught, due to the relinquishing of previous expectations by the parent and 
adjustments by the child. These experiences specific to parents, which may cause 
frustration and/or resentment, could lead to them becoming more critical of their adult- 
child with schizophrenia. In addition to this, as parental caregivers grow older, they may 
experience further burden related to their own ageing such as role loss, chronic health 
problems, depletion of economic resources, decrease of functional ability and concerns 
about meeting the continuing needs of their adult child (Jennings, 1987; Lefley, 1987b; 
Cook et al. 1994). It is possible that these concerns could lead to parents projecting their 
own finstration and anger on to their child and again lead to increased levels of criticism.
Many studies have reported specific types of subjective burden in parental caregivers of 
people with schizophrenia. These include tension, anxiety, resentment and depression 
with accompanying feelings of hopelessness and powerlessness (Doll, 1976; Hatfield, 
1978; Holden and Levine, 1982; Gibbons et al. 1984; Seymour and Dawson, 1986; 
Fadden et al. 1987; Lefley, 1987a). Underlying the subjective burden faced by parents are 
feelings of loss and grief (McElroy, 1987; Chafetz and Barnes, 1989; Atkinson, 1994; 
MacGregor, 1994; Solomon and Draine, 1996) following the loss of their child’s potential 
(Ryan, 1993; Davis and Schultz, 1998) and therefore the loss of hopes and aspirations 
(Parker, 1993; Miller, 1996). Similar experiences of loss are reported by parents whose 
child is diagnosed with learning disabilities (Allan, 1993; Maxwell, 1993) and chronic 
illness (Altschuler, 1997). However, within schizophrenia, parents are likely to witness 
periodic reappearances of their child’s former self (Miller, 1996). In a qualitative study, 
Ryan (1993) found that mothers of people with schizophrenia experienced a ‘life time of 
mothering’ which comprised two domains, namely disruption and loss. The disruption 
was reported both with regard to the mother’s life and the relationship between the mother 
and child. Loss was reported both in terms of the child’s potential and the freedom 
experienced by the mother. A case study analysis by Osborne (1999), that took an in- 
depth look at the experiences of both mothers and fathers of people with schizophrenia.
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elicited similar results with regard to loss but also highlighted the grief experienced by 
parents.
Not aided by the literature on the schizophrenogenic mother, parents experiencing such 
subjective burdens may blame themselves for the occurrence of schizophrenia in their 
child. This could lead to a desire to compensate for their child’s mental health problems 
and so become emotionally overinvolved. Periodic reappearances of their child’s former 
self may provide hope that their caring will ‘bring back’ their child. This in turn could 
serve to compound their emotional overinvolvement.
Sibling relationship
The sibling relationship extends beyond the relationship with one’s parents and precedes 
other significant relationships such as a life-mate or offspring and as such it is among the 
most enduring of human connections (Cicirelli, 1991). The emotional ties between 
siblings have been reported to be second in strength only to those between child and 
parent (Cummings and Smith, 1993). Furthermore, siblings can be a primary source of 
emotional support in preadolescent and adolescent years (Lamb, 1982) and play a role as 
attachment figures throughout the separation-individuation process (Leichtman, 1985; 
Graham, 1988). It is now recognised that this type of support and connection can 
continue throughout adulthood (Sandmaier, 1994).
Research into birth order suggests that younger siblings are strongly influenced by older 
siblings, whereas first-borns are more influenced by the relationship with their parents 
(Sutton-Smith and Rosenber, 1970). Indeed, it has been shown that older siblings can 
influence younger siblings’ social and cognitive development (Azmitia and Hesser, 1993). 
This has also been found to be the case for siblings’ empathy development (Tucker et al. 
1999). Tucker et al. (1999) found that positive behaviours displayed by older brothers, 
such as being physically affectionate, led to high levels of empathy in younger siblings. If 
this is the case then empathy development in the younger sibling may be affected if the
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older sibling displays negative symptoms of schizophrenia such as apathy and emotional 
withdrawal. Leff and Vaughn (1985) reported that empathy is an important part of low- 
EE. Indeed, it has been found that there is a significant relationship between poor 
empathie attitude and relapse in schizophrenia (Giron and Gomez-Beneyto, 1998). This 
lack of empathy about their sibling’s behaviour may give rise to finstration and annoyance 
and therefore could lead to increased levels of criticism.
In order to understand siblings’ behaviour as caregivers to people with schizophrenia the 
impact of their mental health problems on the sibling caregiver must first be recognised. It 
should be noted that the impact on the sibling is not dissimilar to experiences of siblings of 
people with learning disabilities and chronic illnesses in the ways that are highlighted. It 
has been suggested that the sibling relationship is more likely to be disrupted with a 
relatively late onset of schizophrenia (Judge, 1994). Lively et al. (1995) found that in their 
study of 30 siblings with a brother or sister with schizophrenia, 29 reported that the mental 
health problems experienced by their sibling had an impact on their relationship, with 26 
identifying great impact.
As with parents and spouses, sibling experiences have often been explained in terms of 
grief and loss (Johnson, 1988; Miller et al. 1990; Riebschleger, 1991; Titelman and Psyk, 
1991; Lively et al. 1995). However, more specifically in line with the literature on sibling 
bereavement, as with siblings of people with learning disabilities (Barr, 1997) and chronic 
illnesses (Altschuler, 1997), ‘survivor guilt’ is a recurrent theme for siblings of people with 
schizophrenia (Samuels and Chase, 1979; Titelman and Psyk, 1991). This is highlighted 
by Bank and Kahn (1982) who report that “many well siblings ask themselves, ‘By what 
right do I live a relatively normal life when my sibling suffers so much?”’ (p. 264). 
Furthermore, Samuels and Chase (1979) found that survivor guilt may be more common 
among younger siblings of brothers and sisters with schizophrenia, especially if they are of 
the same gender. As a result of this guilt, siblings may try to compensate by doing 
everything for their brother or sister with schizophrenia. This could lead to them
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becoming emotionally overinvolved. As Leff and Vaughn (1985) suggest, guilt, or in this 
case ‘survivor guilt’, is among the emotions which underlie emotional overinvolvement.
In addition to grief and survivor guilt, siblings, like parents, report subjective burden 
which for them can include fear, shame and anger. Fear has been described by siblings 
both as a consequence of witnessing peculiar and erratic behaviour (Samuels and Chase, 
1979; Harris, 1988) but also a fear that someone will be hurt as a result of their sibling’s 
violent behaviour (Johnson, 1988). Siblings also report fear that their brother or sister 
may relapse (Samuels and Chase, 1979; Harris, 1988; Titelman and Psyk, 1991) and fear 
over the hereditary nature of the condition. This extends to concerns about genetic 
transmission of the condition to their children (Schulz et al. 1982). Again this is 
congruent with experiences of siblings of people with learning disabilities (Barr, 1997). A 
sense of shame and embarrassment may occur on the part of siblings due to their brother’s 
or sister’s behaviour (Yarrow et al. 1955; Harris, 1988) which may lead to avoidance of 
public appearances with them (Hatfield, 1978; Link and Cullen, 1990). Feelings of anger 
may occur in both siblings of people with schizophrenia (Parker, 1993) and people with 
chronic illness (Altschuler, 1997) because they perceive that their needs are ignored whilst 
attention is focused on their brother or sister. Feelings such as fear, shame and anger in 
siblings of people with schizophrenia may manifest themselves in terms of critical 
comments towards their brother or sister.
In adulthood, siblings work to balance their allegiance to both their family of origin -and 
therefore their brother or sister with schizophrenia - and any new family or partner (Judge, 
1994). Consequently, sibling caregivers may struggle not only to meet the needs of their 
brother or sister but also to meet their own needs and desires and those of partners and 
children. Indeed, Bank and Kahn (1982) suggest that “for most people it is impossible to 
do a job well and care for a home, spouse and sibling [with schizophrenia]” (p.265). The 
difficulties of balancing the needs of their own family or partner with those of their sibling 
with schizophrenia may prompt them to become critical of their sibling. In addition Lively
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et al. (1995) found that siblings’ leisure activities were often adversely affected by an 
overriding preoccupation with their brother or sister with schizophrenia. This may 
suggest evidence of increased levels of emotional overinvolvement towards their sibling 
with schizophrenia. It seems clear from this that the pressure of balancing allegiances to 
different family members may have important implications for counselling psychologists 
when working therapeutically with siblings of people with schizophrenia.
Although social relationships characterised by integration, approval and reciprocal relating 
are perceived as helpful by people with serious mental health problems (Brier and Strauss, 
1984), the friendship provided by a sibling which may ordinarily involve these elements 
has a potential for conflict and tension when it involves a ‘caretaking’ or ‘rescuing’ role 
(Judge, 1994). The greater the involvement and responsibility required in assuming this 
role, the more likely it is to result in a difficulty in relating reciprocally and integrating with 
their brother or sister with schizophrenia. As a consequence, instead of such a role being 
helpful for the sibling with schizophrenia, it could lead to increased levels of criticism.
Further complications of the sibling caregiver role may occur depending on the timing 
with which they assume this role. If their parents had cared for their brother or sister with 
schizophrenia whilst they grew up and reached adulthood then there is evidence to suggest 
that they themselves may have been affected by this (Day and Kwitkowska, 1962; Hoover 
and Franz, 1972). Hoover and Franz (1972) found in a study of 30 people with 
schizophrenia and 57 of their siblings, that the ‘well’ sibling would function poorly and 
develop personal difficulties if they became entangled with their sibling’s interaction with 
the family. Furthermore, it was found that adolescents and young adults of siblings with 
schizophrenia appeared to be constricted emotionally (Day and Kwitkowska, 1962). This 
may be linked to the younger sibling’s constricted empathy development mentioned 
earlier. A sibling’s level of functioning, emotional stability and degree of maturity, whilst 
growing up with a brother or sister with schizophrenia, may therefore be impaired. 
Therefore if a sibling succeeds their parents and becomes a caregiver to their brother or
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sister with schizophrenia, their role may be influenced by these factors to a greater extent 
than siblings whose brother or sister has a later onset of symptoms.
Spouse/partner relationship
It has been suggested by Josselson (1992) that marriage represents a key and universal 
human need to feel cared for and to feel prioritised in another’s life; indeed this could be 
easily extended to included non-married partners. Such relationships often lead to marked 
dependency and close intimate encounters (Penrose, 1944; Slater and Woodside, 1951; 
Gregory, 1959; Ryle and Hamilton, 1962). However, when one member of the dyad 
experiences symptoms of schizophrenia, there may be a change in roles, behaviours and 
feelings between the couple.
Before trying to understand partners’ caregiving roles for people with schizophrenia, the 
obvious differences between partnerships and blood related family relationships should be 
acknowledged. In Western cultures there is a relatively ‘free’ choice of intimate partners, 
whereas we do not choose our parents or siblings. As a result, spouses or partners may 
feel less obligated to continue if the relationship is not satisfying and may find it easier to 
relinquish the role of caregiver than parents or siblings (Hooley, 1985). Indeed, rates of 
separation and divorce are high in couples in which one partner has schizophrenia 
(Erlenmeyer-Kimling et al. 1980; Fadden et al. 1987). However, even when separation or 
divorce is the outcome there often remains some continued involvement in a caring role 
(Mannion et al. 1994).
Akin to parental and sibling responses to schizophrenia, partners and spouses whose 
relationship began prior to the onset of the illness experience grief over the loss of the 
person that they once knew (Fadden et al. 1987; Noh and Avison, 1988; Miller et al. 
1990). More specifically, spouses or partners mourn the loss of companionship and 
intimacy (Strong, 1988). They may also experience financial burden, especially if the 
partner who is the primary wage earner experiences symptoms of schizophrenia (Mannion
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et al. 1994). Burden is likely to be further compounded if the couple have children in the 
home (Gibbons et al. 1984) and particularly if the carer is a woman (Noh and Avison, 
1988). Such burdens could lead to critical comments directed at the spouse or partner 
with schizophrenia. Couples with children in the home may present further potential for 
increased levels of BE, particularly if children are young and do not understand when their 
mother or father is displaying symptoms of schizophrenia. The pressure on the caregiving 
spouse or partner either to explain their partner’s behaviour or alternatively to attempt to 
hide their behaviour from the children may lead to criticism towards the person with 
schizophrenia.
Social isolation may also occur, as Hatfield (1978) describes, when “old relationships with 
other couples disintegrate”(p. 192). He attributes this to social life becoming difficult 
when “one is out of phase in too many ways with other persons of one’s developmental 
age” (ibid.). Similar feelings of social isolation and limited intimacy are reported by 
partners caring for a person after the diagnosis of chronic illness (Altschuler, 1997). It is 
possible that if the couple were to become socially isolated, the spouse or partner caring 
for the person with schizophrenia may blame them for the breakdown in their social 
relationships. This could lead to critical comments being directed at them.
One part of a relationship specific to a spouse or partner relationship is sexual intimacy. 
The prevailing biological understanding of schizophrenia and medication for the symptoms 
which have prompted this diagnosis may have important implications for sexual intimacy 
in this relationship dyad. The standard biological approach to schizophrenia suggests that 
it is caused by an increased number of dopamine receptors (Wyatt et al. 1988). Sexual 
arousal is mediated through parts of the brain which receive projections from dopamine 
pathways in the central nervous system (Segal, 1985). As a consequence, it may be 
expected that people with schizophrenia have increased libidinal drive (Lehmann, 1986). 
However, due to the common practice of antipsychotic (neuroleptic) drug therapy which 
blocks dopamine receptors, along with their indirect action on the pituitary-gonadal axis.
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there is often a decrease in sexual activity (Lehmann, 1986). Such medicinal effects may 
therefore play an important role in the intimate relationship between partners in a couple. 
A lack of understanding of these effects may lead to dissatisfaction on the part of the carer 
and potentially critical comments directed at their partner with schizophrenia. It may be 
easy to see how, for the spouse or partner relationship, such a specific and important area 
could be overlooked by counselling psychologists if therapeutic work is more generally 
designed with parents of people with schizophrenia in mind.
Literature on relationship dyads in depression.
In order to understand further how different relationships between a carer and a person 
with schizophrenia may affect EE status, it may be useful to draw upon the EE literature 
on other mental health problems. Studies have invoked the EE construct when 
researching other types of psychological disturbance such as depression, eating disorders, 
post-traumatic stress disorder, personality disorders and agoraphobia. Of these, however, 
it is only the literature on depression which is likely to provide a comparable source of 
information. This is due to issues regarding its course as well as possible flaws in the 
generalisation of the EE construct to other types of psychological problems, particularly 
the criticism category. Wearden et al. (2000) suggest that relatives may be more critical 
when the condition takes on an episodic course, i.e., periods of marked symptoms 
interspersed with periods of relative wellness, as opposed to mental health problems which 
have a more stable course. Also when adopting the EE construct for research into these 
other types of mental health problems, the established cut-off criterion for the criticism 
scale on the CFI (six or more comments) within the schizophrenia research leads to a 
classification of low-EE for the majority of carers (Wearden et al. 2000). Unless a clear 
theoretical rationale is provided for suggesting that different types of psychological 
disturbance prompt differing levels of sensitivity to criticism, the alteration of the cut-off 
criterion raises problems of interpretation and increases the chance of type I errors being 
made.
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It is the discussion in the literature on depression regarding the criticism criterion which 
provides potentially important information about the relationship between carers and 
people with schizophrenia. Vaughn and Leff (1976a) provided a rationale in their study to 
decrease the cut-off criterion (to 2 or more comments), suggesting that people with 
depression are, in some way, more sensitive to criticism than people with schizophrenia. 
They do not however specify the exact nature of this increased sensitivity. Data regarding 
this issue are lacking, although an unpublished study by Hooley (1984) provides no 
evidence that a person with depression is more sensitive to negative spouse behaviour. 
Subsequently, it was suggested that the difference in thresholds of criticism found between 
people with schizophrenia and people with depression is a reflection of domestic situation 
and not diagnosis (Hooley et al. 1986; Hooley and Richters, 1995). Hooley et al. (1986) 
acknowledged that there are participation differences between the two bodies of research 
in that there is a bias in the EE research with people with schizophrenia towards a parent 
caregiver, compared with the sole use of spousal caregivers in the depression literature. 
They went on to suggest two reasons why criticism from a spouse was more salient and 
more distressing than from a parent. Firstly, criticism from parents may be more habitual; 
for example, people may be used to or expect parents to point out their child’s deficits or 
faults. Secondly, the concern about and probability of the relationship ending may 
increase sensitivity to partner criticism (Hooley et al. 1986).
What becomes apparent from these suggestions is that the bias in the schizophrenia 
research on EE towards parent-child dyads may in fact be overlooking high levels of EE in 
other relationship dyads. A recent study provides further evidence for this theory. 
Hinrichsen and Pollack (1997) looked at relapse in 54 elderly people with depression, 
comparing EE and its relationship to outcome in two groups. As this study involved 
elderly people with depression the two groups comprised spousal dyads and adult children 
caring for their parent. They found that high-EE predicted increased rates of relapse and 
lower rates of complete and sustained recovery in parents than in spouses with depression. 
Although this study involves parent-child dyads, as the caregiver in the dyad is the adult
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child and not the parent, which is generally the case in schizophrenia research, it would be 
difficult to draw any parallels between parent-child dyads in each body of research. What 
is clear however, is that in comparing different relationship dyads differences are seen in 
the levels of EE, therefore suggesting that different relationships lead to different levels of 
emotions being expressed.
Without controlled studies to examine them these hypotheses remain speculative, although 
what is evident here is that quite different and specific issues are faced by each dyad when 
one member has schizophrenia. Some tentative hypotheses have been put forward to 
highlight how such differences may lead to different levels of criticism or emotional 
overinvolvement and therefore EE. Although it is acknowledged that changes in levels of 
EE specific to each relationship dyad may cancel each other out and therefore not affect 
overall EE status, this does not represent a good enough reason to group the three 
relationship dyads together when assessing EE. Instead, what we may have experienced in 
EE studies by grouping these relationship dyads together is a succession of over­
generalised conclusions. One possible reason for this is the search for high sample sizes in 
studies in order to prove that high-EE is a robust predictor of relapse.
What is called for in future studies examining EE is either a concentration on one 
relationship dyad or, perhaps more preferably, the assessment of differences in terms of 
levels of EE found between each type of dyad. By remaining non-specific when 
investigating EE and its predictive efficacy for relapse in these dyads, the first concern is 
that carers may be wrongly categorised as high-EE, especially when sensitivity to criticism 
may differ across dyads. Secondly, subsequent work with these dyads, such as in family 
intervention work (for reviews see Lam, 1991; Kuipers et al. 1992), is likely to address 
issues which are more suited to experiences of parents of people with schizophrenia and to 
fail to take into consideration the more specific experiences of other carers.
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Implications for Counselling Psychology
Beyond sensitivity to the differences between each relationship dyad for future research, it 
is important that counselling psychologists are aware of issues faced by people in different 
relationships with a person with schizophrenia, when working therapeutically with either 
member of the dyad. It is acknowledged that this relationship impacts on the course of 
schizophrenia and so, when facilitating the exploration and negotiation of this relationship, 
counselling psychologists should be attuned to the specific stressors that could potentially 
arise. In terms of aiding the reduction in levels of EE within relationships, Kavanagh’s 
(1992) interactional model draws upon the interpretations and coping skills each member 
of the dyad brings to bear on the other’s behaviour. Therefore better coping skills and 
interpretations of behaviour that attribute benign intent could achieve a reduction in levels 
ofEE.
Variations of the cognitive approach represent the current trend of working therapeutically 
with people with schizophrenia (e.g. Kingdon et al. 1994; Fowler et al. 1995; Chadwick et 
al. 1996; Drury et al. 1996; Kuipers et al. 1997). In order to reduce levels of EE, 
counselling psychologists may explore the client’s interpretations that he or she holds 
regarding their carer’s behaviour with the aim of reducing any negative feelings attributed 
to the behaviour. Unlike more traditional cognitive theory, in which, through socratic 
questioning (Overholser, 1993a, 1993b), the client is encouraged to come up with their 
own alternative interpretations, with this client group it is suggested that the person with 
schizophrenia is provided with alternative interpretations by the psychologist (Chadwick et 
al. 1996). Therefore, by understanding the similarities and differences between different 
relationship dyads, counselling psychologists will be able to modify any suggestions they 
make. For example, an awareness of how a spousal or partner relationship may involve 
increased sensitivity to criticism due to the chance of separation will enable the counselling 
psychologist not only to be sensitive to the underlying fear of separation but be mindful of 
this when suggesting alternative interpretations. Similarly, by being aware of the
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possibility of prior sibling rivalry in a sibling-sibling dyad the psychologist could draw 
upon the client’s experience of their sibling’s criticism and how this was previously 
interpreted in order to suggest alternative interpretations of their sibling’s behaviour.
The more specific knowledge of different relationship dyads will be important in similar 
ways when working on a group level with people with schizophrenia. In addition, the 
counselling psychologist can pitch their intervention, especially during psycho-educational 
aspects of the group, to all members of the group mindful of how experiences may be 
different for people within different dyads. This will guard against a concentration on 
issues which are more pertinent to adult children with schizophrenia and their parents, and 
instead address specific experiences of other relationship dyads as well.
In turning to reducing levels of EE when working with the relatives of people with 
schizophrenia, it is also beneficial for counselling psychologists to be aware of the 
similarities and differences highlighted in this review between different relationship dyads. 
Thus far the majority of work with relatives has been on a group basis and regularly 
consists of relatives from the different relationship dyads (for a review see Lam, 1991). It 
was acknowledged by Leff et al. (1982) in their controlled trial of family intervention, that 
within their ‘relatives’ group’ it was not possible to deal with the whole range of problems 
brought by different relatives. As a result, sessions with each family were included within 
the intervention. Although they do not specify the nature of the different problems which 
could not be addressed in the relatives’ group, it would seem likely that they included 
problems specific to different dyads. The implications for a counselling psychologist 
therefore, of being aware of the differences highlighted in this review between the dyads, 
are that the relatives’ group can be designed to allow time for specific concerns, held by 
the different dyads, to be elucidated. Far from wasting time, this educative process for 
those not directly experiencing the problems being addressed is likely to facilitate their 
understanding of the experiences of other members of their family. One consequence of 
this shared understanding for both psychologists and family members, is that they can
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work together to facilitate compensatory behaviour in other parts of the family system in 
order to maintain equilibrium which could in turn further promote the goal of reducing 
relapse rates.
When designing such groups what seems important across the dyads is feelings of loss and 
grief. Although in general, exploration of these feelings might be adequately addressed, 
more specific complications such as parent’s loss of hopes and aspirations, sibling’s 
survivor guilt and partner’s loss of companionship and intimacy should also be explored. 
Other specific complications which should be attended to also occur, for example the need 
for sibling caregivers to balance their allegiances between their own family and their 
sibling and the impact this may have on their level of EE. The danger of being ignorant of 
the specific differences such as these between different types of relationship dyad would be 
to miss some very real issues that relatives or carers may be dealing with. One specific 
example of this is if the intervention is pitched primarily at parents of adult children with 
schizophrenia; then, amongst other things, attention to potential sexual dissatisfaction for 
partners of people with schizophrenia is likely to be ignored. Along with not appropriately 
helping relatives with their concerns, the aim of reducing levels of EE may be jeopardised 
from the outset.
In addition, studies have shown that therapists in general may also rate as high-EE when 
working with a client with schizophrenia (Berkowitz and Leff, 1984; Stark and Siol, 
1994). It is always important for counselling psychologists to be aware of their 
countertransference feelings. Within this process, knowing that feelings of 
overinvolvement and criticism may be evident when working with people with 
schizophrenia is extremely helpfiil for the therapist. An understanding of specific 
experiences of people with schizophrenia in different relationships will enable the therapist 
to ascertain more accurately whether the countertransference is related to their own early 
experiences or a reflection of the client’s. This will aid the therapists monitoring of their 
own expressed emotion.
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Adjustments to the therapeutic interventions of both people with schizophrenia and their 
carers should not, however, ignore the consideration of conceptualising EE within a 
systemic framework. Although these suggestions may aid the therapeutic work of 
counselling psychologists working at present with individual members of such dyads, what 
this review points towards is a future progression of EE theorising and practical 
implementation in terms of viewing the family as a whole system and thus the introduction 
of family therapy. In the study noted earlier by Leff et al. (1982), the experimental group 
(N=12) also received family therapy based on systems theory with the aim of reducing 
levels of EE. In this group 9 percent of people with schizophrenia relapsed compared to 
50 percent in the control group (N=12). Despite the limited sample size, it can be seen 
from this study that important changes can be made through applying systems theory in 
this area. The concentration since this work however, when assessing EE, has tended to 
remain within a dyadic relationship. By highlighting the differences found between 
different relationship dyads and there effect on levels of EE, this review may serve to re- 
ignite the interest within the EE literature towards conceptualising EE within a systemic 
framework. This review presents the differences found between different dyads and the 
possible effects on EE. What is implicit in this is the potential knock on effect that one 
relationship dyad may have on other members or ‘elements’ of the family and therefore 
adds weight to the view that systemic thinking may enhance future treatment of such 
families. Expanding on the theoretical links made by Leff and colleagues between the 
predictive efficacy of relapse by EE and family therapy, in illustrating the differences found 
between relationship dyads, this review highlights possible areas of concern that each 
member of the family might bring to systemic therapy. What such an approach may 
achieve is the acknowledgement of all relationship influences on the person with 
schizophrenia instead of the therapeutic isolation of either individual or dyadic 
relationships. Such a move may lead to increased outcome results of therapeutic 
interventions with people with schizophrenia and their families.
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Conclusion
It seems that to date, the EE literature on carers of people with schizophrenia has failed to 
attend adequately to the specific experiences found in different relationship dyads. What 
can be seen from this review is that differences found between the dyadic relationships 
could lead to differing levels of EE. In light of this, closer attention should be given to the 
experiences of different relationship dyads both in future research but also in our work as 
counselling psychologists. Along with this increased understanding of different dyads, 
combining systems theory and EE intervention will be a useful guide to future work in EE. 
Whilst being mindful of the critiques raised about the concept of schizophrenia, by 
attending to both the symptoms of schizophrenia and the wider issues experienced, this 
review has presented a rationale for paying closer attention to experiences of specific 
relationship dyads and for further exploration to proceed.
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